2.2Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal term of art that concerns a court's authority to hear and determine a case.” People v Kiczenski, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This authority is not dependent on the particular facts of the case but, instead, is dependent on the character or class of the case pending.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Likewise, courts do not have inherent subject-matter jurisdiction; it is derived instead from our constitutional and statutory provisions.” People v Scott, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court generally has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving misdemeanors punishable by a fine or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, and ordinance and charter violations punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both; additionally, the district court has jurisdiction over certain preliminary proceedings, such as arraignments and preliminary examinations, in felony cases. MCL 600.8311.¹ 

The circuit court generally has jurisdiction over all felony criminal cases and misdemeanor criminal cases punishable by at least one year of imprisonment. See MCL 600.8311; Const 1963, art 6, § 13. See also People v Winburn, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025), where the Court explained that “Michigan’s constitution and laws grant circuit courts subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases once they are bound over from the district court,” and the Supreme Court’s disposition of defendant’s appeal from his original convictions and sentences did not constitute an order or judgment pursuant to an opinion that would delay the re-investment of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. Rather, subject-matter jurisdiction was reinvested in the circuit court on the day the Supreme Court entered its order vacating defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and remanding the case to the trial court. Id. at ___. See MCR 7.315(C); MCR 7.315(D). See also People v Washington, 508 Mich 107, 122-126 (2021) (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to resentence defendant on remand from the Court of Appeals while his application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals decision was pending in the Michigan Supreme Court).

In People v Kiczenski, ___ Mich App at ___, the trial court denied defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment, which argued that application of the 2011 Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq, to defendant constituted an ex post facto punishment. concluded the Court of Appeals “conclude[d] that subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the circuit court to decide defendant’s motion” because “[t]he circuit court had the power to resolve the motion as it was filed in the case where defendant’s felony trial was handled” pursuant to MCR 6.008(B). Kiczenski, ___ Mich App at ___ (“The lack of a prior order or judgment embodying the restrictions may impact the underlying ruling, but would not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to resolve the motion for relief from judgment.”).

Because subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to hear a case, it is not subject to forfeiture, waiver, or stipulation. See United States v Cotton, 535 US 625, 630 (2002); People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 268 (2011); People v Eaton, 184 Mich App 649, 653 (1990). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction “can be raised at any time by any party or the court,” In re Contempt of Dorsey, 306 Mich App 571, 581 (2014) (citation omitted), and the court is required to recognize that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “regardless of whether the parties raised the issue,” People v Clement, 254 Mich App 387, 394 (2002) (citations omitted). “A trial court must dismiss an action when there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and a party cannot be estopped from raising the issue.” Dorsey, 306 Mich App at 581 (citation omitted). “‘When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, its acts and proceedings are of no force and validity; they are a mere nullity and are void. . . . Thus, an order entered without jurisdiction may be challenged collaterally as well as directly.’” Clement, 254 Mich App at 394 (citation omitted).

Appeal from final order. “In a criminal case, when a trial court enters a final order or judgment from which an appeal by right may be taken, and a defendant files a claim of appeal, the trial court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction over that case in order to permit the defendant to exercise his constitutional appellate rights.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___. “An order or judgment cannot become effective for execution or enforcement purposes until it is issued.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up) (“The date of entry of an order or judgment is not always synonymous with the date it becomes effective; rather, the date that an order or judgment becomes effective is governed by our court rules.”). In Winburn, “defendant filed his claim of appeal from his original convictions and sentences after his sentencing in 1992.” Id. at ___. “Upon the filing of that claim of appeal, the trial court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at ___. Subsequently, “[the Michigan] Supreme Court entered its order vacating defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and remanding to the trial court on September 13, 1995.” Id. at ___. “It was defendant’s filing of a claim of appeal that divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and defendant’s filing of a motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court is only relevant to the extent that it might affect when [the] Supreme Court’s ‘disposition’ of defendant’s application for leave to appeal became effective and subject-matter jurisdiction returned to the trial court.” Id. at ___. “There simply [was] no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the 1995 remand order was ‘an order or judgment pursuant to an opinion’ under MCR 7.315(C) which, unless otherwise ordered, would not have become effective until either the time for filing a motion for rehearing had elapsed or a timely-filed motion for rehearing had been disposed of by the Court.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___, citing MCR 7.315(C)(4)). “Under MCR 7.315(D), the Supreme Court’s 1995 order therefore became effective the day it was entered, September 13, 1995, and subject-matter jurisdiction was re-invested in the trial court on that day.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___ (“Defendant’s filing of a motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court did not stay that investiture.”). “Accordingly, the trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered a judgment of sentence convicting defendant of second-degree murder.” Id. at ___.

