Canon 2: A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities¹

“A. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

B. A judge should respect and observe the law. At all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Without regard to a person’s race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect.

C. A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not use the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others, but participation in activities allowed in Canon 4 is not a violation of this principle.

D. A judge should not appear as a witness in a court proceeding unless subpoenaed.

E. A judge may respond to requests for personal references.

F. A judge should not allow activity as a member of an organization to cast doubt on the judge’s ability to perform the function of the office in a manner consistent with the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, the laws of this state, and the Michigan and United States Constitutions. A judge should be particularly cautious with regard to membership activities that discriminate, or appear to discriminate, on the basis of race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic. Nothing in this paragraph should be interpreted to diminish a judge’s right to the free exercise of religion.

G. No judge may accept any contribution of money, directly or indirectly, for a campaign deficit or for expenses associated with judicial office. Requests for payment of membership dues or fees in a judicial association do not constitute solicitation of funds for purposes of this provision.” Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.

 

Note: MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b)(ii) provides that judicial disqualification is warranted where “[t]he judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, . . . has failed to adhere to the appearance of impropriety standard set forth in [MCJC 2]”; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a)-(g) enumerate other situations warranting judicial disqualification. For more information about judicial disqualification, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Judicial Disqualification Manual.

 

Disclaimer: Many of the opinions in this chapter involve more than one Canon of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct; however, only information relevant to MCJC 2 is featured in this chapter.

 

 

Engaging in misconduct resulting in removal from office.

•Making false statements under oath, tampering with evidence, and failing to disclose relationship. A judge violated MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B) when she “failed to disclose the extent of her [close, personal] relationship with [a detective, who was a witness in a pending case], to the parties in the case”; “failed to disclose the extent of her [close, personal] relationship with [an attorney and the attorney’s law firm] in several cases over which [she] presided”; “failed to immediately disqualify herself from her own divorce proceeding and destroyed evidence in that divorce proceeding even though she knew that her then-estranged husband had filed an ex parte motion for a mutual restraining order regarding the duty to preserve evidence”; “made false statements (a) during court proceedings over which she presided, (b) to the [Judicial Tenure Commission] while under oath during these proceedings, and (c) while testifying at her deposition under oath in her divorce proceeding”; “was persistently impatient, undignified, and discourteous to those appearing before her” by being “routinely disrespectful to attorneys and litigants,” and hostile toward counsel; “required her staff members to perform personal tasks during work hours”; “allowed her staff to work on her 2014 judicial campaign during work hours”; and “improperly interrupted two depositions that she attended during her divorce proceeding.” In re Brennan, 504 Mich 80, 83-84, 93-95, 103-104 (2019). The “multifarious acts of misconduct” warranted “severe sanctions . . . because of [the judge’s] misconduct in making false statements under oath, in tampering with evidence in her divorce proceedings, and in failing to disclose the extent of her relationship with” a detective in a pending case. Id. at 85, 85 n 11 (judge removed from office).

•Making false statements. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when she “falsely told her employer that she required a long-term medical leave of absence due to imminent knee surgeries”; “[a]lthough the medical leave was granted, the surgeries were never performed”; the judge “made numerous intentional misrepresentations to the Judicial Tenure Commission regarding her medical condition and efforts to treat it, including efforts to schedule an independent medical examination”; “made false statements to the Commission regarding the scheduling of an independent psychiatric examination”; and “made false statements in pleadings filed in federal court and in [district court].” In re Sanders, 498 Mich 856, 857-858 (2015) (judge removed from office).

•Making false statements and improper docket management. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A); “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and so conduct herself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B); “[a]llow[ed] family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment” in violation of MCJC 2(C); and “[u]s[ed] the prestige of office to advance personal business interest” contrary to MCJC 2(C), when she “twice made false statements under oath in connection with her divorce proceeding,” “made and solicited other false statements while not under oath, including the submission of fabricated evidence” to the JTC, “improperly listed cases on the no-progress docket,” “was absent excessively and engaged in belated commencement of proceedings, untimely adjournments, and improper docket management,” “allowed a social relationship to influence the release of a criminal defendant from probation,” and “recklessly flaunted her judicial office.” In re Nettles-Nickerson, 481 Mich 321, 322-323, 333 (2008) (judge engaged in other misconduct not relevant to MCJC 2 and was removed from office).

•Engaging in inappropriate relationship, engaging in ex parte communications, and lying under oath. A judge violated MCJC 2 “by failing to ‘avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety,’ failing to ‘promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,’ and allowing a social relationship ‘to influence judicial conduct or judgment’” when he “(a) had a sexual relationship with a complaining witness in a case pending before him without recusing himself for several months, (b) engaged in numerous ex parte communications with her concerning the case, as well as concerning another case in which one of her relatives was a party, (c) violated various policies of the courthouse by permitting his mistress to enter the facility through an employee entrance without going through security, allowing her to remain alone in his chambers while he was on the bench, arranging for her to park her vehicle in an area reserved for judges, and sneaking her cell phone into the courthouse for her, (d) transmitted numerous text messages to her while he was on the bench that contained inappropriate and derogatory references to defendants, litigants, and witnesses appearing before him, (e) lied about when and why he finally did recuse himself from the case in which his mistress was the complaining witness, (f) sought to use the prosecuting attorney’s office as leverage against his then ex-mistress by concocting charges of stalking and extortion against her, and (g) lied under oath during the JTC proceedings.” In re McCree, 495 Mich 51, 55-56, 72-73 (2014), quoting MCJC 2. The Michigan Supreme Court noted its “duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary,” and indicated that the judge “was just recently publicly censured . . . yet continued to engage in misconduct,” which “is strongly suggestive that [the judge] has not yet learned from his mistakes and that the likelihood of his continuing to commit judicial misconduct is high.” Id. at 86. “Such a cavalier attitude about serious misconduct is disturbing, and [the judge’s] apparent failure to comprehend fully the magnitude of his wrongdoing is equally troublesome.” Id. at 86-87 (judge removed from office).

•Committing perjury and falsifying legal documents. A judge violated MCJC 2 “by failing to ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety’ and by failing to ‘respect and observe the law’” when she “(a) committed perjury; (b) signed her former attorney’s name on legal documents without the latter’s permission and filed these documents also without such permission; and (c) made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the JTC proceedings”; “[t]he cumulative effect of [the judge’s] misconduct convince[d] [the Michigan Supreme Court] that [the judge] should not remain in judicial office.” In re Adams, 494 Mich 162, 164, 179 (2013), quoting MCJC 2 (judge removed from office).

•Misappropriating public funds. A judge’s misconduct violated MCJC 2(A), MCJC 2(B), and MCJC 2(C) when she “misappropriated public funds, some of which were intended for victims of crime”; “inappropriately spent much of this money on self-promoting advertisements and travel expenses for herself and various other court employees”; “treated these funds . . . as her own ‘publicly funded private foundation’”; “denied people access to the court by instituting and enforcing an improper business-attire policy”; “employed a family member in violation of court policy”; and “made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the investigation and hearing of th[e] matter.” In re James, 492 Mich 553, 555-556, 558 (2012). “The cumulative effect of [the judge’s] misconduct, coupled with its duration, nature, and pervasiveness, convince[d] [the Michigan Supreme Court] that she [was] unfit for judicial office”; “[a]lthough some of her misconduct, considered in isolation, [did] not justify such a severe sanction, taken as a whole her misconduct r[ose] to a level that require[d] her removal from office.” Id. at 556 (judge removed from office).

•Disregarding the law. A judge’s misconduct violated MCJC 2(A), MCJC 2(B), and MCJC 2(C) when he engaged in “numerous instances of documented judicial misconduct,” including “‘fixing’ (personally and surreptitiously dismissing) traffic citations issued to himself, his spouse, and his staff; preventing the transmission of or altering court information that was legally required to have been transmitted to the Secretary of State; dismissing cases without conducting hearings or involving the prosecutor; failing to follow plea agreements; and making false statements under oath during the JTC hearing.” In re Justin, 490 Mich 394, 396, 398 (2012). “[T]he common themes running throughout [the judge’s] substantiated acts of misconduct [were] a calculated disregard for the law and an intentional effort to undermine the judicial process, as deemed warranted or expedient by the [judge]”; “[s]uch misconduct evince[d] an unacceptable disregard for the role of judge as well as disdain for due process and the right of parties to a fair hearing.” Id. at 413. The judge’s actions [were] completely antithetical to the privilege of being a judge as well as disdain for due process and the right of parties to a fair hearing.” Id (judge removed from office).

•Driving while intoxicated. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A); “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” contrary to MCJC 2(A); and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he “was under the influence of alcohol when he ran his car into [a] store”; left the scene of the accident; “attempted to deceive the police about [the timing of his alcohol consumption] because he was motivated by a desire to avoid criminal prosecution”; and “continued to misrepresent the cause of the accident to the JTC and the master, motivated in addition by a desire to avoid professional discipline.” In re Noecker, 472 Mich 1, 7, 10 (2005). The judge “misled the police, the public, and the JTC about his drinking,” and his “insistence that he was sober at the time of the accident [was] not credible.” Id. at 13. “His misrepresentations about being sober when he caused an automobile accident that carried civil and criminal consequences [were] antithetical to his judicial obligation to uphold the integrity of the judiciary,” and his “repeated deception and the publicity surrounding the incident . . . seriously eroded the public’s confidence in him and in the judiciary.” Id. at 13-14 (judge removed from office).

