16.11​Mandatory Imposition of Adult Sentence

“If the juvenile has been convicted of an offense listed in MCL 769.1(1)(a)-(l), the court must sentence the juvenile in the same manner as an adult.” MCR 6.931(A).⁶⁰ However, “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 255 (2022) (holding that “the Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults”).⁶¹ 

Extending the holding in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that “as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), rev’g People v Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App ___ (2023). In Taylor, one defendant was 19 years old at the time of his offense, and the other defendant (in a separate and unrelated case) was 20 years old when he committed his offense. Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “Each defendant was sentenced to a legislatively mandated punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).” Id. at ___. “Defendants argue[d] that the mandatory nature of their sentences violate[d] Michigan’s prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ . . . .” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. See Const 1963, art 1, § 16. “Determining what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is guided by evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Inherent in this standard is the understanding that as society progresses, punishments that were once acceptable can later be considered cruel or unusual.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “to evaluate the proportionality of a punishment under Michigan’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation.” Id. at ___. Applying the standards from People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167, 176-181 (1972), and People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 33-34 (1992), the Taylor Court found that “[l]ate adolescents who are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating characteristics of late-adolescent brain development.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. As such, “[t]he same considerations that were discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “Mandatorily condemning such offenders to die in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth that late adolescents and juveniles share, no longer comports with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Id. at ___, quoting Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179. “Accordingly, as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___ (further holding that “[t]his decision also applies retroactively to all relevant criminal cases on collateral review”).    

A.​Subset of Specified Juvenile Violations Requiring Adult Sentence

MCL 769.1(1) provides that if a juvenile is convicted of any of the following specified juvenile violations, he or she must be sentenced in the same manner as an adult:

•​first-degree arson, MCL 750.72;    

•​assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83;

•​assault with intent to maim, MCL 750.86;

•​attempted murder, MCL 750.91;

•​conspiracy, MCL 750.157a, to commit murder;

•​solicitation, MCL 750.157b, to commit murder;

•​first-degree murder, MCL 750.316;

•​second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;

•​kidnapping, MCL 750.349;

•​first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b;

•​armed robbery, MCL 750.529; or

•​carjacking, MCL 750.529a.

However, an offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of an offense is not subject to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465, 489 (2012) (homicide offender under the age of 18 may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unless a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82 (2010) (sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for a nonhomicide offense). A juvenile convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory life-without-parole sentence may be subject to the sentencing requirements set out in MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a. Under circumstances in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a applies to an offender, the prosecuting attorney must file a motion if he or she intends to seek imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. MCL 769.25(3); MCL 769.25a(4)(b).

“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and . . . it is the prosecution’s burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 129 (2022). “MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find a particular fact before it can impose an LWOP sentence.” Taylor, 510 Mich at 135. “The trial court . . . must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP.” Id. at ___. “This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission.” Id. at ___ (noting that “our decision today does not foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if it is determined that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence.”).

“[T]he Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 244 (2022).⁶² In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255 (holding that because defendant “was sentenced without consideration of the attributes of youth, his sentence is unconstitutional, and he must be resentenced”).

“[T]he decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole [is properly decided] by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁶³ People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 107-108 (2018) (holding that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments “because neither [MCL 769.25] nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). See Section 19.4(C) for discussion of juvenile life-without-parole sentences.

A juvenile defendant’s “50-to-75-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder [does not] pass muster under the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment . . . .” People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). Additionally, “[u]nder the principle of proportionality, [a defendant is] entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly account[s] for the individualized circumstances of the offender and the offense.” Id. at ___. “[A]s [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012)] and its progeny have now made clear, such circumstances include mitigating considerations related to [defendant’s] youth. Eads, ___ Mich App at ___. In this case, defendant “was found guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) for crimes he committed as a juvenile.” Id. at ___ (citations omitted). “The trial court sentenced [defendant] as an adult and, departing upward from the guidelines, imposed consecutive terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder and two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm.” Id. at ___.

After Miller and the enactment of MCL 769.25a, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile was entitled “to resentencing such that he or she, by default, could not receive a term-of-years sentence with a minimum higher than 40 years or a maximum higher than 60 years.” Eads, ___ Mich App at ___. Defendant’s sentence was “a minimum sentence 10 years higher and a maximum sentence 15 years higher than [the] statutory upper limits—for committing a lesser offense as a juvenile.” Id. at ___. “[I]ronically, [defendant] fared worse than he would have if the jury had convicted him of [first-degree murder].” Id. at ___. Further, “despite [defendant’s] juvenile status and all that has now been recognized to come with it, [he] received a sentence for second-degree murder that would require him to outlive his life expectancy before even becoming eligible for parole and would deny him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at ___. The trial court “openly acknowledged that [defendant’s] background and the circumstances of the murder demonstrated that [he] was immature and impulsive, lacked discipline and self-restraint, and had been negatively influenced by gang members from a young age.” Id. at ___. “Such observations reflect the very characteristics of youth that a sentencing court must consider as potentially mitigating the sentencing offense.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court “dismissed the very notion that such characteristics might have a mitigating effect and instead considered them as aggravating factors in support of a significant departure sentence—an approach plainly contrary to Miller and its progeny.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, defendant’s term-of-years sentence “violate[d] the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and it [was] also disproportionate given the sentencing court’s failure to consider [defendant’s] youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors.” Id. at ___.

