6.5Guilty Pleas and Nolo Contendere Pleas
A guilty plea is a conclusive conviction equivalent to a jury’s guilty verdict. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 440 (1973) (citations omitted). A defendant’s decision to plead guilty “is the most serious step a defendant can take in a criminal prosecution.” People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 95 (1993). A guilty plea “constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights and thus triggers specific protections for the defendant.” People v Samuels, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This requirement mandates not only that a defendant enter into a plea bargain of their own free will, but that their decision is a knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “This constitutional requirement has been integrated into the Michigan Court Rules under MCR 6.302.” Samuels, ___ Mich at ___.1MCR 6.302 describes a detailed process by which a circuit court is to determine whether a plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate. See MCR 6.302(B)-(D). “[W]hile the specific requirements of MCR 6.302(C) are directed at ensuring the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea, these requirements alone might not form a sufficient inquiry into voluntariness.” Samuels, ___ Mich at ___ (“[Due-process] may require a consideration [at the plea colloquy] of whether a package-deal plea offer is unduly coercive [where] a defendant indicates that such a plea offer has a bearing on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.”).2
B.Nolo Contendere (No Contest) Pleas
“A nolo contendere plea does not admit guilt, it merely communicates to the court that the criminal defendant does not wish to contest the state’s accusations and will acquiesce in the imposition of punishment.” Lichon v American Universal Ins Co, 435 Mich 408, 417 (1990). A nolo contendere plea may be offered for a variety of reasons such as: (1) the defendant’s reluctance to relate the details of a particularly sordid crime, (2) the defendant’s recollection of the facts may be unclear due to intoxication or because so many similar crimes were committed that defendant cannot differentiate one from another, and (3) the defendant wishes to minimize other repercussions, e.g., civil litigation. In re Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 134 (1975). The list is not exhaustive. Id.
A no contest plea prevents the court from eliciting a defendant’s admission of guilt, but the result of the defendant’s plea not to contest the charges against him or her is the same as if the defendant had admitted guilt. If a defendant pleads no contest to a charged offense, with the exception of questioning the defendant about his or her role in the charged offense, the court must proceed in the same manner as if the defendant had pleaded guilty. MCL 767.37; see also MCR 6.302(D)(2); MCR 6.610(F)(1)(b). A plea of no contest to a felony offense requires the court’s consent. MCR 6.301(B).
MCR 6.302 describes a detailed process by which a circuit court is to determine whether a guilty plea or nolo contendere plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.3 See MCR 6.302(B)-(D).4
A defendant’s no contest plea to criminal charges does not estop that defendant from denying responsibility in a later civil action arising from the same conduct. Lichon, 435 Mich at 417.
If a defendant’s no contest plea is accepted, MCR 6.302 (not expressly applicable to procedural matters involving offenses cognizable in district court) requires that the court “state why a plea of nolo contendere is appropriate.” MCR 6.302(D)(2)(a).
Note: The court rules governing criminal procedure in cases involving offenses over which the district court has trial jurisdiction contain no requirement similar to MCR 6.302(D)(2). Though not required, a district court’s articulation for the record of its reasons for finding a defendant’s nolo contendere plea appropriate would almost certainly assist any appellate review of the case. Both MCR 6.302(D) and MCR 6.610(F) do require that the court determine that the defendant’s plea is supported by facts indicating the defendant’s participation in the crime charged.
See the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Criminal Pretrial/Trial Quick Reference Materials web page for reference guides concerning no contest pleas.
Generally, guilty and nolo contendere pleas waive all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings and waive the right to challenge issues involving the defendant’s factual guilt. People v New, 427 Mich 482, 488, 491 (1986); see also People v Eaton, 184 Mich App 649, 653-654 (1990). However, an unconditional guilty or no contest plea does not necessarily waive a defendant’s right to challenge the state’s jurisdictional authority to bring the defendant to trial. New, 427 Mich at 495-496; Eaton, 184 Mich App at 658.5 See also People v Cook, 323 Mich App 435, 447 n 3 (2018) (noting that “New’s construct is still controlling”).
Pretrial evidentiary issues. By pleading guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant waives the right to raise issues on appeal regarding a pretrial denial of his or her motion to suppress evidence or quash the information, because those issues involve the defendant’s factual guilt. New, 427 Mich at 485, 496.
Statutes of limitations. The statute of limitations in a criminal case is an affirmative, waivable, nonjurisdictional defense. People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 517 n 7 (2000), effectively overruled in part on other grounds by Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605, 619-624 (2005); People v Burns, 250 Mich App 436, 440, 444-445 (2002). A defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty or no contest waives the defendant’s right to challenge his or her conviction on the ground that the applicable limitations period had expired. People v Allen, 192 Mich App 592, 600 (1992).
“A defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, nolo contendere, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty by reason of insanity. A conditional plea preserves for appeal a specified pretrial ruling or rulings notwithstanding the plea-based judgment and entitles the defendant to withdraw the plea if a specified pretrial ruling is overturned on appeal. The ruling or rulings as to which the defendant reserves the right to appeal must be specified orally on the record or in a writing made a part of the record. The appeal is by application for leave to appeal only.” MCR 6.301(C)(2).6
Conditional guilty pleas may be appropriate when a defendant has “a legitimate legal defense notwithstanding his factual guilt.” People v Reid, 420 Mich 326, 334 (1984). A conditional guilty plea anticipates that the prosecution may be precluded from proving its case against a defendant because of claims or defenses to which the defendant believes he or she is entitled. Id. at 334-335.
