2.3Te rritorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction refers to “[t]he authority to exercise jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the state’s physical borders[, which] developed as an exception to the rule against extraterritorial jurisdiction.” People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 480, 486-487 (1993), superseded in part by statute as stated in People v Gayheart, 285 Mich App 202, 209 (2009); see also Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 208-210.
“[T]erritorial jurisdiction and venue are two different concepts. ‘[J]urisdiction refers to the judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, whereas venue relates to and defines the place where the prosecution is to be brought or tried.’” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 215-216 (citations omitted).2 The Gayheart Court explained:
“‘The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established,’ and ‘[a]ny attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits’ constitutes ‘an illegitimate assumption of power.’ However, nearly 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that ‘[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm[.]’ Until 2002, the common-law rule in Michigan[] . . . was that the state could not exercise territorial jurisdiction over criminal conduct committed in another state unless that conduct was intended to have, and did in fact have, ‘a detrimental effect within the state.’ Blume, 443 Mich at 477. The Blume Court observed that ‘[u]nlike some states, Michigan has not enacted legislation generally defining the reach of its criminal statutes.’ Id. at 480 n 7.” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 208 (some citations omitted).
However, in 2002, the Legislature enacted MCL 762.2, which “broadened the scope of Michigan’s territorial jurisdiction over criminal matters, significantly expanding upon the common-law rule explained in Blume[, 443 Mich 476].” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 208-209. MCL 762.2 provides:
“(1) A person may be prosecuted for a criminal offense he or she commits while he or she is physically located within this state or outside of this state if any of the following circumstances exist:
(a) He or she commits a criminal offense wholly or partly within this state.
(b) His or her conduct constitutes an attempt to commit a criminal offense within this state.
(c) His or her conduct constitutes a conspiracy to commit a criminal offense within this state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed within this state by the offender, or at his or her instigation, or by another member of the conspiracy.
(d) A victim of the offense or an employee or agent of a governmental unit posing as a victim resides in this state or is located in this state at the time the criminal offense is committed.
(e) The criminal offense produces substantial and detrimental effects within this state.
(2) A criminal offense is considered under [MCL 762.2(1)] to be committed partly within this state if any of the following apply:
(a) An act constituting an element of the criminal offense is committed within this state.
(b) The result or consequences of an act constituting an element of the criminal offense occur within this state.
(c) The criminal offense produces consequences that have a materially harmful impact upon the system of government or the community welfare of this state, or results in persons within this state being defrauded or otherwise harmed.”
“[P]ursuant to MCL 762.2(1)(a) and [MCL 762.2(2)(a)], Michigan now has statutory territorial jurisdiction ‘over any crime where any act constituting an element of the crime is committed within Michigan,’ [People v King, 271 Mich App 235, 243 (2006)], even if there is no indication that the accused actually intended the detrimental effects of the offense to be felt in this state.” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 209-210.
However, “the Due Process Clause forbids a state from applying its own substantive law to a transaction or occurrence in which the state has insufficient interests or with which the state has insufficient contacts.” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 221 (citations omitted). Accordingly, in order “to permit the constitutional exercise of territorial jurisdiction[,]” the state must have “‘a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts’ [with the defendant’s conduct] so that application of Michigan’s criminal law [is] ‘neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’” Id. at 217, 220-221, 224-225 (holding that territorial jurisdiction was constitutionally exercised under MCL 762.2(1)(a) and MCL 762.2(2)(a) where “even though the evidence suggested that the fatal blows were struck in Indiana, and despite the discovery of the victim’s body in Indiana,” the evidence “showed that [the] defendant premeditated the killing, kidnapped the victim, and selected the murder weapon in Michigan[,]” demonstrating that “at least one essential element of both felony murder and premeditated murder was actually committed within the state of Michigan[]”) (citations omitted).
“[W]hen the matter of territorial jurisdiction is placed in issue in a given case—and assuming that the trial court has determined that the facts to be offered by the prosecution, if proven, would be legally adequate to confer jurisdiction under MCL 762.2—the prosecution must prove to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged act, consequence, or other condition that would confer territorial jurisdiction under MCL 762.2 has in fact occurred within the state of Michigan.” Gayheart, 285 Mich App at 214. “[L]ike venue, the existence of territorial jurisdiction may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
In general, state courts in Michigan, not federal courts, “have jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution in which a defendant is a non-Indian, the offense is committed on Indian lands or in Indian country, and the offense is either victimless or the victim is not an Indian.” People v Collins, 298 Mich App 166, 177 (2012).