1.4​Precedent

A.​Vertical Stare Decisis

“The essence of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare decisis is that the rule of the case creates a binding legal precept.” Hudson v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Maintaining consistency in the law is one of the primary benefits of stare decisis, as it provides the public with some level of predictability in how the courts have interpreted the law.” Plachta v Plachta, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2026). “The doctrine of vertical stare decisis . . . is the doctrine that a court must strictly follow decisions handed down by higher courts within the same jurisdiction.” In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332, 339 (2019) (punctuation marks, quotation marks, and citation omitted). Accordingly, trial courts “must follow the published decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court.” People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382 (2007).

Where the Legislature amends a statutory provision, the Michigan Court of Appeals “remains bound to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of [the] since-amended statute if the intervening amendment merely ‘undermined’ the foundations of the Supreme Court’s prior decision, but not if the intervening amendment ‘clearly . . . superseded’ the Supreme Court’s interpretation.” In re AGD, 327 Mich App at 341. Where the “Legislature has entirely repealed or amended a statute to expressly repudiate a court decision, . . . lower courts have the power to make decisions without being bound by prior cases that were decided under the now-repudiated previous positive law.” Id. at 341, quoting Associated Builders & Contractors v Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 191 n 32 (2016). However, “when the operative statutory language interpreted by the Supreme Court in the previous case remains the same after amendment, the intervening amendment of the statute does not clearly overrule or supersede the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation.” In re AGD, 327 Mich App at 341.¹⁷

B.​Michigan Supreme Court

Opinion/Decision. The “‘rule of law enunciated in a Supreme Court opinion’ . . . is ‘determinative of the legal question involved’ and becomes binding precedent.” People v Winburn, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 4 (2025), quoting Riley v Northland Geriatric Ctr, 425 Mich 668, 680 (1986). “Language set forth in a footnote can constitute binding precedent if the language creates a ‘rule of law’ and is not merely dictum.” Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 438 (2008). 

“An opinion must be written and bear the authoring justice’s name or the label ‘Per Curiam’ or ‘Memorandum Opinion.’” MCR 7.315(A). “Each justice deciding a case must sign an opinion.” Id. A Michigan “Supreme Court opinion becomes binding precedent for intermediate appellate and trial courts at the time a signed opinion is date-stamped and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, unless” the opinion “specifically states that the opinion is effective at a different date.” Riley v Northland Geriatric Center, 425 Mich 668, 678 (1986). 

“‘The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the [Michigan Supreme] Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases.’” People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 65 (1998), quoting People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 170 (1973). See MCR 7.315(A) (“Except for affirmance of action by a lower court or tribunal by even division of the justices, a decision of the Court must be made by concurrence of a majority of the justices voting.”). “Plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree as to the reasoning are not an authoritative interpretation binding . . . under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109 (1976). However, “a [plurality] decision rendered by less than four justices who nevertheless constitute a majority of a legally constituted quorum is binding on the Court of Appeals and the trial courts.” Id. at 106. “‘If there is merely a majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment but the case is not authority beyond the immediate parties.’” Sexton, 458 Mich at 65, quoting Anderson, 389 Mich at 170. In other words, “plurality opinions in which no majority of the participating justices agree with respect to the reasoning for the holding are not generally considered authoritative interpretations that are binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.” Auto Club Group Ins Co v Booth, 289 Mich App 606, 613 (2010).

Order or judgment. “A Supreme Court order or judgment pursuant to an opinion is strictly limited in its scope to the particular parties involved in the appeal, as opposed to the rule of law enunciated in a Supreme Court opinion, which is determinative of the legal question involved and becomes binding precedent.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at___ n 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“An order of the Supreme Court is binding precedent if ‘it constitutes a final disposition of an application and contains a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.’” Stephens v Dep't of Corr, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 3 (2025), quoting DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 (2012). See also  People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 414 (2006) (Michigan Supreme Court orders “that include a decision with an understandable rationale establish binding precedent”). Accordingly, if a Michigan Supreme Court order “can be understood as adopting the reasoning of [a] dissenting opinion from [the Court of Appeals], . . . that dissent consequently constitutes binding precedent despite originally having been unpublished and not binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(1).” Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 302 Mich App 208, 219 (2013), overruled in part on other grounds 498 Mich 68, 74 (2015).¹⁸