 

Interfering with the administration of justice.

•Misusing authority to influence criminal investigation. A judge engaged in “irresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” contrary to MCJC 2(A), and “a failure to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he “engaged in a sustained campaign to prevent [his intern] from facing legal consequences for her actions by interfering with a police investigation and the subsequent prosecution, in addition to providing false information in his answer to the formal complaint.” In re Simpson, 500 Mich 533, 555, 564-565 (2017). Specifically, the judge “used his position as a judge in an effort to scuttle a criminal investigation of his intern” by arriving at the scene of the drunk-driving accident, identifying himself to the police as a judge, and interrupting the sobriety-testing process. Id. at 546-547. Further, the judge “improperly acted as a legal advocate for [his intern] and used his position as a judge to thwart the township’s criminal prosecution of his intern” and “succeeded for a time in delaying the issuance of the charges.” Id. at 548. Finally, the judge “made ‘an intentional misrepresentation or a misleading statement’ when he attributed the ‘vast bulk’ of his communications with [his intern] to [a case they were working on]” because “[t]he sheer number of communications–which were frequently exchanged during the night and on weekends–is inconsistent with [the judge’s] explanation that the communications related to court business.” Id. at 553-554 (judge suspended for nine months without pay).

•Attempting to influence investigation. Where a judge was involved in an automobile accident and “knew one of the investigating officers who arrived at the scene,” “[t]his existing relationship, coupled with [the judge’s] attempted direction to the officer concerning the type of investigation that he should conduct with regard to the other driver, gave rise to an appearance of impropriety” in contravention of MCJC 2. In re Brown (After Remand), 464 Mich 135, 139-141 (2001) (judge suspended for 15 days without pay).

•Misusing authority to influence case. A judge engaged in conduct that “created the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “fail[ed] to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when a county commissioner was arrested for a domestic altercation and the judge “directed his staff to obtain a copy of the initial police report, which was obtained by accessing [the police department’s] computer system at [the courthouse]”; “directed that a fax be sent to the [jail] reporting that he had sent a personal recognizance bond for [the defendant]”; and “did not contact the [police department] for additional information, but relied on the initial investigation report in determining to authorize the bond.” In re Logan, 486 Mich 1050, 1051-1052 (2010) (judge publicly censured).

•Example where engaging in extrajudicial contact does not rise to level of misconduct. A judge did not violate MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C) when he failed to terminate a meeting with an individual whose asset acceptance case was assigned to another judge, and faxed a letter on official district court stationery to the individual’s attorney; while the judge’s actions “reflected poor judgment,” they did not constitute judicial misconduct. In re Hultgren, 482 Mich 358, 361-364 (2008) (judge cautioned “to more carefully conform his actions to the rules and provisions that guide judicial conduct”).

 

Engaging in sexual misconduct.

•Sexual misconduct including criminal activity. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A); “[f]ailed to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner [that] promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B); and “[f]ailed to treat court employees fairly and respectfully, without regard to gender” in violation of MCJC 2(B), when he “[k]issed a female court employee on the lips on several occasions, all of which were not welcome by the employee”; “[m]ade unwelcome physical contact with female court employees, including placing his hands on their buttocks or breasts”; “[m]ade sexually suggestive comments to a female court employee”; “[u]sed court computer equipment to view pornographic web sites via the Internet”; “[r]estricted use of the computer by other court employees in order to cover up his accessing of pornographic websites”; “[w]as charged with 4th-degree criminal sexual conduct . . . for his physical contacts with female court employees”; and “[w]as charged with common-law misconduct in office . . . for physically assaulting employees while serving in a publicly elected office as a district court judge[.]” In re Ford, 469 Mich 1251 (2004) (judge publicly censured, the most severe punishment that may be imposed on a judge who has resigned).

•Sexual harassment. A judge violated MCJC 2(B) by his “comments to two women prosecutors during a murder trial”; specifically, “[b]y his unnecessarily crass and sexual language,” he “did not ‘promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,’” and “by guessing the attorneys’ heights and weights unbidden while eyeing them,” he did not “‘treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect’ ‘[w]ithout regard to a person’s . . . gender[.]’” In re Morrow, 508 Mich 490, 494, 497-498 (2022) (judge publicly censured and suspended for six months without pay).

•Sexual harassment. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he “engaged in a course of conduct constituting sexual harassment” of his judicial secretary for several years; “[a]lthough his misconduct occurred while off the bench, it was serious and related to his administrative duties as a judge.” In re Iddings, 500 Mich 1026, 1029-1030 (2017). The judge’s deliberate “misconduct created an offensive and hostile work environment that directly affected the job performance of his judicial secretary in her dealings with the public and the court’s business and affected the administration of justice.” Id. at 1030 (judge publicly censured and suspended for six months without pay).

•Indecent exposure. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ailed to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he exposed his genitalia to an undercover police officer in an airport bathroom. In re Halloran, 466 Mich 1219, 1220 (2002) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 90 days without pay).

•Inappropriate drawings and comments. A judge violated MCJC 2(A), MCJC 2(B), and MCJC 2(C), when he “compromised the integrity of the court” by making “lewd drawings–one of female breasts and one of a penis–on notes that were attached to two court files” on two separate occasions, and by commenting on the “small chest size” of a female employee during a retirement party at the courthouse. In re Servaas, 484 Mich 634, 639, 641, 651 (2009). While the judge’s “conduct concerning the comment and two drawings was unquestionably inappropriate,” his actions were viewed as “an aberration given his 35 years of apparent unblemished service” as a district court judge. Id. at 637 (judge publicly censured).

 

Exhibiting lack of judicial temperament. 

•Using controversial tone and manner. A judge violated MCJC 2(B), which “provides that ‘[a]t all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary’ and that ‘a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect,’” when his “conduct demonstrate[d] a pattern of persistent interference in and frequent interruption of the trial of cases; impatient, discourteous, critical, and sometimes severe attitudes toward jurors, witnesses, counsel, and others present in the courtroom; and use of a controversial tone and manner in addressing litigants, jurors, witnesses, and counsel,” that “frequently resulted in appellate reversal of trials over which he had presided.” In re Moore, 464 Mich 98, 131-133 (2001). The judge’s conduct “frequently violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and demonstrate[d], on those occasions, a lack of judicial temperament”; “[s]uch behavior undermines public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Id. at 132-133 (judge suspended for six months without pay).

•Engaging in demeaning conduct. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ailed to respect and observe the law and to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), by engaging in “demeaning conduct” toward a defendant in a case where he “was rude, and yelled at [the defendant] without provocation,” and by “deliberate[ly] fail[ing] to comply with the dictates” of the court rule regarding disqualification in a case in which defense counsel had a pending grievance against the judge. In re Bradfield, 465 Mich 1309, 1310-1313 (2002) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

•Failing to be patient and dignified. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and appearance of impropriety” contrary to MCJC 2(A) when he was not “patient and dignified” and made improper comments to and about a defendant that he sentenced to jail for contempt of court; the judge admitted “that some of his comments directed to and about [the defendant] were improper and eroded public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A). In re Post, 493 Mich 974, 976-977 (2013) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

•Using insulting, demeaning, and humiliating language. A judge violated MCJC 2(A), which provides that “‘[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges,’” and MCJC 2(B), which provides that “‘a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect’” when, during a “protracted and highly contentious divorce and custody case,” she “failed to act in a patient, dignified, and judicial manner during the contempt proceedings against the three children, aged 9, 10, and 13, directing to them . . . comments and gestures far exceeding the proper bounds of stern language permitted to a judge.” In re Gorcyca, 500 Mich 588, 595, 614-615 (2017). The judge “did not observe high standards of conduct and did not preserve the integrity of the judiciary when she mocked the children, threatened them, called them ‘crazy’ and ‘brainwashed,’ exaggerated or lied about the conditions at [an out-of-home care, custody, and treatment center], and generally expressed hostility to the children and their mother,” and “exhibited a lack of judicial temperament during the proceedings in open court when she directed at the three children and their mother language that was insulting, demeaning, and humiliating.” Id. at 615, 643 (judge publicly censured).

•Arriving late to work. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), when matters were set for hearing and she repeatedly arrived late to the courthouse because “some of the litigants, attorneys and witnesses may not have been able to have their matter addressed in as timely a fashion as they would have had if [the judge] had arrived at the courthouse by 9 a.m.” In re Gibson, 497 Mich 858, 859-860 (2014) (third alteration in original) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

 

Failing to fulfill judicial duties.

