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People
v
Houthoofd
( Todd)
138959
138969
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People
v
Gursky (Jason)
137251
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Pelligrino
v
AMPCO
Parking
137111
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Smith
v
Anonymous
Joint
Enterprise
138456
138457
138458
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Lighthouse
Place Development
v
Moorings
Ass'n
139015
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Foster
v
Wolkowitz
139872
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First
Industrial
v
Treasury
139748
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In Re
Abdullah
139586
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People
v
Mushatt
(Ledell)
139413
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People
v
Hercules-
Lopez
(Marco)
139537
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The plaintiff was injured at work when a co-worker backed a truck over his left ankle. Under MCL 500.3135(1), a person may maintain a lawsuit for non-economic damages arising from the ownership, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle by showing that he suffered a “serious impairment of body function . . . .” If a court finds an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function, it must then determine whether the impairment affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. MCL 500.3135(7). In Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004), the Supreme Court held that, if the “course or trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not been affected, then the plaintiff’s ‘general ability’ to lead his normal life has not been affected and he does not meet the ‘serious impairment of body function’ threshold.” In this case, the plaintiff sought to establish that he suffered a serious impairment of body function, but the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, based on Kreiner. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 decision. Did the plaintiff suffer a “serious impairment of body function”? Should the Michigan Supreme Court reconsider its ruling in Kreiner?

Background:

A husband was often absent in the years preceding his wife’s death. He did not see her in the 18 months before her death, nor did he attend her funeral. The wife’s will disinherited her husband and left everything to her sister, who obtained a probate court ruling that the husband was not a “surviving spouse” pursuant to MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i). The sister, on behalf of the estate, then argued that the husband could not succeed to ownership of the property that he and the wife had owned during their marriage as tenants by the entireties. In the alternative, the sister argued that the husband must reimburse the estate for his share of the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments that his wife made on the property while he was absent. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled that the husband succeeded to ownership of the property, and that the wife’s estate could not claim contribution from him. Must the husband reimburse the estate for his share of the payments that his wife made?

Background:

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant physicians mismanaged his medical care, causing him to suffer a stroke. The plaintiff’s expert acknowledged that the likelihood of the plaintiff suffering a stroke without treatment was small (10 to 20 percent), but testified that if the plaintiff had received proper treatment, the risk would have been reduced by 50 percent or more, so that the risk of stroke would have been 5 to 10 percent or less. The defendants moved for summary disposition on the issue of proximate cause. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Is this a “lost opportunity” case, such that the requirements in the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) apply? If so, how should that sentence be interpreted? If not, did the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact with regard to proximate cause?

Background:

The plaintiff claims that her physician failed to timely diagnose her breast cancer, reducing her opportunity to survive and subjecting her to more invasive medical treatment. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert oncologist, determining that the expert’s testimony was not admissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence 702. The trial court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible, but also noting that, under Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53 (2001), a living plaintiff may not recover for the loss of an opportunity to survive based on a decrease in her life expectancy. Did the lower courts err in finding that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible under MRE 702? Was Wickens correctly decided?

Background:

The plaintiffs each sued their former employer, Fifth Third Bank, in Wayne County, alleging that the bank’s termination of their employment violated Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. The bank filed motions to transfer both cases to Oakland County, arguing that it made the decisions to end the plaintiffs’ employment at its Oakland County corporate headquarters. The circuit court denied the motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a split opinion.  Did the Court of Appeals majority correctly determine that the alleged violations “occurred” only in Oakland County, where the decisions to terminate the plaintiffs were made, rather than in Wayne County, where the plaintiffs worked and where the plaintiffs learned of the bank’s decision?