“[I]n light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and the legal developments that have followed, [defendant’s] term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” People v Echols, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “In Miller, the United States Supreme Court recognized that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing and held that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). In this case, defendant, who was one month past his eighteenth birthday, argued that “his term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder for an offense he committed when he was 18 years old violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. Additionally, defendant argued that his sentence was unconstitutional under the state’s principle of proportionality. Id. at ___.

“Under this sentence, [defendant would] not even become eligible for parole for the first time until well past the life expectancy of individuals incarcerated as adults, let alone as youths, and several decades beyond when he would have first become parole-eligible under the life sentence deemed unconstitutional in [People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022)].” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. “Had [defendant] been convicted of first-degree murder as originally charged, he would now be entitled to a resentencing hearing and would be facing a default term-of-years sentence limited to a minimum of 25 to 40 years and a maximum of 60 years.” Id. at ___. “Instead, defendant, for committing a lesser offense than first-degree murder, is left with a minimum sentence that is 15 years higher—and a maximum sentence that is 90 years higher—than the default 60-year statutory upper limit for first-degree murder, and without any of the significant procedural safeguards that must be satisfied to exceed the statutory limits for first-degree murder.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Such a sentence is out of line with other jurisdictions’ punishments . . . and leaves [defendant] without any more meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation than a juvenile sentenced to parolable life.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, defendant’s “75-to-150-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and [defendant] is entitled to resentencing as a result.” Id. at ___. [T]he Court did not resolve the proportionality challenge, noting that defendant’s “sentence could not meet [Michigan’s] proportionality requirement given that it [was] . . . unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.” Id. at ___; see also id. at ___ (also noting that the trial court must ensure that its resentencing is both constitutional and proportional; among other things, the court must consider “defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of the offense as potentially mitigating—and not aggravating—factors”).

See also People v Campbell, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). In Campbell, “[d]efendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offenses, argue[d] that his sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and AWIM [assault with intent to murder] convictions violate the principle of proportionality.” Id. at ___. “A sentence is reasonable if it adheres to the ‘principle of proportionality,’ which requires the sentence to be ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” Id. at ___ (2025), quoting People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 474 (2017). “[A] sentencing court must consider the offender’s youth and treat it as a mitigating factor when imposing a term-of-years sentence on a juvenile defendant.” Campbell, ___ Mich App at ___. Here, “[d]efendant’s minimum sentence of 65 years for second-degree murder exceeds the suggested maximum sentence for an offender who was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “[i]t is clear from the record that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors of defendant’s youth during sentencing” pursuant to the holding in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012). Thus, “[d]efendant was entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly accounted for the individualized circumstances of defendant and the offenses, which included his youth and its attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B.​Constitutionality of Mandatory Adult Sentencing

1.​Separation of Powers, Equal Protection, and Due Process Concerns

The automatic waiver statutes, MCL 600.606 and MCL 764.1f, and court rules, MCR 6.901 et seq., do not violate the separation of powers doctrine because they “do not give prosecutors authority to exercise judicial power . . . [but] simply vest the circuit courts with jurisdiction to hear certain cases that previously came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate courts.” People v Black, 203 Mich App 428, 429-430 (1994).

At the time that Black, 203 Mich App 428, was decided, MCL 769.1 required the circuit court, without exception, to conduct a hearing to determine whether to sentence a juvenile convicted in an automatic waiver proceeding as an adult or as a juvenile. See People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 142 (1999). Effective January 1, 1997, 1996 PA 247 amended MCL 769.1 to require the circuit court to impose adult sentences upon juveniles convicted of certain specified juvenile violations. MCL 769.1(1); see Conat, 238 Mich App at 142-143.

In the four consolidated cases considered in Conat, 238 Mich App at 138, 144, 146-147, the circuit courts held that MCL 769.1, as amended by 1996 PA 247, unconstitutionally divested the sentencing court of discretion to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of an enumerated serious specified juvenile violation as a juvenile rather than as an adult. The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the amendment, holding that it does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or federal and state equal protection and due process guarantees. Conat, 238 Mich App at 146-164. “That the prosecutor’s charging decision has an effect on the sentence that the court may impose . . . is an inevitable effect of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and does not offend the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. at 152. Furthermore, “[w]ithout a showing of intentional discrimination based on impermissible factors, the mere fact that some persons are charged differently from others for the same conduct does not violate equal protection.” Id. at 156-157. Finally, “[b]ecause juveniles have no constitutional right to be treated differently from adults when they engage in criminal conduct, and because without the legislatively created juvenile justice system all juveniles at least fourteen years of age would be subject to adult criminal penalties, . . . the amended automatic waiver system does not deny juveniles the constitutional right to due process.” Id. at 159.

