Chapter 5: District Court Arraignments
Part A: Generally-Applicable Arraignment Principles and Procedures
Part B: Procedures Specific to Misdemeanor Arraignments
Part C: Procedures Specific to Felony Arraignments
The district court conducts initial arraignments for all misdemeanors and felonies. See MCL 600.8311(c); MCR 6.610(D); MCR 6.610(I). This chapter discusses the procedures for conducting initial arraignments in all criminal cases. Additionally, the district court may conduct circuit court (post-bindover) arraignments in felony cases and misdemeanor cases not cognizable in the district court. MCL 600.8311(f); MCR 6.111(A). See Chapter 7 for discussion of post-bindover arraignments.
The procedures for conducting initial arraignments vary depending on whether the crime charged is cognizable in district court or in circuit court. Procedures also vary depending on whether the defendant is arrested with or without a warrant and on whether the arrest takes place in or outside the county in which the offense allegedly occurred. These procedures are discussed in detail in this chapter.
Part A of this chapter contains discussion of procedures and law applicable to arraignment proceedings for offenses cognizable in both district court and circuit court. Part B discusses additional procedures specifically applicable to misdemeanor offenses cognizable in the district court. Part C discusses additional procedures specifically applicable to felony, misdemeanor, and juvenile offenses cognizable in the circuit court.
See the following Michigan Judicial Institute Pretrial/Trial Quick Reference Materials: a table including information on the jurisdiction of district court judges and magistrates over preliminary matters in criminal proceedings; a flowchart for conducting misdemeanor arraignments; and separate checklists specifically applicable to misdemeanor, felony, and juvenile arraignments in district court.
Part A: Generally-Applicable Arraignment Principles and Procedures
5.2Right to a Prompt Arraignment
A.Arraignment “Without Unnecessary Delay”
Michigan law mandates that an arrestee be arraigned “without unnecessary delay.” See MCL 764.1b; MCL 764.13; MCL 764.26; People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 319 (1988); see also MCR 6.104(A). “[T]he state constitutional guarantee of due process of law requires an arrestee’s prompt arraignment.” People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 239 (1984), citing Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
“[I]n all but the most extraordinary situations,” an individual arrested without a warrant may not be detained for more than 48 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause. People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 4 (1999). A delay of more than 48 hours between a defendant’s warrantless arrest and the probable cause hearing is presumptively unreasonable and shifts the burden to the government to show the delay was caused by extraordinary circumstances. Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57 (1991). Moreover, a delay of less than 48 hours may be unreasonable under certain circumstances. Id. at 56.
“Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake. In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility. Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.” Id. at 56-57.
“Both the constitutional and statutory [arraignment] requirements are designed to advise the arrestee of his constitutional rights and the nature of the charges against him by an impartial judicial magistrate, to insure that the arrestee’s rights are not violated, and to afford the arrestee an opportunity to make a statement or explain his conduct in open court if he so desires.” Mallory, 421 Mich at 239 (citations omitted). “Finally, prompt arraignment affords the arrestee an opportunity to have his right to liberty on bail determined.” Id.
Express statutory authority for felony arraignments is contained in MCL 764.26:
“Every person charged with a felony shall, without unnecessary delay after his arrest, be taken before a magistrate or other judicial officer and, after being informed as to his [or her] rights, shall be given an opportunity publicly to make any statement and answer any questions regarding the charge that he may desire to answer.”
General statutory authority for arraignments following a warrantless arrest for an offense of unspecified severity is contained in MCL 764.13:
“A peace officer who has arrested a person for an offense without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the judicial district in which the offense is charged to have been committed, and shall present to the magistrate a complaint stating the charge against the person arrested.”
Videoconferencing technology is the preferred mode for conducting arraignments for in-custody defendants. MCR 6.006(C)(1). Arraignments are “scheduled to be conducted remotely subject to a request under MCR 2.407(B)(4) to appear in person by any participant, including a victim. . . , or a determination by the court that a case is not suited for videoconferencing under MCR 2.407(B)(5).” MCR 6.006(C)(1). “The use of telephonic, voice, videoconferencing, or two-way interactive video technology, must be in accordance with any requirements and guidelines established by [SCAO], and all proceedings at which such technology is used must be recorded verbatim by the court.” MCR 6.006(D). See also MCR 4.401(E) (“[a] district court magistrate may use videoconferencing technology in accordance with MCR 2.407 and MCR 6.006”). For additional information, including a complete list of authorized uses for videoconferencing, see the SCAO’s Michigan Trial Court Standards for Courtroom Technology.