Background:

The defendants in these cases are alleged to have viewed child sexually abusive material on the Internet. When the defendants’ computers were examined, there were images of child pornography stored in temporary Internet files. Each defendant argued that there was no evidence that he knew that the pornographic images had been transferred to the temporary Internet files, and that he did not “knowingly” possess the images, as required by MCL 750.145c(4). The Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants were properly charged under MCL 750.145c(4). Does intentionally accessing and viewing child sexually abusive material on the Internet constitute “knowing possession” of such material under MCL 750.145c(4)? May the presence of temporary Internet files on a computer hard drive amount to “knowing possession” of child sexually abusive material or be circumstantial evidence that a defendant “knowingly possessed” such material in the past?

Background:

The defendants in these cases are alleged to have viewed child sexually abusive material on the Internet. When the defendants’ computers were examined, there were images of child pornography stored in temporary Internet files. Each defendant argued that there was no evidence that he knew that the pornographic images had been transferred to the temporary Internet files, and that he did not “knowingly” possess the images, as required by MCL 750.145c(4). The Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants were properly charged under MCL 750.145c(4). Does intentionally accessing and viewing child sexually abusive material on the Internet constitute “knowing possession” of such material under MCL 750.145c(4)? May the presence of temporary Internet files on a computer hard drive amount to “knowing possession” of child sexually abusive material or be circumstantial evidence that a defendant “knowingly possessed” such material in the past?

Background:

The defendant downloaded child pornography from web sites to CDs and was charged and convicted of “arranging for, producing, making, or financing” child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145(c)(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Does a person who downloads child sexually abusive material from the Internet, or who burns a CD-R of such downloaded material, fall within the scope of MCL 750.145c(2), which criminalizes “mak[ing]” or “produc[ing]” child sexually abusive material? How does the Court of Appeals interpretation of MCL 750.145c(2) interact with the prohibition in MCL 750.145c(4) on the “possession” of child sexually abusive materials? Does the Court of Appeals interpretation of MCL 750.145c(2) have legal consequences for other criminal offenses that involve downloading material from the Internet? Did the trial court correctly find that the defendant committed three or more contemporaneous felonious acts for purposes of scoring Offense Variable 12?

Background:

The plaintiff sued police officers from Melvindale and Allen Park for assault and battery. The plaintiff and the Allen Park officers accepted a case evaluation regarding those officers’ liability, but the plaintiff rejected the evaluation with respect to the Melvindale officers. The plaintiff’s settlement agreement with the Allen Park officers released “all other persons” from any liability arising out of the assault. The Melvindale officers then moved to dismiss the case against them, arguing that the settlement agreement released them from liability. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the release absolved all defendants of liability pursuant to Romska v Opper, 234 Mich App 512 (1999). Was Romska correctly decided?

Background:

After the plaintiff sued her church and its pastor for negligence, the pastor accused her of fraud and malingering. The plaintiff sought damages for the pastor’s statements, adding claims of slander, libel, and false light to her lawsuit. The defendants argued that the pastor’s statements were protected by a qualified privilege because they were communications among church members. Accordingly, the plaintiff had to show that the pastor acted with actual malice when he made the statements, the defendants contended. The trial court did not instruct the jury on the defendants’ qualified privilege theory, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals vacated the jury’s verdict on the slander, libel, and false light claims, and remanded the case for a new trial. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a qualified privilege applied to the pastor’s statements. Does the duty or interest giving rise to the qualified privilege apply to all church members, or only to members who are decision-makers engaged in the conduct of church business? When does the qualified privilege cease to apply with regard to persons who are no longer church members? If an instruction on qualified privilege was required, was the failure to give the instruction harmless?

Background:

The defendant was convicted of armed robbery (for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 108 to 240 months) and two counts of felonious assault (for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 48 to 96 months). The Court of Appeals affirmed the armed robbery conviction, but vacated the two felonious assault convictions. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that this changed the defendant’s sentencing guidelines range for the armed robbery conviction from 108-270 months to 51-127 months, it determined that the defendant was not entitled to resentencing. Is the defendant is entitled to resentencing where his minimum sentence is within the corrected guidelines sentence range?