•Engaging in ex parte communications. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and violated the directive to “treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect” “[w]ithout regard to a person’s race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he e-mailed the prosecuting attorney regarding caselaw pertinent to two pending cases, without notifying defense counsel, and proceeded to disparage the prosecutor’s office for alerting defense counsel to the ex parte communications. In re Filip, 503 Mich 956, 959 (2019) (judge publicly censured).

•Failing to properly handle cases and complete work responsibilities. A judge violated MCJC 2 by improperly handling numerous cases; for example, at an arraignment, the judge inexplicably facilitated a defendant’s release, “plac[ing] the interests of [defendant] and his counsel . . . ahead of all other interests, including protection of the public.” In re Hathaway, 464 Mich 672, 674, 682, 690 (2001). And “[t]he improper effort to persuade [a defendant] to waive his right to a jury trial [was] another example of a serious one-time breach of [the judge’s] responsibility to use her judicial power lawfully” that “surely was connected to a more serious problem that was ongoing–her prolonged failure to attend in timely fashion to the business of her court.” Id. at 690, 692 (judge suspended for six months without pay).

•Failing to properly handle cases. A judge violated MCJC 2(A) by engaging in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” when he corresponded with a defendant several times urging the defendant to plead guilty, and when the defendant declined to do so, “knowingly executed and caused to be filed in the [court] records” a judgment of sentence “which falsely stated that [the defendant] had been advised of right to counsel and appointed counsel and had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived that right, and pled guilty to the charged offense”; “[a]s a result of these actions, [the defendant] was denied the opportunity for a hearing and basic due process.” In re Milhouse, 461 Mich 1279, 1279-1282 (2000) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 10 days without pay).

•Failing to follow the law. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A) when she “reduced charges, dismissed charges outright, or modified sentences in at least 20 criminal cases, without holding a hearing and where she had no explicit authority from the prosecutor to do so”; “dismissed at least 32 ticket cases without holding a hearing and where she had no explicit authority from the prosecutor to do so”; “engaged in ex parte communications by considering substantive matters relevant to the merits of the pending proceedings, without the knowledge or consent of the prosecuting attorney”; “engaged in [other] ex parte contacts”; and “declined to appoint a translator for the defendant when she should have.” In re Church, 499 Mich 936, 937-940 (2016) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 120 days without pay “in light of [the judge’s] disclosed serious and debilitating medical condition” and “her acceptance of responsibility”).

•Failing to follow the law. A judge engaged in “irresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “fail[ed] to conduct oneself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(B), when he engaged in misconduct “arising out of criminal cases in which [he] was the presiding judge,” and “the totality of the evidence . . . paint[ed] a portrait of a judicial officer who was unable to separate the authority of the judicial office he holds from his personal convictions.” In re Morrow, 496 Mich 291, 295, 298-299, 299 n 9 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, (1) the judge “closed the courtroom to the public and the victim’s family during a postconviction hearing without specifically stating the reasons for the closure or entering a written order as required by [court rule]” and “subsequently ordered his court reporter not to prepare transcripts of the hearing”; (2) “failed to sentence a defendant . . . with the mandatory minimum . . . as prescribed by [statute], despite the prosecutor’s bringing the relevant statute to his attention,” and “later discharged the defendant from probation without the defendant having served the mandatory [sentence]”; (3) “refused the prosecutor’s request to remand the defendant . . . to jail awaiting sentencing as required by [statute]”; (4) “following the defendant’s guilty plea, . . . dismissed the case sua sponte on the basis that a previous dismissal order was with prejudice,” and “[w]hen the prosecutor informed him that his justification was contradicted by the record[,] . . . [he] stated that the dismissal was ‘conditional with prejudice’”; (5) “failed to place a sidebar conference on the record, failed to rule on the defendant’s request for a curative instruction, and failed to follow instructions from the Court of Appeals to hold an evidentiary hearing on a contested legal issue, and his ruling on remand was not supported by the trial record”; (6) “at the beginning of a trial over which he was to preside . . . left the bench, shook hands with the defendant, and gave a package of documents to defense counsel”; (7) “sua sponte subpoenaed medical records of the defendant without the parties’ knowledge or consent”; and (8) “personally retrieved an inmate from lockup, escorted him to his courtroom, and sentenced him without restraints or courtroom security personnel present.” Id. at 295-297; see also id. at 297 n 3. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that “although judicial officers should strive to do justice, they must do so under the law and within the confines of their adjudicative role.” Id. at 300 (judge suspended for 60 days without pay).

•Failing to follow the law. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ailed to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he arraigned a disruptive individual “for contempt of court outside of his presence [swearing at court staff], based only on the unsworn conversation he had heard between [court staff], his own observations, and his conversation with [the court clerk]”; “did not disqualify himself, or raise the issue of his possible disqualification, based on his receipt of the information communicated in the . . . conversation with [the court clerk]”; and denied the defendant’s motion for disqualification. In re Wiley, 495 Mich 963, 965-966, 968 (2014) (judge publicly censured).

•Failing to advance case. A judge “[f]ailed to conduct oneself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when she adjourned a case numerous times and ultimately recused herself, “at which time 18 months had passed after the arraignment, and a trial had not occurred.” In re Moore, 472 Mich 1207, 1208-1210 (2005) (judge publicly censured).

•Failing to advance cases. A judge violated MCJC 2(A) by engaging in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” when he engaged in “unwarranted delay, inaction and failure to timely act” in two domestic relations cases; specifically, in a spousal support/child support case, he did not render a decision until “approximately 11 months after the hearing and more than three years after remand from the Supreme Court,” and in a divorce case, he “persistently failed to act or was persistently neglectful in performance of his duties,” including “failure to timely decide motions or promptly enter orders after matters were decided by the court.” In re Jelsema, 463 Mich 1229, 1230-1233 (2001). Additionally, the judge “neither submitted a reply nor requested additional time to respond” to the JTC’s initiation to comment on the two grievances. Id. at 1231, 1233 (judge publicly censured).

•Resolving child custody dispute with coin flip. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A), when she resolved a disputed child custody issue by the flip of a coin. In re Brown, 468 Mich 1228, 1232 (2003). The judge “expresse[d] her deep regret for her conduct . . . and for the resulting negative impact on the public perception of judges, the institutional integrity of the judiciary, and the administration of justice.” Id. at 1228, 1231 (judge publicly censured).

 

Misusing position. 

•Misusing judicial office for personal benefit. A judge engaged in “[i]mpropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A); “[f]ailed to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B); and abused “the prestige of office to advance personal business interests” contrary to MCJC 2(C), when he “used official [court] stationery to solicit donations to produce and implement two educational programs and for business correspondence pertaining to the production of related materials”; “used official stationery to solicit contributions to finance events and activities related to these programs, including prominent placement of his name and judicial status in advertising for a concert to benefit his projects”; and “utilized the funds also to publicize himself.” In re Thompson, 470 Mich 1347, 1347-1348 (2004) (judge suspended for 90 days without pay and ordered to pay costs).

•Misusing judicial office for personal benefit. A judge engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(A); “[f]ailed to respect and observe the law and to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B); and “[a]llowed social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment” in violation of MCJC 2(C), by (1) “engag[ing] in conduct which reasonably could be viewed as sexually offensive toward a subordinate by altering a screen saver message on her computer screen”; (2) “misus[ing] certain court facilities and equipment, property, or personnel for his personal use”; (3) “engag[ing] in a verbal confrontation with the manager of [a local movie theater], identif[ying] himself as a district court judge, and [being] uncooperative when he was asked to leave”; and (4) purchasing a vehicle that he drove for approximately two weeks “without displaying the temporary paper license plates.” In re Trudel, 465 Mich 1314, 1314-1315, 1317 (2002) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 90 days without pay).

•Engaging in inappropriate relationship. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he responded to a card from a defendant on court stationery and inquired if she was interested in seeing him romantically, and continued to e-mail with her thereafter; and when he contacted a judge that had been assigned a criminal case involving a former neighbor. In re Mazur, 498 Mich 923, 924-926 (2015) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

•Misusing judicial office to solicit money from defendants for a charitable cause. A magistrate was presiding over traffic citations and permitted a police officer to sit at a table next to the podium in the courtroom with a bag of tickets from a local field day, and “dismissed the tickets of defendants pleading responsible or who were found responsible and advised them to purchase tickets from the police officer”; “[s]ome defendants were asked how many children they planned to take and if the number was too low they were told they needed to take more children,” and “[o]thers were told to ‘dig deeper,’ call someone, or go to an ATM machine.” In re Shannon, 465 Mich 1304, 1305 (2002). “In one case a defendant was asked how much money he had” and “[w]hen the defendant said he had $116 on him, [the magistrate] told him to buy $100 worth of tickets”; “[t]he average ticket purchase was approximately $50 per person.” Id. The magistrate’s “conduct, whether well intentioned or not, gave the appearance of using the powers of his position as magistrate to solicit money from defendants for a charitable cause” and constituted “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving the appearance of impropriety,” contrary to MCJC 2(A). Shannon, 465 Mich at 1305-1306 (magistrate publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

•Engaging in inappropriate political activity. A judge engaged in “conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), “which erodes public confidence in the judiciary,” when she engaged in inappropriate political activity while a judge or judicial candidate by simultaneously running for judge and mayor, and failing to discontinue mayoral campaign activities after she was elected to the position of judge and signed the oath of office for an upcoming six-year term; and when she engaged in inappropriate campaign conduct/soliciting contribution when she identified herself as treasurer of her campaign committee and solicited donations to her campaign on her website. In re Sanders, 485 Mich 1045, 1046-1049 (2010) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 21 days without pay).

