2.7Court of Claims Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction is exclusive, except as provided in MCL 600.6421¹ and MCL 600.6440.² MCL 600.6419(1).

“All actions initiated in the court of claims shall be filed in the court of appeals.” MCL 600.6419(1).³ 

A.Exclusive Jurisdiction

“Except as otherwise provided in [MCL 600.6419], the court has the following power and jurisdiction:

(a) To hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court.

(b) To hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ that may be pleaded by way of counterclaim on the part of the state or any of its departments or officers against any claimant who may bring an action in the court of claims. Any claim of the state or any of its departments or officers may be pleaded by way of counterclaim in any action brought against the state or any of its departments or officers.

(c) To appoint and utilize a special master as the court considers necessary.

(d) To hear and determine any action challenging the validity of a notice of transfer described in [MCL 600.6404(2) or MCL 600.6404(3)].” MCL 600.6419(1).

No Jurisdiction. The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over any claim for compensation under the worker’s disability compensation act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., or the Compensation of Injured Peace Officers Act, MCL 419.101 et seq. MCL 600.6419(3).

Circuit courts retain their jurisdiction over:

•actions brought by the taxpayer under the general sales tax act, MCL 205.51 et seq.,

•proceedings to review findings as provided in the Michigan employment security act, MCL 421.1 et seq.,

•any other similar tax or employment security proceedings expressly authorized by Michigan statute,

•appeals from the district court and administrative agencies as authorized by law, and

•prerogative and remedial writs consistent with section 13 of article VI of the state constitution of 1963. MCL 600.6419(4)-(6).

B.Verified Claim and Notice

“A claim or notice under [MCL 600.6431(1)⁴] must contain . . . [a] signature and verification by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” MCL 600.6431(2)(d). “The failure to provide a verified claim or notice of intent is a bar to pursuing a claim in the Court of Claims.” Chisolm v State Police, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023). In Chisolm, the Court of Appeals concluded that “plaintiff’s notice satisfied the requirement contained in [MCL 600.6431(2)(d)] of a verification ‘before an officer authorized to administer oaths,’ because plaintiff signed and swore to the notice before a notary public.” Chisolm, ___ Mich App at ___ (noting plaintiff’s notice of intent “was signed by plaintiff and his attorney, and was notarized”). “[R]egardless of whether plaintiff’s notice of intent is a document under the broad definition of ‘document’ in MCR 1.109(B), and thus subject to the subrule governing the verification of documents, plaintiff’s jurat notification satisfies MCR 1.109(D)(3)(a) as an ‘oath or affirmation of the party or of someone having knowledge of the facts stated.’” Chisolm, ___ Mich App at ___.

See Section 2.7(C) for additional information on the notice requirements of MCL 600.6431.

C.Notice Requirements

Under MCL 600.6431(1), “a claim may not be maintained against [the state of Michigan] unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against [Michigan] or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.”

“[A]ll parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the notice requirements of MCL 600.6431(1).” Christie v Wayne State Univ, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2023). “This includes claims against the state brought in the circuit court.” Id. at ___ (noting that MCL 600.6431(1)’s notice requirements apply categorically to “a claim” against the state, including those filed in the circuit court, except as otherwise excepted in the statute). Put differently, “any claim against the state, regardless of where it is filed, must comply with MCL 600.6431(1)’s notice requirements, except for claims brought under the [wrongful imprisonment compensation act (WICA), MCL 691.1751 to 691.1757] as exempted in MCL 600.6431(5).” Christie, ___ Mich at ___. See also Elia Cos, LLC v Univ of Mich Regents, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2023) (holding that defects in complaint cannot be cured after the 1 year notice requirement of MCL 600.6431 has expired⁵).

“[T]he notice requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) apply to all claims against the state, including those filed in the circuit court . . . .” Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (quotation marks omitted). In Flamont, the plaintiff did not file the Court of Claims notice described in MCL 600.6431(A). Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendants’ assertion that “plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431 was fatal to her claims because the statutorily required notice was a condition precedent to overcoming governmental immunity, even when the action was filed in the circuit court.” Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___ (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “she was not required to comply with MCL 600.6431 because she did not file her action in the Court of Claims and Christie and Elia did not have retroactive effect”).