Background:

The plaintiffs sued the defendant, which filed a motion for summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion. But it also ruled sua sponte that, based on the evidence that the plaintiffs presented in their response to the motion, the plaintiffs’ claim, as a matter of law, did not allege an amount in controversy in excess of the circuit court’s $25,000 jurisdictional threshold. The circuit court then remanded the case to the district court. Did the circuit court violate Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 1998-1 by remanding the case based on its review of documents the plaintiffs submitted with their motion response?

Background:

While the respondent-father was incarcerated, his two children were removed from their biological mother’s home on a Child Protective Services petition; eventually, the family court terminated both parents’ parental rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s ruling; shortly after the Court of Appeals ruled, the respondent-father was released from prison. Under the circumstances of this case, did the trial court clearly err in terminating the respondent-father’s parental rights?

Background:

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Number

At Issue

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People
v
Richmond (Edwin)
136648
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After the trial court made an unfavorable evidentiary ruling, the prosecutor dismissed all charges against the defendant. The prosecutor appealed the unfavorable ruling to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and reinstated the charges against the defendant. Did the prosecutor’s dismissal of the charges in the trial court render moot the prosecutor’s subsequent appeal?

Background:

People
v
Wilcox (Larry)
136956
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The defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The minimum sentence guidelines were calculated to be 27 to 56 months. Because the defendant had a prior conviction for criminal sexual conduct, he was sentenced as a repeat offender under MCL 750.520f, which mandated a minimum sentence of at least five years. The defendant was sentenced to 10 to 40 years in prison. Do the legislative sentencing guidelines apply when a criminal statute, such as MCL 750.520f, sets forth its own mandatory minimum sentence? Is the defendant entitled to be resentenced?

Background:

Shepherd Montessori
v
Ann Arbor Charter Twp
137443
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The defendants denied the plaintiff’s request for a variance to allow a Catholic Montessori school to operate in an office park zoning district. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging denial of equal protection and other causes of action. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition on its equal protection claim. Did the Court of Appeals apply the correct standard of review in determining that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s right to equal protection? Did the defendants violate the plaintiff’s right to equal protection in denying the plaintiff’s request for a variance?

Background:

Superior Hotels
v
Township of Mackinaw
138696
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The petitioner built a motel complex on property that it owned. The respondent recorded the assessed value of the property on the assessment roll, but failed to increase the taxable value of the property. When this came to light, the respondent asked the State Tax Commission to order a correction to the taxable value of the property pursuant to MCL 211.154(1), which permits correction of the assessed value of property incorrectly reported or omitted from the assessment roll. The STC made the correction, but the Tax Tribunal reversed, ruling that the STC had no jurisdiction to make the correction because the property was not improperly reported or omitted from the assessment roll, and the assessment value was correctly recorded. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Tribunal’s decision. Does the State Tax Commission have jurisdiction, pursuant to MCL 211.154(1), to correct the taxable value of real property erroneously recorded on the local assessment roll?

Background:

Berkeypile
v
Westfield Ins
137353
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The plaintiff, who was injured in a five-vehicle accident, settled with three drivers for $325,500. The plaintiff then sued her insurer, seeking uninsured motorist benefits based on the negligence of the two drivers who could not be identified. The insurer denied liability because the plaintiff’s total settlement exceeded her $300,000 uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court granted summary disposition for the insurer, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion that interprets the uninsured motorist endorsement as affording coverage in excess of the settlements, so long as the plaintiff’s total damages exceed the settlements. Did the Court of Appeals correctly interpret the contract?

Background:

Allen
v
Bloomfield Hills Sch District
137607
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A train collided with a school bus that maneuvered around a lowered safety gate to enter the railroad crossing. No children were on the bus. The train engineer sued the school district, claiming that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder because he thought at the time that he had injured or killed children. The school district moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on governmental immunity, asserting that the plaintiff had not suffered a “bodily injury” within the meaning of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. The trial court granted the motion but the Court of Appeals reversed in a split published opinion. Does post-traumatic stress disorder qualify as a “bodily injury”?

