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Number

At Issue

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People
v
Richmond (Edwin)
136648
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People
v
Wilcox (Larry)
136956
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Shepherd Montessori
v
Ann Arbor Charter Twp
137443
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Superior Hotels
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Township of Mackinaw
138696
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Berkeypile
v
Westfield Ins
137353
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Allen
v
Bloomfield Hills Sch District
137607
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Myers
v
Muffler Man Supply Co
137608
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State Farm
v
Hudson
137698
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Bezeau
v
Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc.
137500
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Brewer
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A.D. Transport Express
139068
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Lee
v
City of Detroit
138091
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Robinson
v
City of Lansing
138669
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Lenawee Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs
v
St Auto Prop & Cas Ins
137667
137668
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Calendar
Number

At Issue

Status

The plaintiff’s property adjoins the defendant township’s gravel mining district and contains a large gravel deposit. Invoking the “no very serious consequences” rule of Silva v Ada Township, 416 Mich 153 (1982), the plaintiff obtained an injunction barring the township from enforcing an ordinance that prohibits gravel mining on her property.  The township appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. Was the “no very serious consequences” rule of Silva superseded by the enactment of MCL 125.297a? Does the Silva rule violate the separation of powers doctrine by providing enhanced judicial review of local zoning decisions? Does the rule impermissibly shift the burden of proof onto the local government to defend its zoning policy?

Background:

The plaintiffs, owners of a parcel of vacant land, sued Putnam Township after the township denied their request to rezone the property from agricultural to residential use. The trial court found the current zoning to be unconstitutional “as applied” to the plaintiffs’ property, and ruled that the township could not interfere with reasonable use of the parcel as a manufactured housing community. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs costs and expert witness fees, but denied attorney fees. After the parties appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed as to the constitutional “as applied” claim, but affirmed the trial court’s other rulings. Does a rule of finality apply to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim? If so, did the Court of Appeals properly hold that the finality requirement was excused due to futility? Did the trial court err in ordering the township not to interfere with the plaintiffs’ proposed use of their property for a manufactured housing community when the plaintiffs withdrew their application for that use? To support a claim that a zoning ordinance unconstitutionally excludes a lawful use, must the plaintiffs show that there is a need for that use? Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding the plaintiffs their costs and expert witness fees?

Background:

The plaintiff in this case was in a group therapy session with her psychiatrist when a former patient, who had been a member of the therapy group, came into the office and fatally shot the psychiatrist. The gunman killed another patient, and wounded the plaintiff and another patient, before turning the gun on himself. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against the psychiatrist’s estate, his professional corporation, and another physician in the practice. She claimed in part, citing MCL 330.1946, that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the former patient presented a danger to other members of the therapy group. She also asserted a common-law medical malpractice claim, asserting that the defendants breached the standard of care by placing a dangerous patient in group therapy and failing to take reasonable steps for the plaintiff’s protection. There is no dispute that the gunman never threatened the plaintiff directly. Does the plaintiff have a claim under MCL 330.1946? Does the statute preempt all common law causes of action for failure to warn or protect?

Background:

October 21, 2009, Order>>

Background:

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limits the dissemination of protected health information and preempts state law that is less restrictive. Before HIPAA was enacted, Michigan law held that a claimant in a medical malpractice case waived the physician-patient privilege, and that defense counsel could interview the plaintiff’s treating physicians without the plaintiff’s attorney being present. HIPAA, however, precludes the disclosure of protected health information in the absence of patient consent, notice to the patient and an opportunity to object, or a court order. In this published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that ex parte interviews are permissible if a protective order is issued. Did the Court of Appeals correctly decide the case?

Background:

The defendant was accused of having sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl. A jury convicted him of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, but the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the prosecutor elicited extensive testimony from a police detective that the defendant failed to respond to certain accusations regarding the assault and abruptly left an interview. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the conviction. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted the defendant a new trial? Did the trial court err in admitting the police detective’s testimony? Did the defendant waive any error when his attorney expressed satisfaction with the trial court’s instructions to the jury?