A Supreme Court order or judgment that is routinely issued pursuant to an opinion “does not become effective until after the time period for the filing of a motion for rehearing expires, or a timely-filed motion for rehearing is disposed of” under MCR 7.315(C). Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___ n 5. However, if the order or judgment is not issued pursuant to an opinion under MCR 7.315(C), it is “‘entered on the date of filing’” and “‘effective the date it is entered.’” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___, quoting MCR 7.315(D). In Winburn, the Court of Appeals held that a 1995 Supreme Court remand order “was not an order or judgment issued pursuant to an opinion under MCR 7.315(C),” but rather was an order entered pursuant to MCR 7.315(D). Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___ (“The order is found in the Michigan Reporter under the ‘Actions on Applications’ section, is labeled as an order (not as an opinion), makes no reference to any related opinion, and does not itself fit the requirements for a Supreme Court opinion found in our court rules, either in 1995 or presently.”). “Defendant’s case was never placed on the calendar or heard by the Supreme Court; rather, defendant’s application was disposed of via order absent the issuance of any opinion.” Id. at ___. “There simply [was] no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the 1995 remand order was ‘an order or judgment pursuant to an opinion’ under MCR 7.315(C) which, unless otherwise ordered, would not have become effective until either the time for filing a motion for rehearing had elapsed or a timely-filed motion for rehearing had been disposed of by the Court.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___; see MCR 7.315(C)(4). “Under MCR 7.315(D), the Supreme Court’s 1995 order therefore became effective the day it was entered, September 13, 1995, and subject-matter jurisdiction was re-invested in the trial court on that day.” Winburn, ___ Mich App at ___. “Defendant’s filing of a motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court did not stay that investiture.” Id. at ___; see MCR 7.311(G).

Advisory opinions on statutes. “In addition to issuing binding opinions, [the Michigan] Supreme Court is empowered to issue advisory opinions on statutes.” Ruggiero v Unnamed Genesee Co Pub Body, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025), citing Const 1963, art 3, § 8.¹⁹ “As suggested by the important questions of law requirement, the request for an advisory opinion must particularize any claims of unconstitutionality.” Ruggiero, ___ Mich App at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Advisory opinions are not binding but only hold potential persuasive value.” Id. at ___. In Ruggiero, the Court of Appeals held that In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich 660 (1977), was not an advisory opinion or binding decision. Ruggiero, ___ Mich App at ___. “There was no case in controversy nor were there parties before the Court; the Court issued a letter addressed to various political figures, including the Governor of Michigan and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, which was signed by all seven justices.” Id. at ___. “The letter was issued on July 18, 1977, after 1976 PA 267 became effective on March 31, 1977.” Ruggiero, ___ Mich App at ___. “Furthermore, the letter was issued sua sponte, not at the request of the Governor or either house of the legislature.” Id. at ___. “Therefore, because the letter was issued after the effective date of the statute, and not at the request of the political branches, it could not have been an advisory opinion under Const 1963, art 3, § 8.” Ruggiero, ___ Mich App at ___.

C.​Michigan Court of Appeals

Published opinions. “A published opinion of the Court of Appeals has precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Accordingly, “the publication of an opinion of the Court of Appeals creates binding precedent until the Michigan Supreme Court enters a decision altering [the] Court’s decisions or its rationale.” Esordi v Macomb Twp, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (citation omitted). 

“The filing of an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court or a Supreme Court order granting leave to appeal does not diminish the precedential effect of a published opinion of the Court of Appeals.” MCR 7.215(C)(2).

“A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals as provided in [MCR 7.215].” MCR 7.215(J)(1).

“Under the plain terms of MCR 7.215(C)(2), all published decisions of [the] Court [of Appeals] issued prior to November 1, 1990, are binding, precedential decisions under stare decisis.” Plachta, ___ Mich App at ___. “They are not merely persuasive and are not on par with unpublished decisions.” Id. at ___. Although the Court of Appeals is “not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions . . . decided before November 1, 1990, those opinions are nonetheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.” People v Bensch, 328 Mich App 1, 7 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also People v Schurr, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 6 (2024) (stating “decisions published before November 1, 1990, [are binding] only on the trial courts and only if uncontradicted”). In other words, “there is no difference in the precedential effect of a pre- versus post-1990 decision.” Plachta, ___ Mich App at ___. “Instead, the only difference between a pre- and post-November 1, 1990 decision is that the latter must be followed by a subsequent panel unless it is overruled by a conflict panel or the Supreme Court, while the former must be followed unless a subsequent three-judge panel concludes it is distinguishable or warrants reversal.” Id. at ___.

