Whether a contempt is direct or indirect affects the analysis of whether a court has jurisdiction over the action. For a detailed discussion of what constitutes direct and indirect contempt, see Chapter 2.
“A direct contempt, committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, will be noticed by the court, and, on its own motion, it will punish summarily in the mode pointed out by the statute.” In re Wood, 82 Mich 75, 82 (1890). See also MCL 600.1711(1) (“When any contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, the court may punish it summarily by fine, or imprisonment, or both.”).
When the allegedly contemptuous behavior takes place outside the immediate view of the court, i.e., when the contempt is indirect, the court may only punish the alleged contemnor after proof of the facts charged has been made by affidavit or other method and opportunity has been given to defend the charges. In re Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich App 153, 157-158 (2000). See also MCL 600.1711(2) (“When any contempt is committed other than in the immediate view and presence of the court, the court may punish it by fine or imprisonment, or both, after proof of the facts charged has been made by affidavit or other method and opportunity has been given to defend”); MCR 3.606(A) (requiring a “proper showing on ex parte motion supported by affidavits”).1
Generally, the court’s personal jurisdiction over the alleged contemnor is dependent on adequate proof of the facts charged. Ferranti v Electrical Resources Co, 330 Mich App 439, 446 (2019), citing In re Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich App at 159 (“If an inadequate affidavit is the predicate which underlies the contempt proceeding or if no affidavit at all accompanies the petition, the court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the alleged contemnor.”). In Ferranti, the Court held that “the trial court erred by ordering a show-cause hearing on the basis of the submitted affidavit” where the affidavit was “insufficient to establish contemptuous acts.” Ferranti, 330 Mich App at 446.
Corporations and Companies. “Regarding personal jurisdiction, the key decision-maker of a company may be held personally liable for the contempt of the company, irrespective of whether the decision-maker was a party to the litigation or named in an order.” In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney, 343 Mich App 642, 664 (2022) (holding that where the evidence showed that a specific individual was the owner of a restaurant and the person in charge of making decisions on behalf of the restaurant, the trial court had personal jurisdiction to issue contempt orders against that individual, personally, on the basis of any failure by the restaurant to comply with the court’s orders). Similarly, while a corporation is a separate entity from its individual shareholders, officers, and directors, it can only act through its officers and agents; accordingly, “when a court acquires jurisdiction over a corporation as a party, it obtains jurisdiction over the official conduct of the corporate officers so far as the conduct may be involved in the remedy against the corporation which the court is called upon to enforce,” and these individuals “may be sanctioned if they fail to take appropriate action within their power to ensure that the corporation complies with the court order.” Id. at 668 (cleaned up).
C.Indirect Contempt–Domestic Relations
In the context of enforcement of parenting time orders, the failure to attach a supporting affidavit to the motions for orders to show cause as required by MCR 3.606(A) did not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings. Porter v Porter, 285 Mich App 450, 458 (2009).
The Porter Court distinguished cases requiring the attachment of an affidavit by noting that none of the cases apply current statutes or court rules governing domestic relations matters. Id. at 459. Specifically, the Court pointed out that MCL 600.1711(2) allows for facts to be proved by “‘affidavit or other method[,]’” and MCL 552.511b(1) requires the Friend of the Court to “initiate enforcement under the support and parenting time enforcement act if the office receives a written complaint that states specific facts constituting a custody or parenting time order violation.” Porter, 285 Mich App at 459-460 (emphasis added by the Court).2 Porter also notes that MCR 3.208(B) “permits the friend of the court to initiate contempt proceedings on a petition for an order to show cause.” Porter, 285 Mich App at 460. The Court noted that the motion to show cause in this case included proof of service, letters, and e-mails, and that it “arguably stated with specificity facts regarding missed parenting time and telephone contact, which were sufficient to support a finding of contempt.” Id. at 461. Further, the facts were based on personal knowledge, the motion was signed, and the signor would be subject to sanctions under MCR 1.109(E)(5)-(6) if the allegations were untrue or submitted for an improper purpose, thus, affording similar protection against false allegations as those afforded by the signing of an affidavit. Porter, 285 Mich App at 461.3 Finally, the Court noted that:
“Once a circuit court obtains jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, it retains that jurisdiction over custody and visitation matters until the child attains the age of 18. Moreover, Michigan courts have the inherent independent authority to punish a person for contempt. Consequently, even if the contempt proceedings were procedurally defective, the trial court was not deprived of its jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.” Porter, 285 Mich App at 462 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Where “the grandparenting time statute was declared unconstitutional before the contempt judgment [for violation of the court’s grandparenting time order] was entered, the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contempt judgment,” and “the trial court erred in denying defendant’s subsequent motion to vacate the contempt judgment.” Johnson v White, 261 Mich App 332, 346, 350 (2004) (noting that the general rule that a person may not disregard a court order because of their view that the order is incorrect applies only when the order is issued by a court with jurisdiction over the person and over the subject matter).4
“[T]he juvenile court has jurisdiction over contempt proceedings involving contempt of juvenile court orders, even where the [contemnor] is over 19 years of age at the time of the hearing.” In re Summerville, 148 Mich App 334, 341 (1986). See also In re Reiswitz, 236 Mich App 158, 172 (1999).
1 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the required affidavits or other methods of proof.
2 Porter also cited MCL 552.644; however, that statute has been amended to remove the language discussed by Porter.
3 Porter refers to MCR 2.114(D); however, this rule was deleted by ADM File No. 2002-37, effective September 1, 2018. The content that was previously in MCR 2.114(D) is now in MCR 1.109(E)(5), and MCR 1.109(E)(6) provides for sanctions for signatures in violation of the rule.
4 For a detailed discussion of Johnson, see Section 5.8(E).