Background:

Myers
v
Muffler Man Supply Co
137608
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The plaintiff’s right arm was amputated when he reached into a soil screening machine, which had not been fully shut off, to clean it. The plaintiff claims that the company that supplied the machine is liable for his injuries, and that the company acted negligently when it removed a machine guard; that alleged negligence caused his injury, the plaintiff contends. The trial court concluded that there were disputed questions of fact, and it denied the company’s motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed. Was the defendant’s allegedly negligent act of removing the machine guard a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury?

Background:

State Farm
v
Hudson
137698
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The plaintiff insurance company sued the defendant to recover funds that the insurer had paid on an insurance claim. The trial court permitted substituted service. The defendant did not respond to the lawsuit, and the plaintiff obtained a default judgment. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, and its ruling was affirmed on appeal. Was the substituted service proper? Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment?

Background:

Bezeau
v
Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc.
137500
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In 2000, the plaintiff, a resident of Canada, was injured in Maine. He sought Michigan worker’s compensation benefits. In 2007, while his case was pending, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the worker’s compensation act’s statute concerning jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries, MCL 418.845, as giving Michigan jurisdiction over an out-of-state injury if the contract of hire was made in Michigan and the claimant was a resident of Michigan at the time of injury. Karaczewski v Farbman Stein Co, 478 Mich 28 (2007). Should MCL 418.845’s jurisdictional standard, as interpreted in Karaczewski, be applied in this case?

Background:

Brewer
v
A.D. Transport Express
139068
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A magistrate found that the plaintiff, a Michigan resident who suffered a work-related injury in Ohio, failed to meet his burden of proving that his contract of hire with the defendant employer was made in Michigan. The plaintiff’s petition for worker’s compensation benefits was therefore dismissed. The plaintiff argues that 2008 PA 499, which gives jurisdiction to the worker’s compensation agency for an out-of-state injury either if the claimant was a resident of Michigan at the time of the injury or if the contract of hire was made in Michigan, should be retroactively applied to his case. Should the legislative change to MCL 418.845, 2008 PA 499, be applied to this case?

Background:

Lee
v
City of Detroit
138091
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The plaintiff, a police commander, was transferred from the Gang Enforcement Section of the police department to the Records and Identification Section. He sued, claiming that his transfer was in response to an internal complaint that he filed against his commander, and that his transfer violated the Whistleblower Protection Act. In response, the chief of police filed an affidavit asserting that the plaintiff was transferred because he provided a poor response to her request for intelligence about Detroit’s gangs. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Did the plaintiff establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his internal complaint led to his transfer?

Background:

Robinson
v
City of Lansing
138669
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The plaintiff tripped and fell on a sidewalk adjacent to a state trunk line highway. She sued the city under the highway exception to governmental immunity. The city sought to have the case dismissed, relying on the “two-inch rule” in MCL 691.1402a(2), which provides that a sidewalk with a discontinuity defect of less than two inches creates a rebuttable presumption that the municipality maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair. But the trial court denied the city’s motion, holding that § 1402a(2) applies only to county highways. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that subsection (2) is not limited to county highways. Did the Court of Appeals properly interpret § 1402a(2)?

Background:

Lenawee Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs
v
St Auto Prop & Cas Ins
137667
137668
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The plaintiff sued two defendants in 2005, and in 2007 amended its complaint to add the defendants’ insurers. The insurers argued that the claims against them were untimely, and they filed motions for summary disposition, seeking to dismiss the claims based on the no-fault act’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the insurers were involved with the defense of the case from the beginning, and that the amendment should relate back to the date that the complaint was originally filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, based on Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102 (2007), which held that the relation-back doctrine does not extend to the addition of new parties, even if the new party had notice of the claim when it was initially filed, and the new party and the initially named party had substantively identical interests. Was Miller properly decided? Are the insurers entitled to summary disposition?