“Published decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, are precedentially binding.” Ruggiero v Unnamed Genesee Co Pub Body, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 4 (2025). See MCR 7.215(J)(1) (“A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals as provided in [MCR 7.215].”); see also Joseph v Nat'l Gen Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 3 (2025) (“Although Kalin is not strictly binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1) [initially known as the ‘first-out rule’] because it was issued before November 1, 1990, [Kalin is] a published opinion, [and] is nevertheless binding under the rule of stare decisis [under MCR 7.215(C)(2)].”).

Conflicting opinions. “When a panel is confronted with two conflicting opinions published after November 1, 1990, the panel is obligated to follow the first opinion issued.” Bradley v Westfield Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “when the relevant language of a statute is amended, future panels are bound to hold that MCR 7.215(J) does not require them to adhere to earlier opinions that interpreted the pre-amendment version of the statute.” People v Williams, 298 Mich App 121, 126 (2012), overruled in part on other grounds by People v White, 501 Mich 160, 164 (2017).²⁰ While the Court of Appeals “is not strictly required to follow uncontradicted opinions from [the Court of Appeals] decided before November 1, 1990, they are nevertheless considered to be precedent and entitled to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases.” Ruggiero, ___ Mich App at ___ n 4 (cleaned up).

Unpublished opinions. “Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value.” In re DRRR Guardianship, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 10 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see MCR 7.215(C)(1) (“An unpublished opinion [of the Court of Appeals] is not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.”). However, if a Michigan Supreme Court order “can be understood as adopting the reasoning of [a] dissenting opinion from [the Court of Appeals], . . . that dissent consequently constitutes binding precedent despite originally having been unpublished and not binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(1).” Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 302 Mich App 208, 219 (2013), overruled in part on other grounds 498 Mich 68, 74 (2015).²¹ 

D.​Circuit Court

A circuit court is not bound by the decision of another circuit court. People v Hunt, 171 Mich App 174, 180 (1988).

E.​United States Supreme Court

“[S]tate courts are bound by United States Supreme Court decisions construing federal law[.]” People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 261 (2007). However, a United States Supreme Court decision that is “‘based on federal evidentiary grounds,’ . . . is not binding on [state courts].” People v Clary, 494 Mich 260, 271 n 7 (2013), quoting Jenkins v Anderson, 447 US 231, 237 n 4 (1980).

“A plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court . . . is not binding precedent.” People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 559 (2000).

F.​Foreign Jurisdictions: Other States and Federal Courts

“Cases from foreign jurisdictions, which are not binding, can be persuasive.” Bazzy v Citizens Ins Co of America, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (cleaned up). “Caselaw from sister states and federal courts is not binding precedent but may be relied on for its persuasive value.” Esordi v Macomb Twp, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 4 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, state courts are not bound by the decisions of lower federal courts construing federal law, and Michigan courts “are free to follow or reject their authority.” People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 261 (2007).

G.​Attorney General

An attorney general’s opinion is not binding authority. People v Kildow, 99 Mich App 446, 449 (1980); however, it can constitute persuasive authority. Risk v Lincoln Charter Twp Bd of Trustees, 279 Mich App 389, 398 (2008).

H.​Dicta

Obiter dicta means “any statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or debated legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case[.]” People v Case, 220 Mich 379, 382-383 (1922). However, “if a court intentionally addresses and decides an issue that is germane to the controversy in the case, the statement is not dictum even if the issue was not decisive.” People v Ogilvie, 341 Mich App 28, 40 n 8 (2022) (citation omitted). “[O]biter dicta lacks the force of an adjudication and is not binding under the principle of stare decisis.” People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 286 n 4 (1999).²²

I.​Retroactivity of Judicial Decisions²³

Generally. “Ordinarily, judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect.” People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265, 268 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rules determined in opinions that apply retroactively apply to all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate the appellate court's announcement of the rules.” Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2024) (cleaned up). “But judicial decisions which express new rules normally are not applied retroactively to other cases that have become final.” Barnes, 502 Mich at 268. “New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed, because at some point, the rights of the parties should be considered frozen and a conviction final. Id. at 268 (cleaned up). “Thus, as to those cases that have become final, the general rule allows only prospective application.” Id.

