Chapter 19: Selected Issues Regarding Imposition of Adult Sentence

In this chapter. . .

This chapter discusses selected issues regarding imposition of adult sentences upon juveniles in traditional waiver, automatic waiver, and designated proceedings. It does not contain discussion of the procedural or substantive requirements for criminal sentences. See the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Criminal Proceedings Benchbook, Vol. 2, for a thorough discussion of adult sentencing procedures and issues, including sentencing hearing requirements under MCR 6.425 and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines.

Related issues are discussed in the following portions of this benchbook:

•Pretrial custody and detention of juveniles, Chapter 3;

•Sentencing in traditional waiver proceedings, Section 19.4(C)(4)(a);

•Sentencing and dispositional options, case review, and probation revocation in designated proceedings, Chapter 15, Parts D, E, and F;

•Sentencing options, case review, and probation revocation in automatic waiver proceedings, Chapter 16, Parts C, D, and E;

•Appeals, Chapter 20; and

•Fingerprinting and recordkeeping requirements, Chapter 21.

19.1Applicable Court Rules and Statutes¹

MCR 6.425, which contains the applicable procedural rules for criminal sentencing hearings, governs sentencing hearings in traditional waiver proceedings, as well as in designated and automatic waiver proceedings in which the court has decided to sentence the juvenile in the same manner as an adult. See MCR 3.950(E)(2); MCR 3.955(C); MCR 6.901(A); MCR 6.931(A).

Additionally, MCR 6.445(G) governs the imposition of sentence following probation revocation in traditional waiver proceedings, as well as in automatic waiver proceedings in which the juvenile has violated probation by being convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. See MCR 3.950(E)(2); MCR 6.933(G)(1)(a); MCR 6.933(G)(3).² 

The legislative sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq., are applicable to juveniles who are sentenced in the same manner as adults for felony offenses enumerated in MCL 777.11 to MCL 777.19 that were committed on or after January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(2); see also MCR 6.425(C). The minimum sentence imposed “may be within the appropriate sentence range under the version of those sentencing guidelines in effect on the date the crime was committed.” MCL 769.34(2).

Effective March 4, 2014, 2014 PA 22 added MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a to Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to achieve compliance with Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012),³ by establishing sentencing and resentencing procedures applicable to certain offenders under the age of 18 who are convicted of certain offenses carrying mandatory life-without-parole sentences. Also effective March 4, 2014, 2014 PA 23 amended several provisions of the Michigan Penal Code governing offenses that are subject to the mandatory imposition of life-without-parole sentences to provide exceptions to these mandatory sentences as set out in MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a (see, e.g., MCL 750.316). See Section 19.3(C)(3) for discussion of the procedures that must be followed, in cases in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a apply, before a juvenile may be sentenced or resentenced to nonparolable life imprisonment.

Further, the Court reasoned that “no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18,” and “to treat those two classes of defendants differently in [Michigan’s] sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point of being cruel under [Michigan’s] Constitution.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 266 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Parks Court considered an 18-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder, and did not discuss the mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for 18-year-old defendants convicted of other offenses. Id. at 268 (concluding that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution, . . .and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16”). Accordingly, “the Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” Parks, 510 Mich at 244. The Court of Appeals concluded that the holding in Parks was substantive, not procedural, and applied its holding to order resentencing for a defendant who sought relief on collateral review. People v Poole, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024), aff’d ___ Mich ___ (2024) (defendant was an 18-year-old in 2001 when he committed the acts that resulted in a conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole).

Extending the holding in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that “as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), rev’g People v Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App ___ (2023). In Taylor, one defendant was 19 years old at the time of his offense, and the other defendant (in a separate and unrelated case) was 20 years old when he committed his offense. Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “Each defendant was sentenced to a legislatively mandated punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).” Id. at ___. “Defendants argue[d] that the mandatory nature of their sentences violate[d] Michigan’s prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ . . . .” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. See Const 1963, art 1, § 16. “Determining what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is guided by evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Inherent in this standard is the understanding that as society progresses, punishments that were once acceptable can later be considered cruel or unusual.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. Additionally, “to evaluate the proportionality of a punishment under Michigan’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation.” Id. at ___ (citations omitted).

Applying the standards from People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167, 176-181 (1972), and People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 33-34 (1992), the Taylor Court found that “[l]ate adolescents who are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating characteristics of late-adolescent brain development.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. As such, “[t]he same considerations that were discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “Mandatorily condemning such offenders to die in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth that late adolescents and juveniles share, no longer comports with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Id. at ___, quoting Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179.  Taylor, ___ Mich at ___ (further holding that “[t]his decision also applies retroactively to all relevant criminal cases on collateral review”). However, imposition of a life without the possibility of parole sentence following a first-degree premeditated murder conviction does not violate the Michigan Constitution where the defendant was 21 years old at the time he committed the crime. People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213, 219 (2023) (noting its holding is based on binding Michigan Supreme Court precedent and an examination of the factors set forth in Parks).⁴

Retroactive application of People v Parks, ___ Mich ___ (2025). The Michigan Supreme Court held that Parks is retroactive “to cases where the period for direct review had expired when Parks was decided.” People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), aff’g ___ Mich App ___ (2024). Previously, Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), “held that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court “held that federal precedent concerning the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ did not support extending Miller’s protections to 18-year-olds,” but “that our state Constitution’s broader prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 did support such an extension.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Whether Parks would have retrospective or prospective application required an initial determination of whether “the Parks holding was merely procedural, or whether it concerned substantive rights of a fundamental nature.” Id. at ___. “[S]ubstantive rules should normally be given retroactive application.” Id. at ___. Also relevant to determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively or prospectively are the Linkletter-Hampton factors: “‘(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.’” Poole, ___ Mich at ___, quoting People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674 (1971) (utilizing the standard set in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)). However, “[t]he importance of the Linkletter-Hampton factors is greatly circumscribed when substantive rules or rights are implicated in a holding, and retrospective application is favored.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Only when the Linkletter-Hampton factors “strongly indicate otherwise” will a substantive rule be limited to prospective application. Id. at ___. Because Parks involved a substantive rule, it should be given retroactive application and its application to the defendant in Poole required that the defendant be resentenced according to MCL 769.25. Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (confirming retroactivity with Linkletter-Hampton factors and overruling the state retroactivity analysis in People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 (2014)).

The court must advise the juvenile as provided in MCR 6.425(F) after a decision at a juvenile sentencing hearing. MCR 6.931(E)(6). “Requests for and appointment of appellate counsel are subject to the procedures in MCR 6.425(G).” MCR 6.931(E)(6).