•Engaging in imprudent behavior. A judge violated MCJC 2(A) by engaging in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary,” “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,” and “fail[ing] to willingly and freely accept restrictions on conduct, present due to constant public scrutiny, that might be viewed as burdensome on the ordinary citizen,” when he “used his cell phone to make a digital image of himself after completing a half-marathon and captioned the photograph . . . ‘[f]it in my 50’s’”; “showed the digital image to a number of people, including his family, police officers, and deputies who worked in or passed through his courtroom” including digitally sending the image to a sheriff’s department employee “either at her request or on his own . . . approximately a year after it was made”; when interviewed by a reporter, “conducted himself in a flippant manner and did not give the interview the seriousness he should have,” bringing “shame and obloquy to the judiciary”; and, when discussing the digital image with the reporter, stated “‘[t]here is no shame in my game.’” In re McCree, 493 Mich 873, 874-875 (2012) (judge publicly censured).

•Engaging in imprudent behavior. A judge “fail[ed] to avoid all impropriety and appearances of impropriety to ensure that public confidence in the judiciary was not eroded” contrary to MCJC 2(A), and “fail[ed] to conduct oneself at all times in a manner which would promote the public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when she sent a letter to a sheriff’s association concerning the association’s endorsement of a candidate in the judicial primary that raised questions about the moral fiber of the candidate and her spouse and “did not undertake to independently verify the truth or falsity of the representations[.]” In re Fortinberry, 474 Mich 1203, 1204-1206 (2006) (judge publicly censured).

 

Engaging in misconduct involving alcohol/drugs.

•Driving while intoxicated. A judicial candidate engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A); engaged in “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A)”; and “[f]ail[ed] to respect and observe the law and to conduct herself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to the MCJC 2(B). This conduct was made applicable to respondent, as a judicial candidate, by MCJC 5 when, while running for office, she was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and littering. In re McDonald, 503 Mich 1013, 1016 (2019). Following her election to the bench, she pled guilty to disorderly conduct - littering, with a plea agreement for a delayed sentence and dismissal upon successful completion of probation, and admitted to careless driving. Id (judge suspended for 45 days without pay).

•Driving while intoxicated. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct that erodes public confidence in the judiciary” and “[c]onduct involving the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A), and “[f]ailed to conduct oneself at all times in a manner that would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he operated a motor vehicle with a high blood alcohol content “by towing a boat and trailer out of the water at a public launch and parking on the shoulder of a public road,” and ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. In re Tabbey, 497 Mich 900, 901-902 (2014) (judge publicly censured and suspended for 90 days without pay).

•Driving while intoxicated. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A); “[c]onduct involving the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A); and “[f]ail[ed] to conduct oneself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he “consumed at least four sixteen-ounce glasses of beer” and then drove “at speeds around or in excess of 100 miles per hour.” In re Nebel, 485 Mich 1049, 1049-1050 (2010). The judge’s breath tests “revealed that his bodily alcohol content was 0.09 per 210 liters of breath,” and he was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and ultimately pled guilty to a lesser charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired. Id. at 1050 (judge publicly censured and suspended for 90 days without pay).

•Using controlled substance. A judge engaged in “[i]rresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary” in violation of MCJC 2(A); “[c]onduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2(A); and “[f]ailed to conduct oneself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” contrary to MCJC 2(B), when he smoked marijuana at a concert and admitted that he used marijuana approximately twice per year during his judicial tenure, because he was simultaneously “trying[,] convicting, and sentencing individuals in his court who had been charged with marijuana offenses.” In re Gilbert, 469 Mich 1224, 1225-1227 (2003) (judge publicly censured and suspended for six months without pay, without credit for an earlier leave of absence).

 

 

 

Grievance investigations concerning various administrative and court-related matters.

•Engaging in excessive absenteeism. A judge had extremely poor work attendance in the preceding two years (66 days and 46 days), in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 14-4 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Engaging in excessive absenteeism/tardiness. A judge had a high rate of absenteeism and tardiness that was a long-standing issue relating to their service on the bench, including frequent late arrival to court and failure to take the bench at the time their docket was scheduled to begin, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 13-1 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Engaging in ex parte communications. A judge had an ex parte conversation with the officer in charge of the case regarding the retention of evidence, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 18-4 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Failing to disclose fee referral relationship. A part-time municipal judge failed to disclose a fee referral relationship between a private attorney that practiced before the court and the law firm where the judge was a shareholder, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 16-4 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Failing to fulfill judicial responsibilities. A judge appointed a private attorney as a ‘discovery master/facilitator’ in a case that was assigned to the judge so that the judge would not have to preside over potentially long and tedious motion hearings, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 14-6 (dismissed with a caution).

•Failing to recuse. A judge who failed to recuse on a case in which another family member, who is also a judge, signed the search warrant, did not violate MCJC 2 because the judge ultimately recognized the duty not to review a search warrant signed by a family member. JTC Case Summary, 19-3 (dismissed).

•Giving preferential treatment to friend. A judge considered and granted their friend’s incomplete and misleading request for court-appointed counsel when the friend was a defendant in a criminal case and then appointed the judge’s own child to represent the friend, in violation of MCJC 2(A), MCJC 2(B), and MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 14-2 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Making public statement about pending matter. A judge criticized another judge’s sentence of a defendant one day after the sentencing, and before the defendant had exhausted their remedies before the sentencing judge or their opportunity to appeal, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 18-7 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Responding to disqualification request with form letter. A judge’s response to a request for disqualification with a form letter advising the individual to file a motion or consult an attorney did not violate MCJC 2(A); however, the judge could have referred the motion for disqualification to the chief judge for review. JTC Case Summary, 16-5 (dismissed).

•Seeking preferential treatment for defendant. A judicial official asked another judicial official to give preferential treatment to a defendant who was akin to family, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 13-5 (dismissed with an admonition).

 

Grievance investigations concerning various matters in court.

•Exhibiting improper behavior. A judge exhibited dismissive and impatient behavior towards a litigant by using a brusque tone of voice, making accusations that the litigant was lying, not giving the litigant an opportunity to explain their case, and threatening to have the litigant arrested when the litigant attempted to rebut the judge’s unfounded accusations, despite no apparent security risk, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 21-1 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Exhibiting improper behavior. A judge appeared extremely biased by holding an unnecessarily lengthy hearing and ordering costs aimed at punishing the plaintiff rather than fairly compensating the defendant in one case, and knowingly violating a standing disqualification order in another case, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 16-1 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Imposing unduly harsh sanction. A judge imposed an eight-month parenting time prohibition against a party for failing to appear at a hearing in a divorce case, without explanation or justification for the harsh sanction, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 13-6 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Issuing a bond order after recusal and making improper remarks. A judge issued a bond order after granting a motion for recusal when they should have refrained from taking any action in the case, and referred to the criminal histories and/or professional disciplinary history of a party and the grievant, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 14-5 (dismissed with a caution).

•Making improper remarks. A judge made pretrial remarks warning a defendant of additional consequences of exercising the right to a jury trial if convicted after presenting a frivolous defense, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 19-9 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Making improper remarks. A judge told a defendant that they would send the defendant to jail if convicted following a jury trial, challenged defense counsel’s trial experience in defendant’s presence, suggested that defense counsel was urging a jury trial for counsel’s own benefit, and attempted to dissuade the defendant from proceeding with a jury trial, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 19-6 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Making improper remarks. A judge used language at sentencing that conveyed to an objective person that it was the judge’s desire that the defendant had been killed, rather than arrested and convicted, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 18-3 (dismissed with a caution).

•Making improper remarks. A judge stated during a felony sentencing hearing that it was their practice to sentence a defendant at the top of the guidelines following a jury trial, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 17-2 (dismissed with a caution).

•Making improper remarks. A judge exhibited intense anger during a meeting with a social support agency; told a defendant that, as a judge, they could tell the defendant when to urinate; told a defendant that police officers may lie to him; and had a lengthy history of using profanities with other judges, attorneys, and court officers, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary 16-6 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Making improper remarks. A judge attempted to intimidate a defendant who failed to appear for a hearing by calling the defendant’s cell phone and sarcastically insinuating that the defendant’s capture and punishment were the judge’s personal goals, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 15-1 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Making improper remarks. A judge made disrespectful and discourteous comments in two cases, saying they were “a king on [their] throne” and did not have to show the defendant “a damn thing” following a request to see the verified criminal complaint, and telling the defendant to “go away” at the conclusion of a foreclosure hearing, in violation of MCJC 2(B); however, the comments were made in cases with extremely difficult litigants, and the judge expressed remorse and acknowledged their lack of judicial temperament. JTC Case Summary, 14-3 (dismissed with an explanation).

