No. 134461

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Background
In 1979, Alice J. Raymond and her husband Claude, who did not have any children, made mirror-image wills, in which each of them provided that – after taxes, funeral costs, and administrative expenses – the rest of the property should pass to the surviving spouse. Ms. Raymond’s will also provided that if she died after her husband, the residue of her estate should pass as follows:

“A. Fifty (50%) per cent thereof to my brother [sic] and sisters that survive me share and share alike or to the survivor or survivors thereof.
B. Fifty (50%) per cent thereof to the brothers and sisters of my husband that survive me share and share alike or to the survivor or survivors thereof.”

There was a similar provision in Claude Raymond’s will. Ms. Raymond had eight siblings, as did her husband.

When Ms. Raymond died on February 27, 2005, her husband had already died. Five of her siblings, and three of her husband’s, were alive at the time of her death. The estate’s total assets amounted to $796,796.31.

In June 2005, Clair Morse, one of Ms. Raymond’s brothers, filed a petition for probate. A month later, he petitioned the probate court, asking the court to interpret paragraphs A and B to mean that only the surviving siblings of Ms. Raymond and her husband could inherit the residue of the estate, with 50 percent going to Ms. Raymond’s surviving siblings and 50 percent to her husband’s. This meant, he contended, that no share could go to the descendants of the couple’s deceased siblings. The language of the will was unambiguous and demonstrated that Ms. Raymond used that wording deliberately to avoid an outcome where anyone other than a surviving sibling would inherit, her brother maintained.

But the respondents in this case, who are descendants of the predeceased siblings, argued that Ms. Raymond intended for them to inherit also, and that the court should interpret the will to mean that they could take their deceased ancestors’ share by representation. The respondents contended that the phrases “that survive me” and “or to the survivor or survivors thereof” created an ambiguity in the will, and that “survivor or survivors thereof” could include siblings’ descendants. To adopt Mr. Morse’s interpretation would mean that, if all the siblings on one side of the family died, the other side of the family could take the entire residue of the estate, the respondents said; such a result would be contrary to Ms. Raymond’s intent that each side of the family would receive an equal one-half share of the estate, they argued.

At a hearing on November 21, 2005, the probate court agreed with Mr. Morse, denying the respondents a share of the estate. The respondents appealed by right, but in a 2-1 decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court. The Court of Appeals majority said that the phrase “that survive me” showed that the will “clearly limits the class of devisees to the siblings still alive at [Ms. Raymond’s] death.” The “share and share alike” language also indicated that the class was limited to surviving siblings, the majority said. The majority rejected the respondents’ argument Ms. Raymond must have intended for each side of the family to take an equal one-half share of the estate; the will’s terms, not speculation about Ms. Raymond’s intentions, must govern the interpretation of the will, the majority indicated. The language of the residue clause indicated that Ms. Raymond did not wish to leave the estate to anyone other than her and her husband’s siblings, the majority concluded.

But the dissenting judge said that the will’s plain language showed that Ms. Raymond’s estate should be shared by both the surviving siblings and the surviving descendants of predeceased siblings. Interpreting the phrase “or to the survivor or survivors thereof” to mean only surviving siblings is illogical, the dissent said, because the phrase “that survive me” already made that point. The “survivors thereof” clause must therefore refer to someone else, the only logical group being the descendants of predeceased siblings – their survivors, said the dissenting judge. The language “share and share alike” did not pertain to who could inherit, but only affected the proportion each beneficiary could receive, the dissent reasoned. And the 50 percent-division language clearly showed that Ms. Raymond intended for the two families to share equally, the dissent said, which could only happen if descendants of predeceased siblings were allowed to share in the residue.

The respondents appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.

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