5.16Publication of False or Grossly Inaccurate Reports of Court Proceedings¹

A.Statutory Authority

MCL 600.1701(l) provides for a finding of contempt following criticism of a judge or court proceeding in certain circumstances:²

“The supreme court, circuit court, and all other courts of record, have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, persons guilty of any neglect or violation of duty or misconduct in all of the following cases:

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“(l) The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the court’s proceedings, but a court shall not punish as a contempt the publication of true, full, and fair reports of any trial, argument, proceedings, or decision had in the court.”

B.Caselaw

The trial court did not err by finding the respondent guilty of contempt for a letter to the editor he wrote that was published in the Port Huron News. In re Chadwick, 109 Mich 588, 589, 605 (1896). The respondent was an attorney whose client, the defendant in a civil case, received an unfavorable ruling in a bench trial. Id. The letter to the editor argued that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, that the original judge who was presiding over the case was driven out for improper reasons in order to have another judge try the case, and that the judge who actually tried the case made an improper deal with a representative of the plaintiff. Id. at 589-592, 595. The letter further stated that money was what was driving the case and that the decision was not based on justice and the law. Id. The Court recognized that truthful criticism of the court is not contemptuous. Id. at 603 (“So long as critics confine their criticisms within the facts, and base them upon the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt, no matter how severe the criticism may be[]”). However, the Court held that the content of the respondent’s letter to the editor was not truthful and “pass[ed] beyond that line,” tending “to poison the fountain of justice, and to create distrust, and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts, which are of the utmost importance to them in the protection of their rights and liberties.” Id. at 604.

The Court held that the statute permitting the punishment of “the publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of [the court’s] proceedings,”³ did not limit punishment for contempt to the publication of reports regarding pending cases. Id. at 602-603 (rejecting the respondent’s argument that his letter did not refer to a pending case and holding that the ability to punish contempt is not affected by whether a case is pending, but rather, whether the publication referred to official judicial conduct). The Court further held that “[t]he charges in the letter of [the alleged contemnor] had direct reference to the official conduct of the judge, and not to his private character and acts.” Id. at 603.

Finally, the Court noted that a respondent may avoid a finding of contempt if the respondent demonstrates that he or she did not intend to publish false or grossly inaccurate reports of the court’s proceedings, explaining that “[w]here the language is susceptible of two interpretations or constructions, and the party charged asserts under oath that he [or she] did not intend the article to be construed as alleged in the innuendoes, he is purged of the contempt[.]” Id. at 604. However, “if the publication is fairly susceptible of but one construction, and its purport is to defame and degrade the court in the eyes of litigants and the public, his [or her] denial of any intended wrong does not operate to purge him of the contempt.” Id. 

The trial court held a proprietor, editor, and publisher of a weekly newspaper in contempt for publication of an article regarding recent grand jury proceedings that stated the circuit court judge used the grand jury “as a club with which to get even with some of our citizens whom he does not like.” In re Dingley, 182 Mich 44, 46 (1914). The article further accused the circuit court judge of making false allegations about the prosecuting attorney. Id. The Court held that it had “no hesitancy in saying that the publication of the article, unless it is true, is in contempt of court and deserves punishment.” Id. at 51. However, the Court set aside the trial court’s finding of contempt and dismissed the case without prejudice because due process was not afforded to the alleged contemnor. Id. at 51-52 (noting that punishment is appropriate if the alleged contemnor “cannot purge himself of contempt by showing the truth of the publication”).