•Making improper remarks. A judge publicly referred to a fellow judge in an extremely derogatory manner, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 13-4 (dismissed with a caution).

•Resolving dispute unconventionally. A judge who resolved a dispute by drawing a name out of a hat did not violate MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B) where that method of resolution was as sound as any other decision under the circumstances; however, the situation created the impression that the judge was being cavalier about their judicial role and abdicating judicial responsibility. JTC Case Summary, 21-4 (dismissed with an explanation).

 

Grievance investigations concerning various matters outside of court.

•Executing untruthful document for personal benefit. A judge executed a document indicating that their rental property was their principal residence thereby wrongfully obtaining the homestead property tax exemption for it, and failed to obtain a landlord’s license as required by the municipality in which the rental property was located, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 13-3 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Exhibiting inappropriate behavior. A judge threw a can at, and used vulgar language toward, volunteers at a public event, in violation of MCJC 2. JTC Case Summary, 15-2 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Failing to identify supporter. A judge failed to identify the person paying for their printed judicial campaign materials, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 20-3 (dismissed with a caution).

•Financially benefiting from event planned by court staff. A judge attended an event planned for them by their court staff, at which they accepted a large monetary gift from ticket sales proceeds, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 13-8 (dismissed with a caution).

•Making personal inquiry and request on friend’s behalf. A judge called the arresting officer to make a bond inquiry when their friend was arrested and then called the magistrate to request that their friend be released from jail and given a personal bond, in violation of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 18-2 (dismissed with a caution).

•Obtaining firearm conviction. A judge was convicted of carrying a firearm in a sterile area of a commercial airport, in violation of MCJC 2(B). JTC Case Summary, 16-2 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Obtaining impaired driving conviction. A judge pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, in violation of MCJC 2(B) (while public action is typically pursued against judicial officers who violate MCJC 2(B) in this way, the judge’s resignation rendered any formal action moot). JTC Case Summary 14-10 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Participating in certain fundraising events. A judge officiated a game at a fundraiser for an organization that routinely provides several services in cases before the judge’s court, and served as an auctioneer for another agency’s fundraiser, in violation of MCJC 2(B) and MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 20-7 (dismissed with a caution).

•Permitting business entity to use prestige of office for marketing purposes. A judge permitted a business entity that handled their campaign to utilize the prestige of their judicial office in relation to its marketing efforts, in violation of MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 19-1 (dismissed with a caution).

•Publicly endorsing candidate. A judge gave permission for a sign supporting a candidate for nonjudicial office to be placed on their property which amounted to a highly visible public endorsement, in violation of MCJC 2(A). JTC Case Summary, 14-9 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Using prestige of office to promote personal business interests. A judge used the prestige of their office to promote their personal business interests by appearing in a judicial robe, in the judge’s courtroom, in a newspaper article and a social media post that highlighted a product the judge was selling, in violation of MCJC 2(C). JTC Case Summary, 18-6 (dismissed with an admonition).

 

 

Guidance on engaging in various matters in court.

•Understanding technology including artificial intelligence. “Judicial officers have an ethical obligation to understand technology, including artificial intelligence, and take reasonable steps to ensure that AI tools on which their judgment will be based are used properly and that the AI tools are utilized within the confines of the law and court rules.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-155, October 27, 2023. “Further, as AI rapidly advances, judicial officers have an ethical duty to maintain technological competence and understand AI’s ethical implications to ensure efficiency and quality of justice.” Id. MCJC 2(B) and MCJC 2(C) “could be triggered, for example, if a judicial officer uses an AI solution that is considered partial or unfair and may influence the officer’s judgment”; “[t]his could occur if the tool’s algorithm or training data creates bias.” EO JI-155. “Specifically, if an AI tool’s algorithm’s output deviates from accepted norms, would the output influence judicial decisions in violation of [MCJC 2(C)]? EO JI-155. “An algorithm may weigh factors that the law or society deem inappropriate or do so with a weight that is inappropriate in the context presented”; “AI does not understand the world as humans do, and unless instructed otherwise, its results may reflect an ignorance of norms or case law precedent.” Id.

•Disclosing prior relationship between judicial officer and lawyer. “[I]f a judicial officer and a lawyer appearing before the court have divorced or have terminated their prior dating relationship, disclosure must be provided to all parties in order for the parties to have the opportunity to motion the court for disqualification or for the court to raise the issue of disqualification,” in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety under MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-153, November 4, 2022.

•Permitting plea bargain in which prosecutor requires defendant to pay prosecution fee in exchange for a sentence reduction. “A judge may not sanction a plea bargain in a criminal case in which the prosecutor requires the defendant to pay a ‘costs of prosecution’ fee to the prosecutor’s office in return for a reduction or dismissal of the pending criminal offense”; “[t]his practice raises several ethical issues not the least of which is that the judge is asked to condone the position that justice is for sale to those who have the resources to pay for a reduction in charges and detrimental to those who do not have sufficient assets to pay the prosecutor’s assessment.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-117, January 9, 1998. “This on its face is contrary to [MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C)] as the conduct would create in reasonable minds that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired” and “would further reflect that the judge is using the prestige and power of his office to advance the business interests of the prosecutor’s office.” EO JI-117. “It is essential that the pubic have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice” and “[t]his requires that public officials not only in fact properly discharge their responsibilities but also that they avoid, as much as possible, the appearance of impropriety.” Id.

•Sentencing offenders to community service work to compile statistics for election. “A judge may not sentence offenders to community service work to compile statistics on the number of cases handled in the court by candidates for a vacancy on the court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-107, June 18, 1996. MCJC 2(C) “forbids a judge from using the prestige of judicial office to advance the business interests of the judge or others”; “[w]hile a judge may personally speak as an individual on behalf of or support another candidate for judicial office, the judge may not use the prestige of the judicial office . . . to do so.” EO JI-107.

•Providing deposition testimony. “A lawyer may seek the testimony of a sitting judge at deposition if the judge/witness is properly subpoenaed” because MCJC 2(D)² “states that a judge should not appear as a witness in a court proceeding unless subpoenaed” and “[i]n this situation, the judge/witness will be properly subpoenaed.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-57, August 24, 1992. Further, MCJC 2(B) “requires judges to respect and observe the law and to conduct themselves to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” and “[p]roviding requested information within the judge’s knowledge and expertise regarding a dispute before the courts enhances, not detracts, from the integrity of the judiciary, and visibly demonstrates that the judge/witness is participating in legal proceedings the same manner as other citizens.” EO JI-57.

•Imposing sentences requiring payment to specific entity. “A judge may not impose sentences requiring criminal defendants to pay moneys which are allocated to educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic activities, unless the sentencing practice has been authorized by law.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-55, June 22, 1992. Judges are allowed “to participate in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic activities, but . . . may not personally solicit funds for any civic/charitable organization, nor use the prestige of judicial office for solicitation purposes” under MCJC 2(C). EO JI-55. “Unless a sentencing practice has been authorized by law, a judge’s imposition of that sentence is unethical.” Id.

•Imposing sentences with option of community service or contributing to designated charity. “A sentencing judge may not give offenders the option of performing a designated number of hours of community service work or making a monetary contribution to a charity designated by the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-48, March 10, 1992. Under MCJC 2(C), “[a] judge should not use the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others.” EO JI-48. “If judges are forbidden to solicit for charity, clearly judges cannot direct contributions by requesting or requiring offenders to donate contributions in lieu of fine or jail time to charities designated by the judge.” Id. “Just because the option of making cash contributions to the court’s charity in lieu of performing a certain number of hours of community service work is in addition to the more traditional sentences of time and fine does not make the sentencing practice any more acceptable.” Id. “The sentencing judge is left open to the accusation that a particular community service alternative is intentionally more burdensome than required in order to encourage monetary contributions to the judge’s charity,” and “[t]he judicial imposition of dollars for hours also discriminates in favor of those more affluent offenders who have the means to buy out of community service work.” Id.

•Preventing unauthorized practice of law. “Judges have an ethical duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law,” and under MCJC 2(B), “[j]udges have a clear duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial process through the observance of law making it unlawful for a person to practice law without a license.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-26, June 29, 1990. Additionally:

“Administrative responsibilities of judges require them to instruct court personnel to regularly check pleadings filed with the court for signature and professional identification (“P” number) to assure the person representing a party is a member of the State Bar. Judges must instruct court staff to reject pleadings having no professional identification unless the person is appearing pro se.

A judge who knows of unauthorized practice of law activity must take steps to prevent the unauthorized practice and report the incident to authorities empowered to act upon the matter.

When unauthorized practice of law activity occurs within the presence of a judge, the judge must stop the proceeding; place as much information on the record as possible; advise the party to seek the services of a licensed lawyer; and take other remedial action authorized by law.

When unauthorized practice of law activity occurs outside the presence of a judge, the judge must report the incident to the appropriate authority empowered to investigate the matter.