Background:

This case involves a property tax refund claim. In 2002, 2003 and 2004, the Detroit Public Schools collected school operating property taxes from non-residential property owners at a rate that had not been approved by the voters as required by Proposal A. In 2005, a claimant sought a refund of the excess tax, but the state Tax Tribunal dismissed the claim, saying that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because it was not filed within 30 days of when the tax was levied, as required by the Tax Tribunal Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that there had been a mutual mistake of fact between the city tax assessor and the taxpayers. Because MCL 211.53a provides a three-year limitations period for claims of mutual mistake of fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that the claim was timely and that the Tax Tribunal had jurisdiction. Did the Court of Appeals clearly err in concluding that there was a mutual mistake of fact between the assessor and the taxpayers?

Background:

Shortly before the statute of limitations on her medical malpractice claim expired, the plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to the defendant physician’s former business address. She had seen the doctor a number of times at his newer business address, where he had practiced for about two years. Someone at the former address forwarded the notice of intent to the doctor. Was the plaintiff’s case correctly dismissed? To what location must a notice of intent be sent in order to comply with MCL 600.2912b(2)?

Background:

The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and was sentenced to 20 to 75 and 30 to 75 years in prison, respectively. The minimum sentence guidelines range was calculated for the criminal sexual conduct conviction but not the assault conviction. Among other things, the defendant objected that no guidelines range was calculated for the assault conviction. The Court of Appeals found no error. Is the trial court obligated under the guidelines to score all felonies or only the highest class felony?

Background:

The defendant was caught in a police raid, in his bedroom with a plate of narcotics hidden under his bed and two firearms in a dresser drawer among residency documents linking him to the home. At the time of the raid, his wife was on the front porch and his 10-year-old son was on the living room couch. There was no evidence of the child’s involvement in any crime. The defendant was convicted of doing an act that tended to cause a child to become neglected or delinquent so as to tend to come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court, MCL 750.145. Is evidence that a child was present in the home when the defendant was in possession of concealed drugs and weapons legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction?

Background:

The defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery, fleeing and eluding, larceny from a motor vehicle, and driving with a suspended license. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note asking to be instructed concerning an “inadvertent assault.” The judge, who was not the judge who tried the case, proceeded without calling the defendant into the courtroom or making a record. The judge later reported that he told the jurors to rely on the instructions they had already been given, and to work through those instructions to come to their own conclusions. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions, finding structural error because the question involved a substantive issue concerning the law that the jury was to apply. A dissenting judge would have found that the communication was administrative because the judge merely told the jurors to use the instructions they had already been given. Did the Court of Appeals properly decide the case?

Background:

The plaintiff’s income tax records show that he was paid by Robinson Roofing as a non-employee. Relying on these records, the worker’s compensation magistrate concluded that the plaintiff was not an employee under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, and denied the plaintiff’s request for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC’s ruling, holding that the magistrate erred in focusing on the plaintiff’s income tax records when deciding the question of whether plaintiff was an employee. Did the Court of Appeals properly decide the case?

Background:

Under collective bargaining agreements with the Michigan Education Association, various public school districts administer a payroll deduction plan for the MEA’s political action committee. The Secretary of State concluded that the school districts’ administration of the payroll deduction plan amounted to a “contribution” or expenditure” of public funds, in violation of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. Does section 57(1) of the act, MCL 169.257(1), prohibit a school district from expending government resources for such a payroll deduction plan if the costs of the plan are prepaid by the MEA? Does a school district have the authority to collect and deliver payroll deductions for such contributions?

Background:

In this first-party no-fault insurance case, a jury awarded the plaintiff more than $1.3 million in attendant care benefits, as well as no-fault penalty interest. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that 12 percent no-fault penalty interest under MCL 500.3142 does not continue to accrue through the satisfaction of judgment, but ceases to accrue once a judgment is entered?

Background:

The defendant supplied the transportation and money for his girlfriend’s purchase of heroin and crack cocaine. She gave some heroin to the 22-year-old victim, who died of an overdose. A Washtenaw district court bound the defendant over to circuit court on charges that included delivery of heroin causing death, MCL 750.317a, and delivery of less than 50 grams of heroin. The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to quash both charges due to lack of “delivery.” In a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Do the defendant’s actions in this case fall within the scope of MCL 750.317a?

Background: