6.17​Suspended Sentences²⁰²

No single statute expressly confers on a sentencing court the general authority to impose and then suspend all or a portion of a defendant’s sentence.²⁰³ However, the power to suspend sentences “‘has been frequently and constantly exercised by courts of record before and since the adoption of the Constitution.’” People v Cordell, 309 Mich 585, 594-595 (1944), quoting People v Stickle, 156 Mich 557, 563 (1909) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The power of suspension is an inherent, but not unlimited, judicial function; it is subject to any applicable statutory provisions and circumscribed by the executive branch’s exclusive power to commute sentences and grant pardons. Cordell, 309 Mich at 594-595; Oakland Co Prosecutor v 52nd District Judge, 172 Mich App 557, 560 (1988).

A court may not suspend a defendant’s sentence once the defendant has begun serving it; a suspension in that case would be the practical equivalent of a commutation, and only the governor possesses the constitutional authority to commute a criminal sentence. Oakland Co Prosecutor, 172 Mich App at 559-560.

A sentence that is suspended indefinitely may infringe on the powers granted to the executive and legislative branches of government. See People v Morgan, 205 Mich App 432, 434 (1994). An indefinite suspension is not a valid sentence where a defendant’s conviction was punishable by fine, prison, or probation, because the sentence is not within the sentencing alternatives defined by the Legislature in the governing statute. Id. at 433. Similarly, an indefinite suspension encroaches on the executive branch’s exclusive power to pardon because an indefinite suspension has the practical effect of permitting a defendant to commit a crime and avoid punishment. Id. at 434.