The duty to report unauthorized practice of law activity requires judges to report all relevant information, including but not limited to (a) names and addresses of all persons having information concerning the matter, (b) transcripts of proceedings recorded, and (c) copies of all available pleadings, documents and correspondence.

A judge who suspects that a party has or is receiving legal assistance from an unlicensed person outside the presence of the judge should report the incident to the appropriate authority empowered to investigate the matter.” Id.

 

Guidance on engaging in various matters outside of court.

•Attending law firm-sponsored events. “Judicial officers must consider whether attending a law firm event will compromise their duty to avoid impropriety or even the appearance of impropriety as well as whether attendance would lower the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary per [MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B)].” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-156, February 9, 2024. “Depending on circumstances, attendance at a law firm event may suggest to the public that the law firm has a special relationship or influence over the judicial officer, creating the appearance of partiality of the judicial officer towards the firm.” Id. MCJC 2(C) “provides that a judge should not allow ‘social[] or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.’” EO JI-156. “To determine whether attendance at the law firm event would invite the appearance of impropriety or influence,” “a judicial officer must consider attendance from the perspective of a reasonable objective observer.” Id. “Judicial officers must consider whether their attendance carries the prestige of their office and lends credence to the law firm and/or the event in violation of [MCJC 2(C)].” EO JI-156. “While a law firm’s event may be a social affair initially thought to be ordinary social hospitality, judicial officers must be aware that law firm events are often attended by lawyers, spouses, clients, and prospective clients and are typically used to promote the business of the law firm.” Id. “Concerning financing, law firms usually consider these events as business expenses.” Id. “This consideration should be taken into account when a judicial officer is considering an invitation to an event.” Id.

•Accepting a referral fee earned prior to assuming the bench. “A judge may accept a referral fee earned prior to assuming the bench provided the judge disqualify herself or himself from all matters involving the law firm or lawyer to which the case was referred until final payment is made, with very limited exceptions”; MCJC 2 “require[s] disqualification on any matter involving the law firm or lawyer from whom the referral fee is owed until full payment of the referral fee,” and “[o]nce final payment is made, the lawyers may appear before the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-150, November 8, 2021.

•Participating in civic and charitable activities. “A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities which meet the following limitations and/or criteria:

1. The activities may not detract from the dignity of the judicial office.

2. The activities may not interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

3. The activities may not reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality.

4. The activities may not give the appearance of impropriety.

5. The judge may serve and be listed as an officer, director, trustee or nonlegal advisor of a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization and serve as a member of an honorary committee or join a general appeal of such an organization only if: (a) it is unlikely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge; (b) it is unlikely the organization will become engaged in adversary proceedings in any court; (c) the judge does not personally solicit funds; and (d) the prestige of the judicial office is not used for solicitation of funds or membership.

6. The judge may speak at or receive an award in connection with an event of a[n] educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, and even allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the event, but may not individually solicit funds.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, J-8, January 31, 2014.

“A judge is permitted to solicit membership in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization as long as the membership solicitation is not included in the same letter as a solicitation of funds.” EO J-8. “But, a judge should not participate in membership solicitation if doing so could be perceived as using the prestige of the judicial office to coerce participation due to [MCJC 2(A)].” EO J-8.

•Hosting a commercially-sponsored program. “A judge’s hosting of a commercially-sponsored program has the potential to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or judicial office, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, exploit the judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves”; “it is difficult to envision how hosting on a regular basis any commercially-sponsored program would not place the judge in contravention of [MCJC 2(C)’s] proscription against the use of the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-137, May 11, 2012.

•Displaying an attorney’s for-profit educational courses and materials. “The display of an attorney’s for-profit educational courses and materials should not be allowed in the court clerk’s office or in any area the public may perceive to be under the court clerk’s control or other court staff’s control”; “[n]otwithstanding the educational nature of the materials and even where the author’s name is clearly displayed, display of material the sale of which promotes an attorney’s business interests in such an area could be perceived as violating [MCJC 2(A)] concerning a judge avoiding all impropriety and any appearance of impropriety, as well as [MCJC 2(C)], concerning judges using their prestige of office to advance personal business interests of others because the court clerk’s office is an arm of or under the control of the court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-135, October 15, 2010.

•Moderating a forum conducted by a political party. Because MCJC 2 “obligates all judges to avoid impropriety, and the appearance of impropriety, . . . a judicial officer may serve as moderator at a forum on criminal justice initiatives conducted by a political party provided the judge does not comment on pending or impending cases in any court; the judge does not take a position on a legislative initiative that would preclude the judge from later presiding over a case or controversy involving the matter; and, the judge’s participation does not interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial duties.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-121, April 23, 1999.

•Participating in public protest. “A judge may not participate in a public protest against a group or organization which advocates against a particular race, ethnic group or religion.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-109, August 6, 1996. Where “[t]he judge would be appearing in public as a part of a protest against some of the persons, presumably, who may appear before the judge in unrelated matters” and “[t]he protest targets a particular segment of society,” it is important to “preserve a forum in which those persons may be fairly and impartially heard.” EO JI-109; see also MCJC 2(A), MCJC 2(B), and MCJC 2(F).

•Taking position on proposal. “A judge may take a position on a proposal to eliminate adult education in the state to the extent that the position addresses the impact of the proposal on the administration of justice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-108, June 25, 1996. “The matters of educational opportunities and educational resources are significant to the legal system and the administration of justice”; “[i]n fact, the impact of education generally on the social and economic factors material to poverty and crime is a serious matter of interest to the justice system,” and “[t]he concerns and advice of the judiciary are to be welcome.” Id. Accordingly, insofar “as a judge’s public comments on adult education are limited to its impact on the administration of justice, they are not unethical.” Id. However, “the subject of education is often fraught with partisan political considerations, and a judge should therefore be especially mindful of the provisions of [MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C).]” EO JI-108.

•Using jury records for personal election mailings and soliciting support from jurors. “A judge may not use jury records for the judge’s personal election mailings” and “may not personally solicit public statements of support from persons who have served as jurors in the judge’s court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-104, October 5, 1995. MCJC 2(C) “would prohibit the judge from using judicial office, i.e., access to records because of his judicial position, to enhance personal election chances”; “[t]herefore the juror information the judge has acquired is not available for the purposes of soliciting campaign support.” EO JI-104.

•Teaching law course. “A judge may teach a law course as long as the obligations of teaching do not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties”; however, “[a] judge may not serve as a contributing editor of a journal of political opinion” because “[i]f the judge is responsible for editing the journal, the judge would probably be soliciting articles and contacting authors about editing changes” and “the prestige of the judge’s judicial office would thus be brought into play for the private interests of the publication, contravening [MCJC 2(C)].” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-99, March 15, 1995.

•Transferring law practice. “Whether or not a lawyer may ‘assign’ a law practice is a question of law”; “[a] lawyer may not offer or make an agreement to transfer a law practice when:

(a) there is no provision for client consent to the transfer of the client’s file and transfer of lawyer responsibility for the matter;

(b) the transferring lawyer assumes judicial office and continues to be actively involved in the law practiced by the transferred firm; or

(c) the transferring lawyer assumes judicial office and maintains a continuing financial or business interest in the former law practice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-89, April 8, 1994.

“To the extent a transfer perpetuates the name of an elected judge’s former law practice, the practice is not permitted”; “[a] lawyer who assumes judicial office may not allow the judge’s name to remain in the former firm’s name and members of the firm are prohibited from using the judge’s name in the firm name or in professional notices” in accordance with MCJC 2(C). EO JI-89. Further, “[a] judge may not plan to utilize or utilize the library, secretary, conference room, or other assets of the judge’s former law firm on a regular basis after assuming judicial office” because “[s]uch on-going contact and access to a private law practice raises questions regarding judicial impropriety in contravention of [MCJC 2(C)]”; accordingly, “the judge’s ongoing use of the judge’s former private law facility is improper.” EO JI-89.

•Receiving compensation for legal material. “A judge may write an article containing general legal information, provide work product for inclusion in an educational pamphlet or cassette tape sold for profit, and receive compensation therefor, provided that the promotion and sale of the material is not an exploitation of the author’s judicial position and the activity does not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties” under MCJC 2(C). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-76, December 9, 1993.

•Accepting scholarships or fellowships to attend professional development seminars. “A judge may accept scholarships or fellowships in order to attend professional development seminars provided they are awarded on the same terms as applied to nonjudicial applicants and do not adversely reflect upon the judge’s impartiality toward persons whose interests come before the judge,” and “[a] judge may compete for scholarship funds to attend a professional seminar designed to develop leadership and networking for women.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-75, November 16, 1993. However, “[t]he underlying purpose for the scholarship or fellowship may . . . be subject to circumspection.” Id. “For instance, pursuant to [MCJC 2(A)], judges must recognize that they are the subject of constant public scrutiny and must refrain from actions that may be improper or have the appearance of bias.” EO JI-75. “The participation in any event that excludes any person based upon a personal characteristic, i.e., gender, may lead an individual to conclude that a particular personal characteristic may be grounds for prejudice or favorable bias by the participating judge in matters before that court.” Id. “Therefore, it would appear to be prudent for a judge to refrain from association with an organization which admittedly, and in fact, excludes a particular gender from participation.” Id. Additionally, “[t]o the degree that the association seeks to exclusively promote individuals based upon their gender, a judge must exercise extreme caution before participation in activities which fall under the conduct proscribed by [MCJC 2(F)].” EO JI-75. In sum, “a judge’s participation in alumna associations or other organizations whose sole purpose is to promote a particular gender or other personal characteristic to influential positions to the exclusion of others should be carefully considered.” Id.

•Providing services as conciliator. “A judge should not provide services as a conciliator in disputes that are likely subjects of arbitration or litigation” because doing so “might well be viewed as exploitative of the court’s prestige and influence and therefore inappropriate” under MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-69, June 21, 1993.

•Participating in health education and social awareness activities. “A judge may participate in health education and social awareness activities such as AIDS prevention, and encourage other persons to support the same cause”; however, “[a] judge should not wear on the judicial robe symbols indicating the judge’s support or opposition to a particular political, social, or charitable/civic cause.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-68, April 26, 1993. “Wearing the AIDS ribbon would publicly identify the judge with the AIDS educational program,” and “[t]he wearing of a ribbon for this purpose on street clothes outside the courtroom neither detracts from the integrity and impartiality of office or gives the impression the judge is using the prestige of office to advance the business interests of the judge or others” under MCJC 2(C). EO JI-68. However, “a judge should not wear [such a symbol] on the judicial robe.” Id.

•Sitting with spouse at political event. “A judge’s spouse may serve on the campaign committee of a nonjudicial candidate and appear as a committee member on campaign letterhead.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-47, March 6, 1992. MCJC 2(A) “is broad in its scope, and concerned with any activity that may impair a judge’s perception in the public eye.” EO JI-47. Because “a judge must avoid ‘all impropriety and appearance of impropriety’” under MCJC 2(A), and may not allow the prestige of the judicial office to be used for the personal or business interests of others” under MCJC 2(C), “it is not simply the judge’s conduct which must be restricted.” EO JI-47. However, “[t]he name of the spouse, and not the judge, is simply appearing on stationery in his/her capacity as a committee member” and “[t]his does not reflect any impropriety on the part of the judge, nor does it suggest the judge’s public endorsement of a nonjudicial candidate.” Id. “A spouse should not have to hide his/her identity from an election when it is proper for the judge to participate directly in the activities.” Id. Further, “[a] judge may sit on the dais with the judge’s spouse who is serving as co-chairperson of a political party social event.” Id. “When considering the possibility of any benefit to the sponsoring political organization from the judge’s attendance at a dinner as spouse of an organizer, it seems that the benefit is minimal”; “[t]he judge is a guest like anyone else” and “is not giving any speeches, nor is the judge responsible for organizing the dinner.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he judge is not overstepping boundaries by sitting on the dais with the judge’s spouse at a political gathering.” Id.

•Selling law books. “A judge may . . . sell his/her law books to a lawyer who is likely to come before the court on which the judge serves if a device [is] used to shield the identity of the purchaser, such as a blind trust” without running afoul of MCJC 2 because “[a]n indirect sale (via a device to shield purchaser identity) would not violate the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct as long as the identity of the purchaser remains undisclosed to the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-40, July 29, 1991.

•Selling computer program. “A judge who has developed a computer program which will produce forms for use by lawyers may sell the program to a lawyer or other person as a distributor.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-21, May 11, 1990. Under MCJC 2(C), “[a] judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment” and “should not use the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others”; accordingly, “[t]he judge may retain a royalty for the units sold, but may not take part in the marketing of the product or be retained in any advisory capacity as to technical questions concerning the product,” and “should have no ownership in the purchaser entity, nor have any rights in the operation by which the product is distributed.” EO JI-21.

•Repaying campaign loans. “A judicial candidate’s campaign committee should first repay loans to other creditors before repaying loans made by the candidate to his committee” because “[t]hough it is proper for a candidate to loan the committee monies and be later reimbursed from its funds,” “establishing first priority to those funds violates the spirit if not the language of . . . MCJC 2 where a judge must ‘. . . avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety.’” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-7, July 7, 1989. “[T]he circumstance of first priority repayment gives the appearance of private benefit to the candidate to the exclusion of other lenders or contributors, particularly where shortfall results.” Id.

•Attending a court proceeding of family member. “A judge may attend a deposition or hearing in order to provide moral support for a party who is within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to the judge, or for other persons with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-15, November 9, 1989. “As a public figure and member of the judicial branch of government, a judge’s presence at a hearing or other proceeding will inevitably be noticed and an inference can be drawn that the judge is attempting to influence the outcome of the hearing or the conduct of the deposition.” Id. “Whether or not this is true, an appearance of impropriety can arise from the judge’s involvement in a legal matter to which the judge is neither party, nor witness, and otherwise has no legally cognizable interest requiring the judge’s presence at the proceeding”; however, “[t]his inference should be balanced by the concern of the judge when a party in the proceeding is a member of the judge’s family.” Id. “Therefore, a judge is precluded from appearing at a proceeding to provide[] emotional support, unless the other person is related to the judge within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, or is a person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.” Id.

 

Guidance on serving on various organizations.

•Serving on charitable or non-profit organization. “A judge may serve as a member of an honorary committee or may join a general appeal on behalf of a charitable organization and may speak at or receive an award or other recognition in connection with an event of such an organization and a judge may allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the judge’s involvement in an event so long as the judge does not individually solicit funds”; “[a]llowing the use of the prestige of the judge’s office does not create an appearance of impropriety” in violation of MCJC 2. State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-139, October 21, 2013. “[A] judge may not serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a charitable or non-profit organization if the organization is regularly engaged in adversary proceedings before any court or is likely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the particular judge”; engaged in proceedings “includes, but is not limited to, providing testimony or documentary evidence to the court or participating in case status conferences in certain types of cases on a regular basis.” EO JI-39. “The Code of Judicial Conduct must be read as a whole and although [MCJC 4] would (with some restrictions as noted) allow a judge to participate as an officer, director, trustee or nonlegal advisor, if doing so in a particular instance violates the principles of [MCJC 2], the judge may not then participate in that particular instance.” EO JI-139. “Nor may a judge serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a charitable or non-profit organization where the sole purpose of the charitable or non-profit organization is to raise money for the court’s own court-ordered programs” because “[t]o do so would be a violation of [MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(C)] as serving in the capacity stated is more than merely allowing the use of the prestige of office permitted under this provision.” EO JI-139. “A judge’s involvement in this capacity with such a charitable or non-profit organization may create an appearance that the judge has a vested interest in requiring parties appearing before the specialty court to participate in programs run by a non-profit or charitable organization of which the judge is an officer, director, trustee or nonlegal advisor--particularly if the court were to order the party to pay a fee to that entity as part of participating in such a program.” Id.

•Serving on executive agency.“A district court magistrate may not concurrently serve on a city board of police commissioners.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-94, July 27, 1994. “Although the board of police commissioners may serve to facilitate the administration of justice by reviewing and investigating citizen complaints against officers, the fundamental principles of impartiality, independence and integrity of a judge are in conflict with the member’s role on the commission”; “[a]ccordingly, a district court magistrate’s simultaneous service on the city board of police commissioners violates [MCJC 2(B)] by destroying the magistrate’s appearance of impartiality.” EO JI-94.

•Serving as a member of an independent law revision commission. “A judge may sit as a member of an independent law revision commission providing information and assistance to the Legislature so long as the duties of the commission are limited to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice and so long as the membership of the committee does not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-67, March 30, 1993. “It is clear that a judicial officer is required not only to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” under MCJC 2(B), “but also to bear the burden of contributing to the improvement of the law, the legal system and the administration of justice, including the revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice.” EO JI-67.

•Serving on political action committee. “A judge may not serve on a legislative affairs and political action committee whose mission is to support pro-business oriented candidates to partisan or nonpartisan offices.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-65, February 25, 1993. “In regard to the issue of impartiality, the judge must be neutral, and therefore, should refrain from participating in furthering or opposing the interests of business.” Id., citing MCJC 2(C). EO JI-65. “By serving as a member of a committee which has taken a stance in favor of or in opposition to a particular sector of the community, the judge is stripped of impartiality and would face recusal on each occasion that the policy or law affecting that sector was the subject matter being contested in a legal proceeding or when a member of that sector appeared before the judge in question.” Id. “It is clear that promoting the interests of the business sector is distinct and apart from the general ‘improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice’ as it pertains to the courts.” Id.

•Serving on board of legal aid organization. “A judge serving on the board of directors of a nonprofit legal aid organization is required to disclose the relationship when one of the parties appearing before the judge is represented by a lawyer from the legal aid organization.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-51, April 3, 1992. “[I]f the legal aid organization has a personal interest in the proceeding, pecuniary or otherwise because of commitment to the particular causes or the enforcement of its own policies, then the judge must recuse from hearing the case or deciding the issue,” because “[t]o sit in judgment on such matters . . . could result in the appearance of impropriety contravening [MCJC 2(A)].” EO JI-51.

•Serving on attorney discipline board. “A judge may serve as a member of an attorney discipline board hearing panel and participate in a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-24, May 17, 1990. “[MCJC 2(A)] provides that a judge should expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny, and requires that a judge avoid all appearance of impropriety”; “[a] judge must adhere to restrictions on conduct that might be considered burdensome by the average citizen, but a judge is obligated to accept these limitations freely and willingly.” EO JI-24. “[MCJC 2(B)] requires that a judge conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”; “[g]enerally MCJC 2 focuses on the need to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary and the need to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.” EO JI-24. “When read together [with MCJC 4], . . . [there is] no explicit prohibition or underlying philosophy which would require a lawyer to resign from the disciplinary board hearing panel when the lawyer becomes a judge.” Id.

•Serving on board of organization with political ties.“A judge may not serve as a member of the board of directors of a charitable, nonprofit organization which is under the auspices of a political party” because doing so “has the potential of compromising . . . the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” in contravention of MCJC 2. State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-22, May 16, 1990. “Even if it is assumed that the organization is well-distanced from the political party, the mere fact that the foundation bears the name of a deceased leader of the party makes it more probable than not that the judge, as a member of the board, will be perceived by the public to endorse the brand or style of politics engaged in by the deceased political leader.” Id. “In sum, any accomplishments or misfortunes of the proposed charitable foundation accrue to the benefit or disadvantage of the county democratic party, and the national party in general,” and “[a] judge should not be a party to such an endeavor.” Id.

 

Serving in dual roles.

•Serving as full-time staff attorney or law clerk and part-time magistrate or part-time referee. “[A] part-time magistrate or part-time referee is subject to the [MCJC] and therefore, must avoid the appearance of impropriety”; accordingly, under MCJC 2(A) “it is ethically prohibited for an attorney to simultaneously serve as a full-time judicial law clerk or staff attorney and as a part-time magistrate or referee in the same or different jurisdiction.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-151, May 13, 2021.

•Serving as part-time referee and attorney. “Part-time Family Court Referees may not represent private clients in domestic relations matters before the circuit judge who appointed the family court referee and before the family court judges who supervise the referee’s performance and hear appeals from the part-time lawyer/referees decision in domestic relations matters as the judge is disqualified from hearing the matters presented by the family court referee.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-126, January 25, 2002. “However, part-time family court referees may represent private clients in domestic relations[] matters in the circuit in which they act as referee if the parties have waived the disqualification of the judge pursuant to [MCR 2.003(E)], or if there is a visiting judge presiding over their matters.” EO JI-126. “Part-time family court referees may represent private clients in all other matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit court” but “[p]art-time family court lawyer[] referees may not represent private clients before other part-time family court referees presiding in the same circuit as the advocate lawyer referee.” Id. “As a judicial officer subject to the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, a family court referee is subject to public scrutiny and must avoid all impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” under MCJC 2(A); “it is foreseeable that a favorable ruling or recommendation for the lawyer/referee’s client will be perceived as a form of professional courtesy coupled with the expectation of favored treatment if and when the presiding lawyer/referee appears in a representative capacity before the other part-time lawyer/referee.” EO JI-126. “Thus, it is improper for a part-time lawyer/referee serving in one circuit to represent private clients in proceedings before other part-time family court referees presiding in the same circuit just as it is improper to appear before the judge who employs them.” Id.

•Serving as case evaluator and judge. “A lawyer who has served as a [case evaluator] under MCR 2.403 may not thereafter preside as judge in a judicial proceeding between the same parties involving the same matter” because MCR 2.403(D)(3) specifically provides that a judge “may not preside at the trial of any action in which he or she served as case evaluator.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-112, March 26, 1997.³ MCJC 2(B) provides that “[j]udges must at all times observe and respect the law and conduct themselves in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judicial system” and MCJC 2 “cautions judges against conduct that may be prejudicial to the administration of justice”; accordingly, “[h]aving served on a [case evaluation] panel, a judge cannot thereafter preside at the trial of any action in which the judge served as [case evaluator].” EO JI-112.

•Serving as part-time judge and conservator. “A part-time judge may serve as the conservator of a protected person but should decline if such service would impose on the performance of judicial duties, detract from the dignity of judicial office, or if it would constitute the use of the prestige of office to advance the personal interests of the judge or others”; however, “[a] part-time judge may not serve as conservator of a business or other enterprise.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-88, March 30, 1994. “[J]udges and part-time judges alike should not permit the use of ‘the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others’ as proscribed by [MCJC 2(C)]”; “[s]pecial care must be exercised to avoid a violation of the judicial Canons, and therefore, although a part-time judge may serve as a conservator for a protected person, a part-time judge may not act as conservator of a business.” EO JI-88.

•Serving as assistant prosecutor and part-time magistrate. “An assistant prosecutor may not serve as a part-time magistrate for a district court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-56, July 24, 1992. “The dual role of prosecutor one day and magistrate the next could cause the person to be dealing with the same defense lawyer or defendant as an adversary on one occasion and as a trier of fact on another,” and “[t]his ability to act as a neutral and detached judicial officer one day a week after advocating for the people as an assistant prosecutor the rest of the week is simply too much to expect from the human personality” in accordance with MCJC 2(C). EO JI-56.

•Serving as retired judge and mediator or arbitrator. “A retired judge may participate as mediator or arbitrator as long as (a) the retired judge does not participate during the period of any judicial assignment, (b) the retired judge is disqualified from mediation and arbitration in matters in which the judge served as judge, and is disqualified as judge from matters in which the judge participated as mediator or arbitrator, and (c) the participation does not reflect adversely on the retired judge’s impartiality or raise an appearance of impropriety.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-28, July 12, 1990. “The retired judge should ensure that the mediation activities in which the retired judge participates are not so identified with one party, organization or interest group as to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or to raise questions of bias or the appearance of impropriety” in contravention of MCJC 2(A) and MCJC 2(B). EO JI-28.

•Serving on census count committee. “A judge may serve as a member of a census count committee formed to promote census awareness in the judge’s community, if (a) the activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office, (b) the activities do not interfere with the performance of judicial duties, (c) the activities do not reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, and (d) participation in the activities does not constitute an appearance of impropriety.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-18, March 27, 1990. “It is unlikely, if not impossible, for such a ‘blue ribbon committee’ to be involved in proceedings before a state court or federal court judge”; “[t]o serve on the committee would not be a violation of [MCJC 2].” EO JI-18.

•Serving as director of nonprofit corporation. “A judge may serve as director of a nonprofit corporation formed by a university to manage various entrepreneurial activities for the university, if (a) the nonprofit corporation is a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, (b) the nonprofit corporation will not be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, and (c) the nonprofit corporation will not be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-18, March 27, 1990. “Although it would appear unlikely that the nonprofit corporation formed by the state university would become engaged in legal proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or that the organization ‘will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court,’ if such should occur, the judge should resign from the board of the corporation.” Id.

 

Guidance on lending support.

•Donating to a nonjudicial candidate’s campaign. “A sitting judge may make a private monetary donation to a nonjudicial candidate’s campaign”; “[e]ven though the candidate must publish a financial report of donations, the contribution would not amount to a ‘public endorsement’ of the candidate.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-145, June 15, 2015. “Given the [2013] amendments of [MCJC 2] allowing judges to be more involved in fundraising activities” and “relax[ing] some of the previous restrictions on a judge’s extrajudicial activities,” “a campaign contribution to a nonjudicial candidate, without more, is not ethically prohibited.” EO JI-145.

•Signing resolution endorsing petition. “A judge may not sign a resolution which requests specific action be taken by the mayor and county board of commissioners regarding business closings of a local employer and the union workers it employs.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-52, April 27, 1992. MCJC 2(C) provides that “[a] judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment” and “should not use the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others.” EO JI-52. “The judges are not being asked to individually endorse the [r]esolution because they have particular interest in or knowledge of the issues; it seems clear that all judges of the circuit court are being asked to endorse the [r]esolution solely because they are judges, and the prestige of the judicial office will bring great pressure to bear on behalf of the [r]esolution supporters.” Id. “Use of the judicial office for such purposes is prohibited.” Id.

•Providing reference for criminal defendant. “A judge should not provide a character affidavit for a criminal defendant, because it is a sworn statement, not subject to cross-examination” and “[a] judge should decline to provide a personal or character reference for a criminal defendant, except in response to a formal request, unless the judge has good reason to believe that refusal would bring about a failure of justice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-41, October 1, 1991. Although “a judge is explicitly allowed to provide a reference when solicited” under MCJC 2(E), “a judge may not allow the judicial office to be used for the private interests of others” under MCJC 2(C). EO JI-41. “If the judge is being asked to provide the reference or affidavit solely because of the judge’s position, the request should be declined”; “[i]f, however, the judge has personal knowledge of the individual or the incident which is the subject of the request, and the knowledge is unrelated to the position which the judge holds, it is not improper to comply.” Id.