“Flamont makes no reference to cases filed in reliance on [Tyrrell v Univ of Mich, 335 Mich App 254 (2020), overruled by Christie, 511 Mich at 19], which is not surprising since the plaintiff could not and did not assert any such reliance given that the notice period applicable in Flamont had run before Tyrrell was decided.” Landin v Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (taking “no issue with Flamont’s application of Christie to cases not affected by the Tyrrell decision” but considering “whether Christie should be applied retroactively to post-Tyrrell/pre-Christie cases”). In Tyrrell, the Court of Appeals “held in a published and precedentially binding opinion that when a state entity is sued in Circuit Court, as opposed to the Court of Claims, the plaintiff need not file a claim or notice of intent within a year after accrual as otherwise required by MCL 600.6431(1).” Landin, ___ Mich App at ___. In Landin, relying on Tyrrell, the plaintiff “filed suit in circuit court without complying with the requirements of [MCL 600.6431].” Landin, ___ Mich App at ___. Subsequently, the Christie Court held “that the requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) apply to all suits against the state, including those filed in circuit court.” Landin, ___ Mich App at ___. However, “because Tyrrell, despite being wrongly decided, was binding precedent at the relevant time in this case, the decision in Christie was a new rule of law as to it and similarly-situated cases.” Landin, ___ Mich App at ___ (concluding that “plaintiff’s reliance interest was such that the Christie decision should not be applied retroactively as to her”). Accordingly, the Landin Court held that “Christie does not apply retroactively to circuit court cases that were in a procedural posture wherein Tyrrell’s interpretation of MCL 600.6431 was the law in Michigan during the one-year notice or filing period following accrual of a claim.” Landin, ___ Mich App at ___. But see Hudson v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (concluding that Landin was binding and controlling precedent but “call[ing] for the convening of a special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider the conflict between Flamont and that of Landin relative to the retroactivity of Christie”; were it not for Landin, the Hudson Court would have affirmed the trial court, “consistent with the holding in Flamont that the rule in Christie was not a new rule of law because the Supreme Court does not announce a new rule of law when it overrules a decision of the Court of Appeals that misinterpreted a statute contrary to the statute’s plain language, legislative intent, and existing precedent”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).While a plaintiff’s complaint is required to be verified under MCL 600.6434, a plaintiff is “not required to file both his verified notice of intent and his verified complaint within the time period specified in MCL 600.6431.” Chisolm v State Police, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2023) (holding that because plaintiff “complied with MCL 600.6431 by timely filing his [verified] notice of intent, [he] was not required also to file his verified complaint within the time period established by MCL 600.6431”). Although “plaintiff’s original complaint was not verified and the amended complaint, though verified, was not filed until after the time limit for complying with MCL 600.6431,” “the Court of Claims did not err by holding that plaintiff’s amended complaint was not subject to dismissal under MCL 600.6431.” Chisolm, ___ Mich App at ___. The Court distinguished Elia Cos, LLC, where “the plaintiff did not file a verified notice of intent[,]” “and although the plaintiff filed a complaint within the time period[,] the complaint was not verified.” Chisolm, ___ Mich App at ___. In contrast, in Chisolm, “plaintiff fully complied with MCL 600.6431 by timely filing a verified notice of intent to file a claim. Having done so, plaintiff’s complaint was not subject to the time requirements of MCL 600.6431.” Chisolm, ___ Mich App at ___.

D.Jury Trial Right and Joinder

MCL 600.6421 addresses trial by jury and the joinder and transfer of claims.

“Nothing in [Chapter 64 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq.] eliminates or creates any right a party may have to a trial by jury, including any right that existed before November 12, 2013, . . . [nor] deprives the circuit, district, or probate court of jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law, including a claim against an individual employee of this state for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law. Except as otherwise provided by this section, if a party has the right to a trial by jury and asserts that right as required by law, the claim may be heard and determined by a circuit, district, or probate court in the appropriate venue.” MCL 600.6421(1).