Background:

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At Issue

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The plaintiff’s property adjoins the defendant township’s gravel mining district and contains a large gravel deposit. Invoking the “no very serious consequences” rule of Silva v Ada Township, 416 Mich 153 (1982), the plaintiff obtained an injunction barring the township from enforcing an ordinance that prohibits gravel mining on her property.  The township appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. Was the “no very serious consequences” rule of Silva superseded by the enactment of MCL 125.297a? Does the Silva rule violate the separation of powers doctrine by providing enhanced judicial review of local zoning decisions? Does the rule impermissibly shift the burden of proof onto the local government to defend its zoning policy?

Background:

The plaintiffs, owners of a parcel of vacant land, sued Putnam Township after the township denied their request to rezone the property from agricultural to residential use. The trial court found the current zoning to be unconstitutional “as applied” to the plaintiffs’ property, and ruled that the township could not interfere with reasonable use of the parcel as a manufactured housing community. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs costs and expert witness fees, but denied attorney fees. After the parties appealed, the Court of Appeals reversed as to the constitutional “as applied” claim, but affirmed the trial court’s other rulings. Does a rule of finality apply to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim? If so, did the Court of Appeals properly hold that the finality requirement was excused due to futility? Did the trial court err in ordering the township not to interfere with the plaintiffs’ proposed use of their property for a manufactured housing community when the plaintiffs withdrew their application for that use? To support a claim that a zoning ordinance unconstitutionally excludes a lawful use, must the plaintiffs show that there is a need for that use? Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding the plaintiffs their costs and expert witness fees?

Background:

The plaintiff in this case was in a group therapy session with her psychiatrist when a former patient, who had been a member of the therapy group, came into the office and fatally shot the psychiatrist. The gunman killed another patient, and wounded the plaintiff and another patient, before turning the gun on himself. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against the psychiatrist’s estate, his professional corporation, and another physician in the practice. She claimed in part, citing MCL 330.1946, that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the former patient presented a danger to other members of the therapy group. She also asserted a common-law medical malpractice claim, asserting that the defendants breached the standard of care by placing a dangerous patient in group therapy and failing to take reasonable steps for the plaintiff’s protection. There is no dispute that the gunman never threatened the plaintiff directly. Does the plaintiff have a claim under MCL 330.1946? Does the statute preempt all common law causes of action for failure to warn or protect?

Background:

October 21, 2009, Order>>

Background:

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limits the dissemination of protected health information and preempts state law that is less restrictive. Before HIPAA was enacted, Michigan law held that a claimant in a medical malpractice case waived the physician-patient privilege, and that defense counsel could interview the plaintiff’s treating physicians without the plaintiff’s attorney being present. HIPAA, however, precludes the disclosure of protected health information in the absence of patient consent, notice to the patient and an opportunity to object, or a court order. In this published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that ex parte interviews are permissible if a protective order is issued. Did the Court of Appeals correctly decide the case?

Background:

The defendant was accused of having sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl. A jury convicted him of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, but the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial because the prosecutor elicited extensive testimony from a police detective that the defendant failed to respond to certain accusations regarding the assault and abruptly left an interview. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the conviction. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted the defendant a new trial? Did the trial court err in admitting the police detective’s testimony? Did the defendant waive any error when his attorney expressed satisfaction with the trial court’s instructions to the jury?

Background:

This case involves a property tax refund claim. In 2002, 2003 and 2004, the Detroit Public Schools collected school operating property taxes from non-residential property owners at a rate that had not been approved by the voters as required by Proposal A. In 2005, a claimant sought a refund of the excess tax, but the state Tax Tribunal dismissed the claim, saying that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because it was not filed within 30 days of when the tax was levied, as required by the Tax Tribunal Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that there had been a mutual mistake of fact between the city tax assessor and the taxpayers. Because MCL 211.53a provides a three-year limitations period for claims of mutual mistake of fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that the claim was timely and that the Tax Tribunal had jurisdiction. Did the Court of Appeals clearly err in concluding that there was a mutual mistake of fact between the assessor and the taxpayers?