“A conditional plea requires the agreement of the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge.” People v Andrews, 192 Mich App 706, 707 (1992) (citation omitted).
MCR 6.301(D) prohibits a court from accepting a defendant’s plea to an offense lesser than the one charged unless the prosecutor consents.7 See Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 121-122 (1974) (holding that the prosecutor has discretion to charge a greater, rather than a lesser-included, offense); Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 683-684 (1972) (holding that the choice of the statute under which to prosecute the accused is an executive function properly exercised by the prosecutor, not the court).
1 Although the rules set out in subchapter 6.300 of the Michigan Court Rules are not specifically applicable to district court proceedings, see MCR 6.001(B), these rules may be instructive whenever MCR 6.610 does not supply a rule specific to plea proceedings involving offenses cognizable in district court.
2 Due process “might not be entirely satisfied by compliance with subrules (B) through (D).” People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 330-332, 337-338 (2012) (holding that, “regardless of the explicit wording of” former MCR 6.302(B)-(D), which did not specifically require a trial court to inform a defendant about the possibility of lifetime electronic monitoring, “a court may be required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to inform a defendant that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is a consequence of his or her guilty or no-contest plea.” MCR 6.302(B)(2) was subsequently amended to require this advice by the court). “Because [the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA)] is a punitive collateral consequence for the conviction of certain crimes, a defendant must be informed of its imposition before entering a guilty plea” and “the registration requirement must be included in the judgment of sentence.” People v Nunez, 342 Mich App 322, 334 (2022) (noting that “MCR 6.427(9) provides that for any offense the court must include in the judgment of sentence ‘the conditions incident to the sentence’”). While MCR 6.429(A) permits “trial courts to sua sponte amend an invalid judgment of sentence . . . within six months of its entry, [t]he amendment in [Nunez] was attempted beyond the six-month limitations period.” Nunez, 342 Mich App at 329 n 5. The Nunez Court concluded that “[it was] too late for the judge to amend or correct the judgment of sentence to add a registration requirement, and the prosecution [was] not empowered to do so by letter.” Id. at 334. Accordingly, “the failure of the trial court to adhere to the statutory notice requirement and to include SORA registration in the judgment of sentence prevent[ed] any belated application of SORA to [the defendant]” under MCL 28.724(5). Nunez, 342 Mich App at 334.
3 Although the rules set out in subchapter 6.300 of the Michigan Court Rules are not specifically applicable to district court proceedings, see MCR 6.001(B), these rules may be instructive whenever MCR 6.610 does not supply a rule specific to plea proceedings involving offenses cognizable in district court.
4 However, due process “might not be entirely satisfied by compliance with subrules (B) through (D).” People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 330-332, 337-338 (2012) (holding that, “regardless of the explicit wording of” former MCR 6.302(B)-(D), which did not specifically require a trial court to inform a defendant about the possibility of lifetime electronic monitoring, “a court may be required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to inform a defendant that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is a consequence of his or her guilty or no-contest plea.” MCR 6.302(B)(2) was subsequently amended to require this advice by the court). “Because [the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA)] is a punitive collateral consequence for the conviction of certain crimes, a defendant must be informed of its imposition before entering a guilty plea” and “the registration requirement must be included in the judgment of sentence.” People v Nunez, 342 Mich App 322, 334 (2022) (noting that “MCR 6.427(9) provides that for any offense the court must include in the judgment of sentence ‘the conditions incident to the sentence’”). While MCR 6.429(A) permits “trial courts to sua sponte amend an invalid judgment of sentence . . . within six months of its entry, [t]he amendment in [Nunez] was attempted beyond the six-month limitations period.” Nunez, 342 Mich App at 329 n 5. The Nunez Court concluded that “[it was] too late for the judge to amend or correct the judgment of sentence to add a registration requirement, and the prosecution [was] not empowered to do so by letter.” Id. at 334. Accordingly, “the failure of the trial court to adhere to the statutory notice requirement and to include SORA registration in the judgment of sentence prevent[ed] any belated application of SORA to [the defendant]” under MCL 28.724(5). Nunez, 342 Mich App at 334.
5 Jurisdictional defects have been found where a defendant raises issues such as “improper personal jurisdiction, improper subject matter jurisdiction, double jeopardy, imprisonment when the trial court had no authority to sentence [the] defendant to the institution in question, and the conviction of a defendant for no crime whatsoever.” People v Carpentier, 446 Mich 19, 47-48 (1994) (Riley, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Nonjurisdictional defects include violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), People v Wanty, 189 Mich App 291, 293 (1991); noncompliance with the 180-day rule, People v Eaton, 184 Mich App 649, 657-658 (1990); and claims of unlawful search and seizure, People v West, 159 Mich App 424, 426 (1987).
6 Although the rules set out in subchapter 6.300 of the Michigan Court Rules are not specifically applicable to district court proceedings, see MCR 6.001(B), these rules may be instructive whenever MCR 6.610 does not supply a rule specific to plea proceedings involving offenses cognizable in district court. MCR 6.610 does not discuss conditional pleas and their availability to misdemeanor cases. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals has noted instances of conditional guilty pleas in district court without any negative comment on the process. See, e.g., City of Owosso v Pouillon, 254 Mich App 210, 212-213 (2002) (noting a district court took a conditional plea); People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599, 603 (1998) (noting the same).
7 Although the rules set out in subchapter 6.300 of the Michigan Court Rules are not specifically applicable to district court proceedings, see MCR 6.001(B), these rules may be instructive whenever MCR 6.610 does not supply a rule specific to plea proceedings involving offenses cognizable in district court.