“However, there are ‘certain special concerns—related to collateral review of state criminal convictions—that affect’ how courts determine whether a case should be considered closed.” Id., quoting Reynoldsville Casket Co v Hyde, 514 US 749, 758 (1995). “In essence, these ‘special concerns’ amount to exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for closed cases, allowing a new legal rule to be applied on collateral review to an otherwise closed case.” Barnes, 502 Mich at 268. “Both federal and state rules govern the retroactive application of new legal principles to criminal cases that are otherwise final but subject to collateral review.” Id. at 268-269.

New rule of law. “A rule of law is new for purposes of resolving the question of its retroactive application either when an established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first impression is decided which was not adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.” People v Robinson, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2026) (cleaned up). “Put another way, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “As a general matter, ‘judicial decisions which express new rules normally are not applied retroactively to other cases that have become final.’” Id., quoting Barnes, 502 Mich at 268. “When determining whether an opinion applies retroactively, therefore, [courts] must first consider the ‘threshold question’ of whether that ‘decision amounts to a new rule of law.’” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___, quoting League of Women Voters v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 520, 566 (2022). 

In Robinson, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022), “did not announce a new rule of law.” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___. “First, Peeler unquestionably ended the existing and judicially accepted practice of allowing one-person grand juries to issue indictments.” Id. at ___. “Second, Peeler decided an issue of first impression which was not adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Until Peeler, no appellate court had ruled on whether the one-man grand jury law allowed judges to issue indictments.” Id. at ___. “Finally, no existing precedent dictated that the trial court in Peeler reject the legitimacy of the indictment.” Id. at ___ (applying presumption that Peeler did not apply retroactively and holding that neither the federal nor the state retroactivity test for new rules demanded retroactive application of Peeler as it “did not announce a new substantive rule of constitutional law”).

The Michigan Supreme Court “does not announce a new rule of law when it overrules a decision of the Court of Appeals that misinterpreted a statute contrary to the statute’s plain language, legislative intent, and existing precedent because in that situation, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the existing law that was misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals.” Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Flamont, the Court of Appeals observed that Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), which overruled Tyrrell v Univ of Mich, 335 Mich App 254 (2020), “clearly declared the meaning of the law as it existed, based on the unambiguous statutory language, and corrected a relatively short-lived misinterpretation of the law that had served to thwart the legislative intent and the mandated result.” Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted) (concluding that Christie had full retroactive effect because its holding did not constitute a new rule). See also Hudson v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025) (holding “the statement in Flamont that Christie is fully retroactive was not dictum”).

Federal retroactivity analysis. “In Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989), . . . the United States Supreme Court set forth the federal standard for determining whether a rule regarding criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases in which a defendant’s conviction has become final.” People v Maxson, 482 Mich 385, 388 (2008). “Teague established the ‘general rule’ that ‘new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.’” Maxson, 482 Mich at 388, quoting Teague, 489 US at 310.²⁴ 

Under the federal retroactivity test, “‘courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law.’” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___, quoting Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190, 198 (2016).²⁵ “Substantive rules include rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct, as well as rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Robinson, the Michigan Supreme Court held that Peeler, 509 Mich at 400, “did not announce a new substantive rule of constitutional law.” Id. at ___. “First, Peeler concerned the process of getting to trial.” Id. at ___; see id. at ___ (“Peeler unquestionably ended the existing and judicially accepted practice of allowing one-person grand juries to issue indictments.”). “It did not concern categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishment altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Instead, Peeler regulated the manner of determining a defendant’s culpability.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Second, [the Court’s] holding in Peeler was ‘statutory,’ not constitutional.” Id. at ___ (citation omitted). “Consequently, the federal test d[id] not demand retroactive application of Peeler.” Id. at ___.

State retroactivity analysis. “It is well established that the general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect.” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 564 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “But there are well-established exceptions to this rule.” Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 266 (2007) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that “courts should consider the equities involved” and “[c]ourt decisions should have the goal of reaching justice”). If “‘injustice might result from full retroactivity, [the Michigan Supreme] Court has adopted a more flexible approach, giving holdings limited retroactive or prospective effect.’” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 565, quoting Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 68 (1997).

