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No. 133433
| Amanda Jean Odom, |
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Raymond S. Sakis |
Plaintiff-Appellee, |
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Jason R. Sakis |
| v |
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals) |
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(Wayne - Giovan, W.) |
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| Wayne County and City of Detroit, |
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Defendants, |
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| and |
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| Christine Kelly, |
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Mark J. Zausmer |
| Defendant-Appellant. |
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Carson J. Tucker |
| __________________________________________ |
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Click to view briefs in Adobe format:
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief>>
Attorney General's Post-Argument Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Association of Police Organizations' Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Municipal League Liability and Property Pool and Michigan Municipal League's Amici Curiae Brief>>
Michigan Municipal Risk Management Authority's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Wayne County Prosecutor's Office's Amicus Curiae Brief>>
Background
Christine Kelly, a Wayne County deputy sheriff, was conducting an official surveillance for the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department Morality Unit in a stretch of Woodward Avenue frequented by prostitutes. Kelly observed Amanda Jean Odom walking in the area and suspected her of prostitution. Odom entered a car in a parking lot, was taken to a store, returned to the car after exiting the store, and left in the car. Other officers stopped the car at Kelly’s direction. Although the car contained three women and a baby, and Odom was allegedly wearing her American Red Cross identification badge because she had just left work, Kelly gave Odom a ticket for disorderly conduct. The charge was later dismissed, and then reissued, and then dismissed again. Odom sued Kelly, the city of Detroit, and Wayne County for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution; the city and county were dismissed on governmental immunity grounds shortly after the suit was filed. Kelly moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.11(C)(7), contending that she too was entitled to have the case against her dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. Kelly cited MCL 691.1407(2), which provides that, “each officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service” if the employee believes that she is acting within the scope of her authority, the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function, and the employee’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. MCL 691.1407(3) states that subsection (2) “does not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986.” The trial court denied Kelly’s motion, concluding that the facts relating to whether she had probable cause to arrest Odom were in dispute. Kelly filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The appeals court concluded that Odom’s complaint alleged that Kelly committed intentional torts. Therefore, the relevant standard was whether Kelly’s intentional acts were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, the appellate panel reasoned. Given the conflicting accounts of the incident, the Court of Appeals said, the trial court could not determine as a matter of law that Kelly’s conduct was “objectively reasonable.” Kelly sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which initially denied leave to appeal, but then granted Kelly’s motion for reconsideration and granted leave to appeal.
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