2.​Eighth Amendment Concerns

a.​Defendants May Not Be Sentenced to Mandatory Life Imprisonment Without Parole for Homicide Offenses

Previously, a juvenile who was convicted, in an automatic waiver proceeding, of first-degree murder—including felony murder and aiding and abetting first-degree murder—was subject under Michigan law to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See former MCL 750.316; MCL 750.316(1)(b); MCL 767.39; MCL 769.1(1)(e); MCL 769.1(1)(g). Moreover, under MCL 791.234(6)(a), any offender serving a life sentence for first-degree murder is ineligible for parole.⁶⁴

In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465, 489 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not, consistently with the Eighth Amendment, be imposed upon an individual who was under the age of 18⁶⁵ at the time of the sentencing offense. Rather, a homicide offender under the age of 18 may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole only if a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances. Id. at 489.

Effective March 4, 2014, 2014 PA 22 and 2014 PA 23 added MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a to Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure and amended several provisions of the Michigan Penal Code in order to achieve compliance with Miller, 567 US 460, by (1) eliminating mandatory life-without-parole sentences for certain offenders under the age of 18 in cases that are not final for purposes of appellate review; (2) establishing, in MCL 769.25, a procedure under which the prosecuting attorney, in a case that is not final for purposes of appellate review, may seek imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for an offender under the age of 18, and providing for the imposition of a term-of-years sentence if a life-without-parole sentence is not imposed; and (3) establishing, in MCL 769.25a, a procedure for the resentencing of defendants in cases that are final for purposes of appellate review, in the event that either the Michigan Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court determined that Miller was to be given retroactive application (and, indeed, the United States Supreme Court held in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), that Miller is to be applied retroactively, thereby triggering application of MCL 769.25a to cases on collateral review).

Under circumstances in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a applies to an offender, the prosecuting attorney must file a motion if he or she intends to seek imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. MCL 769.25(3); MCL 769.25a(4)(b). “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and . . . it is the prosecution’s burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 129 (2022). “MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find a particular fact before it can impose an LWOP sentence.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “The trial court . . . must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP.” Id. at ___. “This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission.” Id. at ___ (noting that “our decision today does not foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if it is determined that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence.”).

“[T]he Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 255 (2022).⁶⁶ In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255 (holding that an 18-year-old defendant “must be resentenced” because he “was sentenced without consideration of the attributes of youth”).

Retroactive application of People v Parks, ___ Mich ___ (2025). The Michigan Supreme Court held that Parks is retroactive “to cases where the period for direct review had expired when Parks was decided.” People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), aff’g ___ Mich App ___ (2024). Previously, Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), “held that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court “held that federal precedent concerning the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ did not support extending Miller’s protections to 18-year-olds,” but “that our state Constitution’s broader prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 did support such an extension.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Whether Parks would have retrospective or prospective application required an initial determination of “whether the Parks holding was merely procedural, or whether it concerned substantive rights of a fundamental nature.” Id. at ___. “[S]ubstantive rules should normally be given retroactive application.” Id. at ___. Also relevant to determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively or prospectively are the Linkletter-Hampton factors: “‘(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.’” Poole, ___ Mich at ___, quoting People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674 (1971) (utilizing the standard set in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)). However, “[t]he importance of the Linkletter-Hampton factors is greatly circumscribed when substantive rules or rights are implicated in a holding, and retrospective application is favored.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Only when the Linkletter-Hampton factors “strongly indicate otherwise” will a substantive rule be limited to prospective application. Id. at ___. Because Parks involved a substantive rule, it should be given retroactive application, and its application to the defendant in Poole required that the defendant be resentenced according to MCL 769.25. Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (confirming retroactivity with Linkletter-Hampton factors and overruling the state retroactivity analysis in People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 (2014)).

“[T]he decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole [is properly decided] by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁶⁷ People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 107-108 (2018) (holding that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments “because neither [MCL 769.25] nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). The court must then conduct a hearing and “consider the factors listed in [Miller, 567 US 460],” before sentencing the juvenile. MCL 769.25(6). See Section 19.4(C) for discussion of the procedures that must be followed, in cases in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a apply, before a juvenile may be sentenced or resentenced to nonparolable life imprisonment. For a table summarizing the application of MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a to juvenile offenders, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Quick Reference Guide.

b.​Defendants Under Age 18 May Not Be Sentenced to Life Imprisonment Without Parole for Nonhomicide Offenses

A sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for any nonhomicide offense. Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82 (2010).

For additional discussion of Miller, 567 US 460, and Graham, 560 US 48, see Section 19.4(C).