Orders of disposition are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See In re Ricks, 167 Mich App 285, 295 (1988); In re Scruggs, 134 Mich App 617, 621-622 (1984).
There are no binding appellate decisions addressing the appropriate standard of review of either the Family Division’s decision to designate a case or its sentencing or dispositional determination in a designated proceeding.
See, however, In re Curry, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 3, 2002 (Docket No. 238793), in which the panel adopted, for purposes of reviewing a sentencing or dispositional decision in a designated proceeding, the standard of review applicable to reviewing a sentencing decision in an automatic waiver proceeding:
“We conclude that the [bifurcated] procedure applicable when reviewing a trial court’s decision to impose an adult or juvenile sentence under MCL 769.1(3) and MCR 6.931 applies equally to a trial court’s decision whether to enter a juvenile dispositional order, a delayed sentence, or an adult sentence under [(former)] MCL 712A.18(1)(n) [(now MCL 712A.18(1)(o))] and [(former)] MCR 5.955 ([now MCR 3.955)]. People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29 (2000).
Hence, we first review the trial court’s factual findings . . . for clear error. . . . Second, we review the trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. . . . ‘This second part of the analysis scrutinizes how the court weighed its factual findings to come to the ultimate sentencing decision.’” In re Curry, slip op at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).
In imposing sentence or disposition in a designated proceeding, the court need not explicitly address each of the factors set out in MCL 712A.18(1)(o).13 People v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 116-118 (2003). The Petty Court, although it did not specifically set forth the standard of review applicable to decisions under MCL 712A.18(1)(o), abrogated Thenghkam, 240 Mich App at 41-42, 48, in which the Court of Appeals had construed the nearly identical inquiry under the automatic waiver statute, MCL 769.1(3), as requiring the trial court to articulate specific findings with regard to each of the enumerated best-interests factors. The Petty Court stated as follows:
“Instead of concentrating primarily on the sufficiency of the trial court’s factual determinations vis-à-vis the criteria listed in MCL 712A.18(1)(o)(i)-(vi), a plain reading of the statute requires that a court deliberately consider whether to enter an order of disposition, impose a delayed sentence, or impose an adult sentence in light of the six factors enumerated in subsection [1(o)(i)-(vi)]. As evidence that it complied with the statute, the trial court, on the record, must acknowledge its discretion to choose among the three alternatives. Hence, a court should consider the enunciated factors . . . to assist it in choosing one option over the others. A trial court need not engage in a lengthy ‘laundry list’ recitation of the factors. Rather, the focus of the hearing should be on the three options, i.e., an adult sentence, a blended sentence, or a juvenile disposition, as outlined in the [relevant] court rules. For this reason, we repudiate the Court’s reasoning in Thenghkam to the extent it conflicts with this explicit three-part inquiry.
As a result, trial courts will no longer be forced to undertake a mechanical recitation of the statutory criteria. Rather, a court must logically articulate on the record why it has chosen one alternative over the other two, in light of the criteria articulated in [MCL 712A.18(1)(o)]. By so doing, a court performs the analysis required by the Legislature, while establishing an adequate record to permit appellate review.” Petty, 469 Mich at 117-118.
C.Traditional Waiver Proceedings
The Family Division’s decision whether to waive jurisdiction under MCL 712A.4 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Fultz, 453 Mich 937 (1996). See also In re Fultz, 211 Mich App 299, 306 (1995), rev’d on other grounds 453 Mich 937 (1996)14 (holding that an order denying a motion to waive jurisdiction is reviewed under a “bifurcated standard”: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while the decision to waive or retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
D.Automatic Waiver Proceedings
The standard of review of a circuit court’s decision to sentence a juvenile as an adult or to place the juvenile on probation and commit him or her to state wardship following conviction in an automatic waiver proceeding is set out in Thenghkam, 240 Mich App at 41-42:
“This Court employs a bifurcated procedure to review a trial court’s decision to sentence a minor as a juvenile or as an adult. First, we review the trial court’s factual findings . . . for clear error. . . . Second, we review the ultimate decision whether to sentence the minor as a juvenile or as an adult for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal citations omitted.)
However, in People v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 116-118 (2003), the Michigan Supreme Court abrogated Thenghkam, 240 Mich App at 41-42, 48, to the extent that it required the sentencing court to provide a recitation of all of the statutory factors in making a decision regarding the sentencing of a juvenile following conviction in an automatic waiver proceeding. See Section 16.16 for a discussion of Petty, 469 Mich at 116-118.
The “proportionality standard” established in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635 (1990), which applies to review of a criminal sentence, must not be considered when deciding whether to sentence a juvenile as an adult or to sentence the juvenile to probation and commit him or her to state wardship. See Thenghkam, 240 Mich App at 49-50 n 21.
The Court of Appeals may not consider posthearing reports or other information concerning a juvenile that was prepared after the juvenile sentencing hearing (for example, updated service plans and psychiatric reports) when reviewing the sentencing court’s decision to impose sentence or probation and state wardship. People v Lyons (On Remand), 203 Mich App 465, 469-470 (1994).
The harmless error rule applies to corrections of error in both juvenile delinquency and criminal proceedings. See MCL 769.26; MCR 2.613(A); MCR 3.902(A).
13. Petty discussed former MCL 712A.18(1)(n); that provision has been redesignated as MCL 712A.18(1)(o).
14.For more information on the precedential value of an opinion with negative subsequent history, see our note.