The guarantee against double jeopardy “‘prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.’” Witte v United States, 515 US 389, 396 (1995), quoting Helvering v Mitchell, 303 US 391, 399 (1938) (emphasis added by Witte opinion). Because criminal contempt sanctions clearly have a punitive purpose, double jeopardy protections attach in nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings. United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 696 (1993). See also In re Murphy Contempt, 345 Mich App 500, 510 (2023) (noting that in a nonsummary proceeding “more traditional due process protections can be observed,” and it is more similar to a typical criminal bench trial). However, “summary criminal contempt proceedings are not subject to the constitutional protections against double jeopardy” because when “compared to regular criminal trials and nonsummary proceedings, summary proceedings serve different purposes and, more importantly, are subject to materially different procedures.” Id. at 513 (noting that in a summary proceeding, “[t]he judge takes the matter up immediately, no evidence is taken or jury impaneled, and sentencing is swift”). Accordingly, “if a criminal conviction for contempt of court from a summary proceeding is reversed on appeal, double jeopardy will not bar the matter from being taken up in a nonsummary proceeding on remand.” Id. at 513.
Civil contempt sanctions are remedial or coercive and are not typically subject to double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments; accordingly, a person may be subjected to both criminal and civil sanctions for the same act, as long as the civil sanctions serve a purpose distinct from punishment. Yates v United States, 355 US 66, 74-75 (1957). In Yates, the United States Supreme Court upheld the imposition of both civil and criminal contempt sanctions for a single continuing act of contempt, reasoning that “[t]he civil and criminal sentences served distinct purposes, the one coercive, the other punitive and deterrent[.]” Id. at 74.
“The multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy is designed to ensure that courts confine their sentences to the limits established by the Legislature and therefore acts as a restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts.” People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 17-18 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The multiple punishments strand is not violated where a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes.” Id. at 18 (cleaned up). Many statutes explicitly allow for punishment of both a criminal offense and contempt of court, for example:
•MCL 750.394(3), throwing, propelling, or dropping a dangerous object at a train or motor vehicle;
•MCL 750.411h(5) and MCL 750.411i(6), stalking and aggravated stalking;1
•MCL 600.1348 discharging or disciplining employee summoned for jury duty; and
•MCL 780.762 and MCL 780.822, discharging or disciplining an employee who is a crime victim or a victim representative for attending court.
MCL 600.1745 specifically addresses indictment for contemptuous conduct. MCL 600.1745 states:
“Persons proceeded against according to the provisions of [Chapter 17 of the Revised Judicature Act, which addresses contempts], shall also be liable to indictment for the same misconduct, if it be an indictable offense; but the court before which a conviction shall be had on such indictment shall take into consideration the punishment before inflicted, in imposing sentence.”
The Michigan Supreme Court held that MCL 600.1745 clearly indicates the Legislature’s intent to allow separate punishment of a person found in criminal contempt of court for contemptuous conduct that also violates a criminal statute. People v McCartney (On Remand), 141 Mich App 591, 596 (1985). See also People v Szpara, 196 Mich App 270, 272 (1992) (noting that the contempt provision for violating an injunction barring entry into the marital home in a divorce proceeding and the statute criminalizing breaking and entering “serve different purposes[;] [t]he contempt provision serves to vindicate the authority of the court, . . . while the breaking and entering statute punishes a defendant for his [or her] criminal actions[,] thus, the contempt action is a “separate and distinct offense from the criminal act which provides the basis for the contempt adjudication”).
1 See also People v Coones, 216 Mich App 721, 728 (1996) (holding the language of MCL 750.411i(6) makes it clear “that the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for both of defendant’s convictions of aggravated stalking and criminal contempt for violating the temporary restraining order”). Note that the Coones Court cites People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458 (1984), in support of its conclusions, and Robideau was overruled by People v Smith, 478 Mich 292 (2007), to the extent it created a different test for determining when multiple punishments are barred on double jeopardy grounds. Smith explains that “[i]n interpreting ‘same offense’ in the context of multiple punishments, federal courts first look to determine whether the legislature expressed a clear intention that multiple punishments be imposed. Where the Legislature does clearly intend to impose such multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution, regardless of whether the offenses share the ‘same elements.’ Where the Legislature has not clearly expressed its intention to authorize multiple punishments, federal courts apply the ‘same elements’ test of [Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299 (1932), and not the test that Robideau articulated,] to determine whether multiple punishments are permitted. Accordingly, we conclude that the ‘same elements’ test set forth in Blockburger best gives effect to the intentions of the ratifiers of our constitution.” Smith, 478 Mich at 316 (quotation marks and citations omitted).