Background:

Shortly before the statute of limitations on her medical malpractice claim expired, the plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to the defendant physician’s former business address. She had seen the doctor a number of times at his newer business address, where he had practiced for about two years. Someone at the former address forwarded the notice of intent to the doctor. Was the plaintiff’s case correctly dismissed? To what location must a notice of intent be sent in order to comply with MCL 600.2912b(2)?

Background:

The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and was sentenced to 20 to 75 and 30 to 75 years in prison, respectively. The minimum sentence guidelines range was calculated for the criminal sexual conduct conviction but not the assault conviction. Among other things, the defendant objected that no guidelines range was calculated for the assault conviction. The Court of Appeals found no error. Is the trial court obligated under the guidelines to score all felonies or only the highest class felony?

Background:

The defendant was caught in a police raid, in his bedroom with a plate of narcotics hidden under his bed and two firearms in a dresser drawer among residency documents linking him to the home. At the time of the raid, his wife was on the front porch and his 10-year-old son was on the living room couch. There was no evidence of the child’s involvement in any crime. The defendant was convicted of doing an act that tended to cause a child to become neglected or delinquent so as to tend to come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court, MCL 750.145. Is evidence that a child was present in the home when the defendant was in possession of concealed drugs and weapons legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction?

Background:

The defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery, fleeing and eluding, larceny from a motor vehicle, and driving with a suspended license. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note asking to be instructed concerning an “inadvertent assault.” The judge, who was not the judge who tried the case, proceeded without calling the defendant into the courtroom or making a record. The judge later reported that he told the jurors to rely on the instructions they had already been given, and to work through those instructions to come to their own conclusions. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions, finding structural error because the question involved a substantive issue concerning the law that the jury was to apply. A dissenting judge would have found that the communication was administrative because the judge merely told the jurors to use the instructions they had already been given. Did the Court of Appeals properly decide the case?

Background:

The plaintiff’s income tax records show that he was paid by Robinson Roofing as a non-employee. Relying on these records, the worker’s compensation magistrate concluded that the plaintiff was not an employee under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, and denied the plaintiff’s request for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC’s ruling, holding that the magistrate erred in focusing on the plaintiff’s income tax records when deciding the question of whether plaintiff was an employee. Did the Court of Appeals properly decide the case?

Background:

Under collective bargaining agreements with the Michigan Education Association, various public school districts administer a payroll deduction plan for the MEA’s political action committee. The Secretary of State concluded that the school districts’ administration of the payroll deduction plan amounted to a “contribution” or expenditure” of public funds, in violation of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. Does section 57(1) of the act, MCL 169.257(1), prohibit a school district from expending government resources for such a payroll deduction plan if the costs of the plan are prepaid by the MEA? Does a school district have the authority to collect and deliver payroll deductions for such contributions?

Background:

In this first-party no-fault insurance case, a jury awarded the plaintiff more than $1.3 million in attendant care benefits, as well as no-fault penalty interest. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that 12 percent no-fault penalty interest under MCL 500.3142 does not continue to accrue through the satisfaction of judgment, but ceases to accrue once a judgment is entered?

Background:

The defendant supplied the transportation and money for his girlfriend’s purchase of heroin and crack cocaine. She gave some heroin to the 22-year-old victim, who died of an overdose. A Washtenaw district court bound the defendant over to circuit court on charges that included delivery of heroin causing death, MCL 750.317a, and delivery of less than 50 grams of heroin. The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to quash both charges due to lack of “delivery.” In a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Do the defendant’s actions in this case fall within the scope of MCL 750.317a?

Background: