6.10​Witness Testimony

A.​Witness Credibility

“[W]itness credibility is a question for the fact-finder[.]” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 182 (2016).

“Questions regarding credibility are not sufficient grounds for relief unless the ‘testimony contradicts indisputable facts or laws,’ the ‘testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities,’ the ‘testimony is material and . . . so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror,’ or the ‘testimony has been seriously impeached and the case is marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.’” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 183, quoting People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644 (1998). In Solloway, the “defendant failed to establish that the evidence ‘preponderate[d] heavily’ against the trial court’s verdict.” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 183, quoting People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546, 553 (2012) (alteration in original). “The trial court found that [the minor-victim’s] testimony of [the] assault was ‘very clear and very credible.’” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 183. In addition, “[t]he trial court found that [the sexual assault nurse examiner’s (SANE)] testimony of the victim’s injuries was consistent with the victim’s account of the sexual assault.” Id. “In particular, the trial court noted [the SANE’s] testimony that the victim’s injuries, as a whole, were ‘inconsistent with difficult bowel movements’ as defendant attempted to claim.” Id.

“The jury was permitted to infer that [defendant’s] implausible testimony was evidence of guilt.” People v Skippergosh, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024). In Skippergosh, defendant testified that one assault against the victim was committed by “four anonymous women in the living room while they were covering his eyes.” Id. at ___. Regarding another assault, defendant testified that the victim “was screaming for help . . . because she required assistance removing taco meat from the refrigerator.” Id. at ___. At defendant’s sentencing, the trial court described defendant’s testimony about the assaults as “almost laughable.” Id. at ___. “As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defendant’s uncorroborated and confused testimony. And if the jury did disbelieve the defendant, it was further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up).

The inherent authority trial courts have to control their courtrooms “includes the authority to control the mode and order by which witnesses are interrogated,” as well as “broad discretion in controlling the course of a trial.” People v Wills, III, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2026). This includes decisions regarding a witness’s appearance in court, which are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ___. However, the court’s discretion is not unlimited. Id. at ___. “A trial court may not deny an incarcerated defendant’s request to wear civilian clothes because the constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable jail attire may affect a juror’s judgment.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). Likewise, although “issues related to a nondefendant witness’s appearance do not directly affect the presumption of innocence, and thus . . . do not necessarily raise constitutional concerns,” a nondefendant witness’s appearance while testifying at a trial “may have a significant impact on a witness’s credibility and may undermine the fairness of trial.” Id. at ___. For instance, “the propriety of handcuffing or shackling a testifying witness is subject to the same analysis as that for defendants, without distinguishing between defense and prosecution witnesses.”Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, “requiring a [nondefendant] witness to appear in jail attire raises concerns that the jail clothes will undermine the witness’s credibility and taint the fact-finding process.” Id. at ___. Forcing a witness to testify wearing jail clothes would alert the jury that the witness was in jail, “suggesting either pending charges or a criminal conviction.” Id. at ___. Consequently, when an incarcerated witness’s “pending criminal charges [had] no relevance to the current case,” the trial court abused its discretion by requiring that witness to testify wearing jail clothes. Id. at ___.

B.​Prosecutorial Discretion and the Nonparticipating Witness

The prosecutor has exclusive authority to decide whether to dismiss or go forward with a case when the complaining witness is absent or does not want to participate. People v Morrow, 214 Mich App 158, 165 (1995). In Morrow, the complainant testified at the preliminary examination that the defendant repeatedly raped her; however, the complainant testified that she lied during the preliminary examination and that she actually had consensual sex with the defendant. Id. at 159. The Court of Appeals found that under the “unique facts of this case,” the trial court impinged on the prosecutor’s executive branch powers when the court dismissed the information. Id. at 165-166. The trial court also found that the complainant’s decision to recant her previous testimony before trial should not alone preclude the prosecution from reaching the jury:

“It is the province of the jury to determine which of the victim’s accounts is the truth, and there is no abuse of power in the prosecutor relying upon and arguing for the victim’s earlier sworn testimony in support of the criminal charges against defendant.” Morrow, 214 Mich App at 165.