MCR 6.104(A), which applies to both felonies and misdemeanors,1 provides, in relevant part:
“Arraignment Without Unnecessary Delay. Unless released beforehand, an arrested person must be taken without unnecessary delay before a court for arraignment in accordance with the provisions of [MCR 6.104], or must be arraigned without unnecessary delay by use of two-way interactive video technology[2] in accordance with MCR 6.006(A).”
Note: Circuit Court Plan for Judicial Availability. In each county, the court with trial jurisdiction over felony cases must submit a plan for making a judicial officer available to conduct felony arraignments on each day of the year, or a plan to make a judicial officer available every day of the year to set bail for felony offenses. MCR 6.104(G)(1)-(2).3 If a court adopts the latter plan of availability and makes an officer available to set bail each day of the year, the court’s plan must provide for the prompt transport of any defendant who is unable to post bond to the judicial district where the offense occurred. MCR 6.104(G)(2). “Prompt transportation” requires that the defendant be arraigned “not later than the next regular business day.” Id.
B.Consequences of a Lengthy Delay
“‘[A]n improper delay in arraignment . . . does not entitle a defendant to dismissal of the prosecution.’” People v Cain (Cain I), 299 Mich App 27, 49 (2012), vacated in part on other grounds 495 Mich 874 (2013),4 quoting People v Harrison, 163 Mich App 409, 421 (1987). However, failure to conduct a district court arraignment without unnecessary delay may jeopardize the admissibility of a confession or physical evidence in subsequent court proceedings against the defendant. Cain I, 299 Mich App at 49 (citations omitted).
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of persons and property. Thus, it is this amendment that prohibits unreasonable delays between an arrest and a finding of probable cause. The Fifth Amendment prohibits involuntary self-incrimination. It is therefore this amendment that prevents a prosecutor from introducing a confession that was not made voluntarily. When a confession is made during an unreasonable seizure, these two protections intersect.” People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 627 (2000) (citations omitted).
Evidence must be excluded when it was obtained during an unlawful detention designed to allow law enforcement personnel additional time to gather evidence. People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 240-241 (1984). The exclusionary rule similarly bars the admission of any evidence that would not have been obtained but for the procurement of evidence first obtained by unlawful detention. Id. at 241. However, “[t]he exclusionary rule will not bar the admission at trial of evidence which has been acquired absent exploitation of a statutorily unlawful detention.” Id.
Where there is no bona fide emergency to justify a lengthy detention and circumstances indicate that a detention was prolonged beyond 48 hours in an effort to obtain more evidence to support the accused’s guilt, a person’s constitutional right to be free of unreasonable seizure may be implicated. People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 13-14 (1999). Therefore, statements made by an accused during a period of unnecessary delay “may well be found inadmissible” against the accused at trial. Id. at 4. However, unnecessary prearraignment delay is only one factor to be considered when determining whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 319 (1988).
A delay of more than 48 hours between a defendant’s warrantless arrest and the probable cause hearing is presumptively unreasonable and shifts the burden to the government to show the delay was caused by extraordinary circumstances. Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57 (1991). Based on Riverside, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a delay in excess of 80 hours was a presumptive violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure. Manning, 243 Mich App at 631-632. However, in the absence of police misconduct, such a lengthy delay did not automatically make involuntary any statements the defendant made during the extended detention. Id. at 644-645. Notwithstanding the presumptive unreasonableness of the seizure, the Manning Court concluded that the ultimate admissibility of a defendant’s statement required a traditional inquiry into the statement’s voluntariness. Id. at 645, citing Cipriano, 431 Mich 315. The Court noted, however, “that in some situations the length of the delay alone may be a sufficient ground to suppress a defendant’s statement, particularly where the delay is so inexplicably long that it raises an inference of police misconduct.” Manning, 243 Mich App at 645.
See also Cain I, 299 Mich App at 48-50 (the defendant was not deprived of due process despite not being arraigned until three days after his arrest where “no evidence was obtained as a direct result of the ‘undue delay,’ which would have begun . . . 48 hours after [the] defendant’s arrest;” because the evidence against the defendant, including his statement to police and his identification from a photo lineup, was obtained within 48 hours after his arrest, “there was no evidence to suppress”).