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No. 125289
| City of Monroe, |
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Robert D. Goldstein (810) 695-3700 |
Plaintiff-Appellant, |
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vs (Appeal from Ct of Appeals) |
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(Monroe - LeBeau, M.) |
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| Helen Faith Jones, |
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David F. Grenn (734) 384-9700 |
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Oral argument on application
Click on link to view briefs in Adobe format:
Plaintiff-Appellant's Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Plaintiff-Appellant's Supplemental Brief>>
Defendant-Appellee's Brief in Opposition>>
The Ability Center of Greater Toledo Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law>>
Background
This case concerns interpretation of the Michigan vehicle code and raises an issue that has potential implications for the regulation of handicapped parking throughout the State. Over a one-year period beginning in September 2000, the City of Monroe issued more than 200 tickets that cited Helen Faith Jones, a disabled driver, for violating a local ordinance. The ordinance in question states that "[n]o person shall park a vehicle in the unmetered areas of the city continuously for a period of more than one hour where one-hour parking limits are posted." Jones argues that the tickets cannot be enforced against her. She points to a provision in the Michigan vehicle code, MCL 257.675(6), which states that a disabled person is entitled to "courtesy [that] shall relieve the disabled person . . . from liability for a violation with respect to parking, other than in violation of [the vehicle code]." Jones argues that the tickets issued by the City of Monroe cited the local ordinance, not the Michigan vehicle code, and she contends that § 675(6) prevents the city from enforcing its local ordinance. The district court and circuit court ruled that the city could enforce its local ordinance against Jones, despite § 675(6), but the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion. The city appeals. It argues that its local ordinance reflects the Michigan vehicle code parking restrictions, and that it does not matter whether the tickets issued to Jones cited the Michigan vehicle code or the local ordinance. The city further argues that the Court of Appeals decision misinterprets the scope of § 675(6) and has the effect of nullifying local parking ordinances as they apply to disabled persons.
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