13.7Required Reasonable Efforts Determination

DHHS is obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunify a child and the child’s family in all cases except those cases involving an aggravated circumstance listed in MCL 712A.19a(2). In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707 (2022); see also In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (“‘Absent aggravating circumstances, the DHHS has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.’”), quoting In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App at 707.¹ See also In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (“Reasonable efforts toward reunification are not necessary if there is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in [MCL 722.638(1) and (2)].”) (cleaned up).

“The trial court plainly erred by finding that [respondent’s] boys were subjected to aggravating circumstances [under MCL 722.638] because . . . the abusers . . . were not a parent, guardian, or custodian of the boys,^[2] and nothing in the record suggests that they ever resided with the boys.”) (reversed and remanded). Because the requirements of MCL 722.638(1) were not met, MCL 722.638(2) did not apply to the petition, and therefore, the DHHS was obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and her sons before seeking termination. Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App at ___.

“The mere fact of imprisonment is not one of [those aggravating circumstances].” In re Dixon (On Reconsideration), 347 Mich App 337, 362 (2023). In Dixon, the Court held that the DHHS was obligated to make reasonable efforts at reunification with the child’s father after the mother’s parental rights were terminated, even though the father was incarcerated. Dixon, 347 Mich App at 362. A trial court is required “to permit ‘regular and frequent parenting time’ when a child is removed from a parent’s care,” despite that the parent is incarcerated. Id. at 361, quoting MCL 712A.13a(13), and MCL 712A.18f(3)(e). In Dixon, the DHHS failed to arrange for the father to have video visits with his child as the trial court had ordered. Dixon, 347 Mich App at 361. Further, the DHHS did little to provide the incarcerated father with services “even after he was named as a respondent.” Id. at 362. “At the very least, the caseworker must provide available workbooks for father to complete, as has been done in many other cases involving incarcerated parents.” Id. at 362.

After determining that a respondent’s lack of medical knowledge about the respondent’s child’s medical condition is an obstacle to reunification, the DHHS is obligated to provide the respondent with resources to overcome that obstacle. In re OO Claudio-Perez, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024). Respondent’s parental rights were terminated on the basis of respondent’s inability “to properly care for her medically fragile son suffering from Ehlers-Danlos syndrome.” Id. at ___. Having identified the deficiency, the DHHS failed to make “reasonable efforts to cure that deficiency.” Id. at ___. “When DHHS fails to provide a respondent with any resources to overcome the obstacles to reunification, it necessarily fails to make reasonable efforts at reunification.” Id. at ___.

“Offering services and visitation while termination is pending is not enough” to satisfy DHHS’s duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification. In re C Walters, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “[MCL 712A.19a(2)] unambiguously provides that the efforts being made must be aimed at reunification, and this is impossible if the agency that is offering the services is actively working to terminate parental rights.” Walters, ___ Mich App at ___. “The statutory framework mandates provision of services, preparation of a case service plan, and periodic dispositional reviews; this evidences the Legislature’s position that reunification is the preferred outcome over termination.” Id. at ___ (reversing the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights at the initial disposition hearing where DHHS failed to make reunification efforts before bringing the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, and no aggravated circumstance exception to that obligation under MCL 712A.19a(2) was established).³

If an agency during a child protective proceeding advises a court not to place a child in the custody of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, the agency must submit a written report to the court stating:

“what efforts were made to prevent the child’s removal from his or her home[;] or

the efforts made to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal from his or her home.” MCL 712A.18f(1). See also MCR 3.973(E)(2).

The written report must include all of the following:

“(a) If services were provided to the child and his or her parent, guardian, or custodian, the services, including in-home services, that were provided.

(b) If services were not provided to the child and his or her parent, guardian, or custodian, the reasons why services were not provided.

(c) Likely harm to the child if the child were to be separated from his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.

(d) Likely harm to the child if the child were to be returned to his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.” MCL 712A.18f(1).

“The court, on consideration of the written report prepared by the agency responsible for the care and supervision of the child pursuant to MCL 712A.18f(1), shall, when appropriate, include a statement in the order of disposition as to whether reasonable efforts were made:

      (a)    to prevent the child’s removal from home, or

      (b)    to rectify the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the child’s home.” MCR 3.973(F)(3). See also MCL 712A.18f(4), which contains substantially similar language.

Note: To establish a child’s eligibility for federal foster care maintenance payments under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, a court is required to make a finding that reasonable efforts have been made to avoid non-emergency removal of a child from his or her home and placement of the child in foster care. 42 USC 672(a)(1). See Section 8.4 for a detailed discussion of the reasonable efforts finding, and Section 14.1 for a detailed discussion of federal funding.⁴

“[E]fforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code unless the [DHHS] modifies its services as reasonably necessary to accommodate a parent’s disability[, a]nd termination is improper without a finding of reasonable efforts.” In re Hicks (Hicks II), 500 Mich 79, 90 (2017), aff’g in part, vacating in part 315 Mich App 251 (2016) (finding that “[d]espite the recommendations of the [DHHS’s] medical professionals that [the respondent-mother] could benefit from services tailored to her [intellectual] disability[,] . . . and despite the [DHHS’s] failure to provide those court-ordered services, the circuit court nonetheless [improperly] concluded that the [DHHS] had made reasonable efforts at reunification and terminated [the respondent’s] parental rights[;]” although the DHHS “cannot accommodate a disability of which it is unaware[,]” it was “clear that the [DHHS] knew of [the respondent’s] disability[, and o]nce the [DHHS] knew of the disability, its affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification meant that it could not be ‘passive in [its] approach . . . .as far as the provision of accommodations is concerned[]’”), quoting Pierce v Dist of Columbia, 128 F Supp 3d 250, 269 (D DC, 2015).

“Although DHHS has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of the respondent-parent to participate in the services and demonstrate having benefited from them.” In re MJC, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). Respondent did not fail to participate or benefit from services when the DHHS never prepared, and the trial court never adopted, a case service plan for respondent. In re G Matamoros, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (DHHS’s allegation in its supplemental petition that respondent failed to benefit from court-ordered services was “clearly not true since there were no services ordered for respondent and as a result, respondent was never obligated to comply with or benefit from services”).

For additional information on providing reasonable accommodations for disabled parents subject to child protective proceedings, see Section 13.8.