9.13Application to Pending Actions of Newly Adopted or Previous Version of Court Rule
“There is no bright-line rule for determining when an amended or previous version of a rule applies; rather, the court must look more closely to the particular circumstances of the case at issue and at the purpose of the amendment.” Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “the question of whether a newly amended or adopted court rule applies is governed by MCR 1.102 because it provides its own specific rules for the application of new and amended court rules that should take precedence over the generalized rules of retrospectivity and prospectivity.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). MCR 1.102 states:
“These rules take effect on March 1, 1985. They govern all proceedings in actions brought on or after that date, and all further proceedings in actions then pending. A court may permit a pending action to proceed under the former rules if it finds that the application of these rules to that action would not be feasible or would work injustice.”
“Although the rule explicitly addresses the initial adoption of the modern court rules in 1985, those principles from MCR 1.102 have been applied not only to the initial adoption of the rules, but also to later adopted or amended rules.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (cleaned up). “That is, a newly adopted court rule will not be applied to pending actions if a party acts, or fails to act, in reliance on the prior rules and the party’s action or inaction has consequences under the new rules that were not present under the old rules.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up) (noting that “the norm is to apply the newly adopted court rules to pending actions unless there is reason to continue applying the old rules”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“MCR 1.102 provides the pertinent analysis because it specifically permits trial courts to apply former court rules if doing so would prevent injustice.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___. “The injustice exception to applying the current rule in MCR 1.102 must be applied narrowly and with restraint, such that the exception does not subsume the rule itself[.]” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “An injustice is not present merely because a different result would be reached under the new rules.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up) (“adopt[ing] the framework announced in Reitmeyer[ v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 332 (1999),] as the appropriate guide for trial courts to follow when determining whether to apply a newly adopted court rule to pending actions”). Accordingly, “an individualized determination guided by the nonexhaustive factors from Reitmeyer—including timing, purpose of the newly adopted rule, possible gamesmanship, and reliance—is appropriate given that these factors bear on whether injustice would occur.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___.
B.Caselaw: Determining When An Amended or Previous Version of a Rule Applies
“[T]rial courts should look to Reitmeyer[ v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 332 (1999),] as the guidepost for determining whether to apply a newly amended rule to a pending case.” Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025) (“formally adopt[ing] Reitmeyer’s analysis to guide the determination of whether to apply a current or former court rule”). In Webster, “during the pendency of the litigation, [the] Court amended MCR 2.403 and, while MCR 2.403(O) had previously permitted an award of costs and attorney fees as sanctions against a losing party who rejects a case-evaluation award (unless the verdict is more favorable to them than the award), the amendment . . . eliminated the availability of case-evaluation sanctions altogether.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (citation omitted). “The trial court appropriately cited the test from Reitmeyer, explaining that because of the court-rule change during the pendency of the case, the current version of the rule ‘applies unless the result thereunder would work an injustice.’” Id. at ___. “The court found significant that case evaluation occurred more than a year before the rule change.” Id. at ___. “Also significant was that before the change became effective, the parties attended multiple settlement conferences, participated in a facilitation session, and had three different trial dates.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, the trial court “found that plaintiff’s decisions to proceed to trial were made in reliance on the availability of sanctions under the former rule such that justice favored its application.” Id. at ___.
“Reitmeyer instructs that one factor guiding the determination is whether applying the amended rule furthers its purpose given the timing of events in the case.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___. “One purpose of eliminating case-evaluation sanctions was to level the playing field, particularly given that the process often benefitted defendants who could absorb costs across multiple cases.” Id. at ___. “Another reason was that stakeholders felt that case evaluation would often force settlements divorced from the merits of the claims.” Id. at ___. In Webster, “all the actions that could affect whether to award case-evaluation sanctions occurred before the amendment became effective.” Id. at ___ (noting that “case evaluation occurred more than a year before the rule change”). “Accordingly, because of the timing of events in the case, the goals of the amendment would not have been furthered.” Id. at ___. “Relatedly, the trial court should look to the parties’ reliance or lack of reliance on the rules that existed when they made pertinent strategic decisions.” Id. at ___. “[O]ne could find that plaintiff had every reason to believe that if the case went to trial, the trial would be over and any sanctions would be awarded under the old court rules.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted) (rejecting defendants’ argument “that, because the trial had not yet occurred by the date the amendment was effective, former MCR 2.403(O) was not applicable” considering that “the parties prepared for trial numerous times leading up to the rule change”).
“Reitmeyer also directs the trial court to look to the plaintiff’s obvious gamesmanship or lack thereof.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ n 7. “However, unlike the amendments of MCR 2.405, case-evaluation sanctions were not removed to avoid gamesmanship.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ n 7. “Nor [was] there any argument that the delays in [Webster] were caused by gamesmanship.” Id. “So, the trial court appropriately did not consider this factor.” Id. “Applying the considerations from Reitmeyer, . . . the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding case-evaluation sanctions to plaintiff under former MCR 2.403(O).” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (“[B]ecause defendants rejected the case-evaluation award and the verdict was not more favorable to defendants than the award, plaintiff [was] entitled to sanctions under the conditions of MCR 2.403(O) as it was applied.”).
A trial court’s decision regarding the application of a newly adopted court rule to a pending action is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025). “Abuse-of-discretion review is generally appropriate when a decision requires familiarity with the facts of the case and experience in maintaining a trial court docket.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Relatedly, abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate when a question is not primarily legal but instead grows out of, and is bounded by, case-specific detailed factual circumstances.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion when the trial court correctly applied MCR 1.102 and Reitmeyer[ v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc, 237 Mich App 332 (1999)].”). “The factual findings undergirding these [nonexhaustive Reitmeyer] factors are reviewed for clear error.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ n 8 (“We find no clear error in the trial court’s findings of fact.”).
In Webster, “the Court of Appeals appeared to conduct a de novo analysis of whether application of the current rule would work an injustice under MCR 1.102.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___ (noting that “the appropriate standard for reviewing the trial court’s decision is the abuse-of-discretion standard”). “While the Court of Appeals arguably analyzed pertinent factors in the individual case, it failed to contend with the articulated reasons for the trial court’s decision within the Reitmeyer framework.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Moreover, the trial court’s decision to apply former MCR 2.403(O) was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes considering the specific facts of [the] case.” Webster, ___ Mich at ___. “Merely because a denial of sanctions may have been supportable does not mean that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing sanctions.” Id. at ___. “The trial court did not simply rely on the fact that a different result would be obtained from applying the current rule.” Id. at ___. “Instead, it appropriately considered plaintiff’s reliance interests and the timing of the rule change to conclude that application of the former rule would work injustice.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“hold[ing] that the trial court had discretion to apply the former court rule under MCR 1.102 and did not abuse that discretion”).