14.14Sentencing Following Traditional Waiver¹

A juvenile who has been tried as an adult following traditional waiver to the court of general criminal jurisdiction generally must be sentenced as an adult.² People v Veling, 443 Mich 23, 39 (1993), citing People v Cosby, 189 Mich App 461, 464 (1991); MCR 6.901(B) (providing that the court rules applicable to juveniles subject to automatic waiver for specified offenses, including the requirement of a juvenile sentencing hearing (“waiver back”), do not apply to cases in which the Family Division waived jurisdiction under MCL 712A.4). See also People v Williams, 245 Mich App 427, 432 (2001).³ 

However, an offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of an offense is not subject to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465, 489 (2012) (homicide offender under the age of 18 may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unless a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82 (2010) (sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for a nonhomicide offense).

A juvenile convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory life-without-parole sentence may be subject to the sentencing requirements set out in MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a. Under circumstances in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a applies to an offender, the prosecuting attorney must file a motion if he or she intends to seek imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. MCL 769.25(3); MCL 769.25a(4)(b).

“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and . . . it is the prosecution’s burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing.” People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2022). “MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find a particular fact before it can impose an LWOP sentence.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___. “The trial court . . . must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP.” Id. at ___. “This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission.” Id. at ___ (noting that “our decision today does not foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if it is determined that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence”).

“[T]he Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” People v Parks, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2022).⁴ In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, ___ Mich at ___ (holding that an 18-year-old defendant “must be resentenced” because he “was sentenced without consideration of the attributes of youth”).

 People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30, 33-34 (1992), “set forth criteria to apply in a challenge to a statutory sentence: (1) the severity of the sentence imposed compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed on other offenders in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation.” People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “There is no requirement that a trial court reduce its sentence out of consideration for a defendant’s youth.” Id. at ___. “Instead, recent caselaw requires only that the attributes of youth be taken into consideration.” Id. at ___. “There is no authority that imposes a higher standard of articulation regarding youth beyond [the] general requirement that a trial court must adequately explain its sentence on the record in order to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up).

“[T]he decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole [is properly decided] by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁵ People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 107-108 (2018) (holding that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments “because neither [MCL 769.25] nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). See Section 19.4(C) for discussion of juvenile life-without-parole sentences.

In Williams, 245 Mich App at 429-430, the juvenile defendant had previously been tried for an offense as an adult in circuit court. Accordingly, the Family Division waived jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.4(5) without holding a second-phase waiver hearing.⁶ Williams, 245 Mich App at 430. On appeal from his conviction and adult sentence, the juvenile argued that because the Family Division did not conduct a second-phase hearing before waiving jurisdiction, he was entitled to a “juvenile sentencing hearing” under MCL 769.1(3) and MCR 6.931 (governing sentencing following automatic waiver for specified offenses). The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the plain language of MCR 6.901(B) precludes a juvenile sentencing hearing pursuant to MCR 6.931 in all traditional waiver proceedings. Williams, 245 Mich App at 433-435. The Court noted that since MCL 712A.4(5) does not require that a juvenile be convicted in the previous proceeding, application of that provision in a subsequent proceeding where an adult sentence is mandatory may lead to unfair results, putting them “in the same sentencing category as juveniles who are tried and convicted of the most heinous crimes under the modern automatic waiver statute.” Williams, 245 Mich App at 437. The Court allowed for the possibility that the Legislature and Michigan Supreme Court intended to preclude a juvenile sentencing hearing only where the juvenile was previously convicted of an offense as an adult, but the Court concluded that the plain language of the relevant statute and court rules did not provide for such a procedure. Id. at 437-438.

The Williams Court additionally noted that the panel in People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 38-39 (2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by People v Petty, 469 Mich 108 (2003),⁷ had erroneously stated, in dicta, that the circuit court retains discretion to impose a juvenile sentence following traditional waiver proceedings and conviction. Williams, 245 Mich App at 435-436. The Thenghkam dicta also contradicts MCR 6.901(B), Veling, 443 Mich at 39, and Cosby, 189 Mich App at 464.

Time of Sentence. “The court must sentence the defendant within a reasonably prompt time after the plea or verdict unless the court delays sentencing as provided by law.” MCR 6.425(D)(1). The Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause “does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges[,]” and therefore does not “apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution.” Betterman v Montana, 578 US 437, 439-441 (2016) (“[h]olding that the Clause does not apply to delayed sentencing”). However, “although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern[ inordinate delay in sentencing], a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 439.

Incarceration for Failure to Pay Court-Ordered Financial Obligations. Before incarcerating a defendant for failure to pay a court-ordered financial obligation, the court must determine the defendant’s ability to pay without manifest hardship. MCR 6.425(D)(3)(a). MCR 6.425(D)(3)(c) sets out criteria the court must consider in determining manifest hardship. See Section 19.2 for discussion of MCR 6.425(D)(3).