9.14Motions for Rehearing or New Trial
In a delinquency proceeding, a party may seek a rehearing or new trial by filing a written motion1 stating the basis for the relief sought. MCR 3.992(A). MCL 712A.21 allows a petition for rehearing to be filed by “an interested person[,]” which includes a member of a local foster care review board with whom the juvenile’s case has been assigned. MCL 712A.21(3). “A motion will not be considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented to the court, or presented, but not previously considered by the court, which, if true, would cause the court to reconsider the case.” MCR 3.992(A).
1.Timing
The written motion stating the basis for the relief sought must be filed “within 21 days after the date of the order resulting from the hearing or trial. The court may entertain an untimely motion for good cause shown.” MCR 3.992(A).
Any response by parties to a motion for rehearing or new trial “must be in writing and filed with the court and served on the opposing parties within 7 days after notice of the motion.” MCR 3.992(C).
“All parties must be given notice of the motion in accordance with [MCR] 3.920.”2 MCR 3.992(B).
3.No Hearing Required
The court does not need to hold a hearing before ruling on a motion for rehearing or new trial. MCR 3.992(E). “Any hearing conducted shall be in accordance with the rules for dispositional hearings and, at the discretion of the court, may be assigned to the person who conducted the hearing.”3 Id.
4.Stay of Proceedings and Grant of Bail
The court may stay any order or grant bail to a detained juvenile pending a ruling on a motion for rehearing or new trial. MCR 3.992(F).
5.Findings by Court
The court must state the reasons for its decision on the record or in writing. MCR 3.992(E).
C.Standards for Granting Relief
MCR 3.992(A) does not state the standard for granting relief following a court’s consideration of a party’s motion for rehearing or new trial. See In re Alton, 203 Mich App 405, 409 (1994). However, MCR 2.613(A), the “harmless error rule” for civil proceedings, applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings. MCR 3.902(A). See also In re Alton, 203 Mich App at 410. MCR 2.613(A) states:
“An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.”
In In re Alton, 203 Mich App at 409-410, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the juvenile court for a rehearing on the juvenile’s motion for a new trial, adopting the following guidelines for ruling on such motions:
“In ruling on the motion, the parties and the trial court applied the rules for granting a new trial embodied in MCR 2.611(A)(1). That court rule is not applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See MCR [3].901(B). Therefore, we remand this case for the trial court to reconsider the juvenile’s motion under the proper standard of review: whether, in light of the new evidence presented, it appears to the trial court that a failure to grant the juvenile a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A). In this case, that means the trial court must decide whether it appears that if the court refuses to grant the motion, it will be exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile who is not properly within its jurisdiction. The trial court must state the reasons for its decision on the record or in writing. MCR [3].992(E).”
But see In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 23-24 (1999), a delinquency case in which the Court of Appeals applied the standard that governs criminal cases when deciding whether to grant a new trial–that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. According to the Ayers Court, a court may grant such a motion “only if the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict so that a miscarriage of justice would result from allowing the verdict to stand. The trial judge is not allowed to sit as the ‘thirteenth’ juror and grant a new trial on the basis of a disagreement with the jurors’ assessment of credibility.” Id. at 23-24, citing People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642, 647 (1998).
“Under MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e), a new trial may be granted to all or some of the parties, on all or some of the issues, whenever their substantial rights are materially affected, for any of the following reasons: a verdict or decision is against the great weight of the evidence or contrary to law.” People v Knepper, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (cleaned up). “The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to overrule a jury and grant a new trial is unquestionably among the highest in our law.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “As a general principle, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “unless it can be said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “The trial court may also override the jury’s credibility determination when the testimony is ‘patently incredible’ or it is ‘so inherently implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, or where the [witness’s] testimony has been seriously impeached and the case marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, to obtain a new trial, the defendant must establish that one of these circumstances exists, and that there is a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted or that it would be a manifest injustice to allow the guilty verdict to stand.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In Knepper, the “defendant challeng[ed] his conviction for attempt to commit CSC-I by contending that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” Id. at ___. The defendant argued “that the victim’s testimony was so patently implausible that it could not be believed by any reasonable juror,” “his theory of the case was not impeached, and that an extraneous influence on the jury—the victim asserting for the first time at trial that defendant raped her—caused the guilty verdict.” Id. at ___. “But defendant [failed to] identify any specific element of the crime of conviction that he believes is negated by inconsistent testimony.” Id. at ___. Although “defendant thoroughly attack[ed] the victim’s testimony about the altercation she had with her father on the night in question,” he did “not explain how inconsistent testimony on that issue support[ed] his argument that his conviction of attempt to commit CSC-I was against the great weight of the evidence.” Id. at ___. “Despite the victim’s credibility issues,” “her testimony was [not] impeached to the point that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or that her testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities.” Id. at ___. “Simply stated, the record contain[ed] ample evidence to support defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit CSC-I, so defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of the great weight of the evidence.” Id. at ___. “The fact that the victim’s father would not have approved of his daughter engaging in sexual acts with defendant could bear upon the victim’s credibility, but it [did] not negate her version of events, so the issue remain[ed] one of credibility.” Id. at ___ (stating that “even if defendant was correct in claiming that the victim and her father engaged in a violent altercation, that does not negate the victim’s claim that defendant committed the offense of attempt to commit CSC-I”). “In sum, although the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction was not strong, consisting primarily of the victim’s testimony which suffered from inconsistencies and an accompanying lack of credibility, the bar defendant must clear to obtain relief in the form of a new trial is exceedingly high.” Id. at ___ (holding that defendant failed to meet that high standard).
As the trier of fact, “[t]he jury [is] permitted to infer that [a defendant’s] implausible testimony [is] evidence of guilt.” People v Skippergosh, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024). “[I]f the jury [does] disbelieve the defendant, it [is] further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “In this case, [the defendant] was found guilty of domestic violence as a habitual offender under MCL 750.81(5).” Skippergosh, ___ Mich App at ___. Following testimony from the victim’s family members and neighbors, the defendant “provided implausible testimony to explain away . . . two assaults and the circumstances surrounding them.” Id. at ___. “For example, [the defendant] testified that the January 2020 assault against [the victim] was committed by four anonymous women in the living room while they were covering his eyes, and that [the victim] was screaming for help in December 2021 because she required assistance removing taco meat from the refrigerator.” Id. at ___. During sentencing, the trial court “characterized [the defendant’s] testimony as ‘almost laughable in terms of what you tried to convince the jury actually happened.’” Id. at ___.
The Skippergosh Court further held that “[a] prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “a prosecutor may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court further noted that “in light of the testimony presented at trial, it was reasonable for the prosecution to infer and argue that [the victim’s] family members did not have any unusual or impermissible motivations for testifying, and that they were compelled to do so simply out of commonplace concern for the well-being of a family member.” Id. at ___. “Further, nothing in the prosecution’s closing argument . . . hint[ed] at having special knowledge of the family members’ truthfulness or reasons for testifying.” Id. at ___.
MCR 3.992(D) states that “[t]he judge may affirm, modify, or vacate the decision previously made in whole or in part, on the basis of the record, the memoranda prepared, or a hearing on the motion, whichever the court in its discretion finds appropriate for the case.” The court may also enter an order for supplemental disposition while the juvenile remains under the court’s jurisdiction. MCL 712A.21(1).
1 See SCAO Form JC 15m, Motion and Authorization/Denial.
2 See Section 5.2.
3 See Section 10.7 for discussion of the applicable evidentiary rules.