“For declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ sought by a party within the jurisdiction of the court of claims described in [MCL 600.6419(1)] and arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions with a matter asserted for which a party has the right to a trial by jury under [MCL 600.6421(1)], unless joined as provided in [MCL 600.6421(3)], the court of claims shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over the matter of declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ until a final judgment has been entered, and the matter asserted for which a party has the right to a trial by jury under [MCL 600.6421(1)] shall be stayed until final judgment on the matter of declaratory or equitable relief or a demand for extraordinary writ.” MCL 600.6421(2).

“With the approval of all parties, any matter within the jurisdiction of the court of claims described in [MCL 600.6419(1)] may be joined for trial with cases arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions that are pending in any of the various trial courts of the state. A case in the court of claims that has been joined with the approval of all parties shall be tried and determined by the judge even though the trial court action with which it may be joined is tried to a jury under the supervision of the same trial judge.” MCL 600.6421(3).

E.Transfer to the Court of Claims

“A notice of transfer to the Court of Claims must be provided before or at the time the defendant files an answer.” MCR 2.228(A). If the time to file an answer has passed, and “the court in which [the] civil action is pending has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims, the defendant must seek leave to file a notice of transfer and the court may grant leave if it is satisfied that the facts on which the motion is based were not and could not with reasonable diligence have been known to the moving party more than 14 days before the motion was filed.” MCR 2.228(B)(1). “If the court in which [the] civil action is pending does not have subject matter jurisdiction because the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, MCR 2.227 governs.” MCR 2.228(B)(2). See Section 2.2(A) for more information on transfers under MCR 2.227.

An order for transfer of jurisdiction must be entered on a SCAO-approved form. MCR 2.226(A). If the order “is not prepared as required under [MCR 2.226(A)], and the order lacks the information necessary for the receiving court to determine under which rule the transfer was ordered, the clerk of the receiving court shall refuse to accept the transfer and shall prepare a notice of refusal on a form approved by the [SCAO] and return the case to the transferring court for a proper order within seven business days of receipt of the transfer order.” MCR 2.226(B). Upon receipt of a refusal to accept a transfered case under MCR 2.226(B), the transferring court must “prepare a proper order in accordance with [MCR 2.226(A)] and retransfer the case within seven business days.” MCR 2.226(C).

F.Remedy in Federal Court Exception

MCL 600.6440 provides:

“No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof.”

G.Res Judicata

“The judgment entered by the court of claims upon any claim described in [MCL 600.6419(1)], either against or in favor of the state or any of its departments or officers, upon becoming final is res judicata of that claim.” MCL 600.6419(2).

H.Setoff, Recoupment, or Cross Declaration

“Upon the trial of any cause in which any demand is made by the state or any of its departments or officers against the claimant either by way of setoff, recoupment, or cross declaration, the court shall hear and determine each claim or demand, and if the court finds a balance due from the claimant to the state, the court shall render judgment in favor of the state for the balance.” MCL 600.6419(2).

I.Judgment

“Writs of execution or garnishment may issue upon the judgment the same as from the circuit court of this state.” MCL 600.6419(2). The judgment entered by the court of claims upon any claim, either for or against the claimant, is final unless appealed from as provided in [MCL 600.6401 et seq.].” MCL 600.6419(2).

J.Caselaw

1.Jurisdiction Over Actions for Mandamus Against State Officials and Departments⁶

“MCL 600.6419, as amended by 2013 PA 164, properly delegates to the Court of Claims jurisdiction over actions for mandamus against state officials and departments”; although MCL 600.6419(1)(a) and MCL 600.4401(1)⁷ “clearly conflict,” they can be harmonized by reading MCL 600.6419(1)(a) “to expand the original jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include ‘any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers,’ such that the Court of Claims now possesses jurisdiction over mandamus claims that had previously been within the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to MCL 600.4401(1).” O’Connell v Dir of Elections, 316 Mich App 91, 100, 103-104, 108 (2016) (holding that “the Court of Claims erred by concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and decide” the plaintiff judge’s mandamus action against the Director of Elections and other state-level defendants). “[T]he circuit court never had exclusive jurisdiction over claims for mandamus against state-level defendants, MCL 600.6419(1) permissibly delegated such jurisdiction to the Court of Claims, and MCL 600.6419(6)^[8] did not revoke that delegation of jurisdiction because it was unnecessary to do so.” O’Connell, 316 Mich App at 104, 106 (holding that the exception under MCL 600.6419(6) did not apply because the circuit court shared concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and therefore lacked exclusive jurisdiction over mandamus actions involving state officers).