Although crime victims have rights under Const 1963, art 1, § 24, and under the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq.,³⁰ a crime victim may not “determine whether [the Penal C]ode has been violated or whether the prosecution of a crime should go forward or be dismissed.” People v Williams, 244 Mich App 249, 251, 254 (2001) (finding error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the charges against the defendant “[a]fter concluding that the victim [who failed to appear to testify] did not want defendant prosecuted and that the . . . offense was a private crime rather than a public crime”).

C.​Corroboration of Sexual Assault Victim’s Testimony Not Required

“The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under [MCL 750.520b] to [MCL 750.520g].” MCL 750.520h; see also People v Aikens, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (the minor victim’s testimony alone was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s jury conviction of two counts of CSC-III and two counts of CSC-IV). “‘It is a well-established rule that a jury may convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a CSC victim.’” People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 564 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016),³¹ quoting People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642 n 22 (1998). “Moreover, ‘because it can be difficult to prove a defendant’s state of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.’” Hallak, 310 Mich App at 564, quoting People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 622 (2008).

The purpose of the noncorroboration rule³² was explained by the Court of Appeals in People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53, 57 (1976):

“The purpose of the anti-corroboration rule is not to save verdicts in which inadmissible corroborating evidence is introduced. It is designed to permit a verdict to withstand a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a case in which the only testimony against the defendant is that of the complainant.”

See, e.g., People v Phelps, 288 Mich App 123, 133 (2010), where the Court of Appeals, quoting MCL 750.520h, held that “[e]ven without additional evidence, the complainant’s testimony that she did not give [the defendant] permission to have penile-vaginal intercourse, was engaged in a different consensual act with him, and was surprised when he inserted his penis into her vagina was sufficient to sustain a conviction of CSC I because ‘[t]he testimony of a victim need not be corroborated[.]’” (Third alteration in original.)

“‘[T]he question is not whether there was conflicting evidence, but rather whether there was evidence that the jury, sitting as the trier of fact, could choose to believe and, if it did so believe that evidence, that the evidence would justify convicting defendant.’” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 714 (2015), quoting People v Smith, 205 Mich App 69, 71 (1994) (alteration in original). “[T]he prosecutor ‘is not obligated to disprove every reasonable theory consistent with innocence to discharge its responsibility; it need only convince the jury “in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.”’” Bailey, 310 Mich App at 713, quoting People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400 (2000), quoting People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273 n 6 (1995). “Further, ‘“[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.”’” Bailey, 310 Mich App at 713, quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757 (1999), quoting People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100 (1993) (alteration in original).

D.​Evidence of Sexual Assault Victim’s Resistance Not Required

“A victim need not resist the actor in prosecution[s] under [MCL 750.520b to MCL 750.520g].”³³ MCL 750.520i.

See, e.g., People v Phelps, 288 Mich App 123, 135 (2010),³⁴ where the Court of Appeals, quoting MCL 750.520i, held that “[a]lthough the complainant did not testify that she tried to physically resist [the defendant] or try to get up from the bed, ‘[a] victim need not resist the actor in a prosecution [for criminal sexual conduct].’” (Third and fourth alterations in original.)

For three additional Michigan cases addressing CSC victims where there was no evidence of resistance to the sexual assault, see People v Carlson, 466 Mich 130, 132 (2002) (a CSC-III case where the victim did not physically restrain or push the defendant away, but did verbally tell him “no” and “I don’t want to” repeatedly before penetration); People v Makela, 147 Mich App 674, 678 (1985) (a CSC-IV case where the victim was frightened to try to get away from the defendant); People v Jansson, 116 Mich App 674, 679 (1982) (a CSC-III case where the victim was unwilling to engage in intercourse but was frightened and panicked and did not know what action to take to prevent the forcible sexual intercourse).