“Unlike other errors that a defendant eventually loses the ability to raise, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be ignored for purposes of finality because the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the trial court’s very authority to bind the parties to the action at hand.” Washington, 508 Mich at 132. A “trial court [is] divested of subject-matter jurisdiction when the Court of Appeals assume[s] its appellate jurisdiction over the case.” Id. at 122. A defendant’s appeal from a trial court’s judgment “divest[s] the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. When the Court of Appeals render[s a] judgment, . . . jurisdiction remain[s] with the appellate courts until [the Michigan Supreme] Court’s disposition of defendant’s application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ judgment.” Id. at 126-127 (holding that the trial court’s judgment of sentence, rendered when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, was void ab initio”).

Interlocutory appeal. “Interlocutory appeals, in contrast to appeals from final orders, do not divest a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a case.” Scott, ___ Mich at ___; see also People v Robinson, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (holding that the error in the indictment procedure did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction and so did not necessarily void the court’s judgment). “A final order is the demarcation that divests a trial court of its general subject matter jurisdiction and permits a criminal defendant to exercise his or her constitutional right to an appeal.” Scott, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks omitted). “Until that time, the trial court retains general subject-matter jurisdiction over the case while an interlocutory appeal is pending.” Id. at ___. “When a trial court enters a final order, it relinquishes its general power to find facts and render conclusions of law affecting the final order unless permitted by court rule or by order from courts exercising appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at ___. “Allowing a trial court to substantively alter a final order may well affect the very basis on which our appellate courts have assumed jurisdiction to ensure the review recognized by [Michigan’s] Constitution.” Id. at ___. “The same cannot be said of interlocutory appeals, given that a defendant remains entitled to constitutional review based on a final order.” Id. at ___. “Interlocutory appeals simply do not implicate [Michigan’s] Constitution and therefore remain outside the scope of jurisdictional concern.” Id. at ___. Indeed, “interlocutory appeals are a precautionary procedure designed to correct a significant error in a specific case that may require reversal of the entire cause on final review if an interlocutory appeal is not taken.” Id. at ___ Further, “appeals from final orders receive plenary review, while interlocutory appeals are based on a very limited record.” Id. at ___. “Interlocutory appeals are merely a procedural mechanism provided by our court rules to provide discretionary preliminary review of an alleged error and are not necessarily dispositive.” Id. at ___.

In Scott, the defendant applied in the Michigan Supreme Court “for leave to appeal a Court of Appeals judgment that remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.” Id. at ___. “Under those circumstances, an automatic stay of the remand proceedings was in place that barred the trial court from addressing aspects of that interlocutory appeal.” Id. at ___, citing MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a). While the defendant’s application was pending, “the trial court violated an automatic stay” when it conducted “a trial in which evidence disputed in the interlocutory appeal was admitted.” Scott, ___ Mich at ___. Although “the trial court abused its discretion by holding a trial that included this evidence under these circumstances,” the Scott Court held that it was “a procedural error” that could “be remedied through subsequent appellate review after a final judgment [was] entered.” Id. at ___ (“A trial court’s error committed while an interlocutory appeal is pending has no effect on the trial court’s general subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.”).

Separate actions. A “trial court [does] not lack subject-matter jurisdiction to resentence” a defendant “when the Supreme Court simultaneously exercise[s] jurisdiction over a separate but related complaint for superintending control.” People v Johnson, 345 Mich App 51, 54 (2022). In Johnson, the “[t]he trial court erred by concluding that the Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the complaint for superintending control divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to resentence” the defendant. Id. at 61-62. The Court of Appeals observed that “unlike in Washington, this case involves two separate actions [the criminal case and a complaint seeking superintending control]” and “[a] complaint for superintending control constitutes the filing of a civil action.” Id. at 62 (cleaned up). “The trial court reasoned that defendant’s application for leave to appeal this Court’s denial of superintending control conferred jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over defendant’s criminal case, such that Washington applied and the trial court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction. But nothing was required to confer jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over the action seeking superintending control.” Id. at 62 (cleaned up).