2.Jurisdiction Over Headlee Amendment Claims

The Court of Claims “has subject-matter jurisdiction over Headlee Amendment claims.” Telford v State of Michigan, 327 Mich App 195, 197 (2019) (the Court of Claims erred when it transfered the plaintiffs’ Headlee Amendment claim to the circuit court pursuant to City of Riverview v State of Michigan, 292 Mich App 516 (2011), which holds that a Headlee Amendment action may be filed in circuit court pursuant to MCL 600.308a(1), because “the Legislature intended to repeal MCL 600.308a(1) by implication when it enacted 2013 PA 164,” expanding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims).

3.Jurisdiction Over Appeals Regarding the Department of Treasury’s Seizure of Tobacco Products

There is “an inherent tension between” MCL 600.6419(1)(a), which provides the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction for claims “against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court” and MCL 205.429(4), which requires an “appeal to the circuit court of the county where the seizure was made[.]”⁹ Prime Time Int’l Distrib, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 322 Mich App 46, 55 (2017) (emphasis added). “To remedy this tension, [the Court] look[s] first to the exceptions under the CCA,^[10] MCL 600.6419(5), which provides: ‘[the CCA] does not deprive the circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district court and administrative agencies as authorized by law.’” Prime Time Int’l Distrib, 322 Mich App at 55-56. Accordingly, where MCL 600.6419(5) applies, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to hear an action against the state. Prime Time Int’l Distrib, 322 Mich App at 56. Whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction in this case “turns on whether MCL 205.429(4) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the circuit court for matters involving appeals from the Department pursuant to the TPTA.” Prime Time Int’l Distrib, 322 Mich App at 57. Accordingly, the Court of Claims did not err by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the TPTA, MCL 205.429(4), confers exclusive jurisdiction to the circuit court; MCL 205.429(4) does not confer concurrent jurisdiction to any other court. Prime Time Int’l Distrib, 322 Mich App at 57, 58 (concluding that MCL 600.6419(5) applies and the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ appeals pursuant to the TPTA).

4.Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Tort Claims

The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional tort claims against the state or any of its departments. Rusha v Dep’t of Corrections, 307 Mich App 300, 305 (2014).

5.Intervention

The Court of Claims properly denied private parties’ motions to intervene as defendants under MCR 2.209; the private parties could not intervene in the action because, under MCL 600.6419, “the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against non-state actors.” Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About Parochiaid v Michigan, 321 Mich App 456, 465 (2017), citing Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 583-584 (2008).

Under MCL 600.6419(1)(a) and MCL 600.6419(7), for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction over a state officer who is seeking to intervene as a defendant, “the officer must have been acting, or reasonably believed he or she was acting, within the scope of his or her authority at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, not at the time he or she filed a motion to intervene or become a part of the action.” Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About Parochiaid, 321 Mich App at 470 (holding that where the plaintiffs asserted that state legislation was unconstitutional, state legislators could not intervene; the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over the state legislators because the plaintiffs had raised no claims against them “for allegedly wrongful conduct during which they were acting, or reasonably believed that they were acting, within the scope of their authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of their duties”) (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).¹¹

6.Power of Legislature to Expand Court of Claims’ Jurisdiction

Neither MCL 600.6419 (conferring jurisdiction to Court of Claims) nor MCL 600.6437 (authorizing the Court of Claims to issue orders against the state and its subunits)¹² preclude the Court of Claims from “exercis[ing] jurisdiction over any other case, if the Legislature were to grant it additional jurisdiction.” River Investment Group, LLC v Casab, 289 Mich App 353, 358 (2010).