Prospective application of a holding is appropriate when it decides an issue of first impression, and the resolution of the issue was not clearly foreshadowed, or when it overrules settled precedent. People v Parker, 267 Mich App 319, 327 (2005).²⁶ Accordingly, “complete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law.” Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240 (1986); see also Rowland, 477 Mich at 267 (opinion of the Court) (“[A] holding that overrules settled precedent may properly be limited to prospective application.”).

Linkletter-Hampton factors. When determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively or prospectively, Michigan courts take into account the Linkletter-Hampton factors: “‘(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.’” People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), quoting People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674 (1971) (articulating standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)²⁷).

Procedure versus substance. The “primary focus concerns whether a past holding is procedural or substantive.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (“[T]he initial question is whether [a] holding was merely procedural, or whether it concerned substantive rights of a fundamental nature.”). “‘When considering procedural rules governing trial conduct, the Linkletter-Hampton criteria play a predominant role.’” Poole, ___ Mich at ___, quoting People v Gay, 407 Mich 681, 706 (1980). “‘However, when non-procedural or substantive rights of a fundamental nature are affected, they are normally to be accorded retrospective application.’” Poole, ___ Mich at ___, quoting Gay, 407 Mich at 706. “‘The Linkletter-Hampton considerations may be addressed, but only in the rare instance will they have determinative effect.’” Id. at ___. “Thus, the importance of the Linkletter-Hampton factors is greatly circumscribed when substantive rules or rights are implicated in a holding, and retrospective application is favored.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___.

“Substantive rules set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishment altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “It follows that when a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Poole, the Michigan Supreme Court held that People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022) (holding that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole was cruel or unusual punishment for 18-year-old defendants under the Michigan Constitution), applied retroactively to cases where the period for direct review had expired when Parks was decided. Poole, ___ Mich at ___. The Poole Court held that the Parks rule was substantive because it “necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although . . . a substantive rule is typically accorded retroactive application, . . . the Linkletter-Hampton factors continue to have limited utility, given that they may have a determinative effect in the rare case.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. “In other words, a substantive rule might not be applied retroactively if the Linkletter-Hampton factors strongly indicate otherwise.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (“An examination of the Linkletter-Hampton factors is thus necessary to confirm whether Parks should have retroactive application.”).

“The first [Linkletter-Hampton] factor, concerning the purpose of the new rule, favor[ed] retroactive application of Parks because Parks declared mandatory life-without-parole sentences unconstitutional for an entire class.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (overruling “mistaken holding that the first factor focuses on whether a rule is concerned with a defendant’s guilt or innocence,” referring to People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 (2014)). “The second factor, concerning reliance, also favor[ed] retroactive application because reliance on pre-Parks caselaw [was] detrimental to that group of defendants who received mandatory life-without-parole sentences for crimes committed when they were 18 years old, but whose cases were already finished on direct review when Parks was decided.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. “The third factor, concerning the administration of justice, [did] not favor retroactive application, given the use of judicial resources and the impact of resentencing hearings on those affected by the underlying crimes.” Id. at ___. “However, on balance, the application of the Linkletter-Hampton factors reaffirm[ed] [the Michigan Supreme Court’s] conclusion that Parks [was] entitled to retroactive application as a substantive rule[.]” Poole, ___ Mich at ___.

In Robinson, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “the Linkletter-Hampton factors do not support applying [Peeler, 509 Mich at 381,] retroactively on collateral review.” Robinson, ___ Mich at ___. “With respect to the purpose of the new rule, . . . Peeler concern[ed] the process of getting to trial, not the fairness of the trial itself.” Id.; see id. at ___ (“Peeler ended the existing and judicially accepted practice of allowing one-person grand juries to issue indictments.”). “Because the rule’s purpose is unrelated to the fairness of a trial, the first Linkletter-Hampton factor [did] not favor retroactive application.” Id. at ___. “With respect to the general reliance on the old rule, it is undisputed that before Peeler, prosecutors and judges relied upon the unchallenged assumption that the one-man grand jury law allowed judges to issue criminal indictments.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks omitted). “The second Linkletter-Hampton factor therefore weigh[ed] against Peeler’s retroactive application.” Id. at ___. “Finally, although the exact number of defendants subjected to the errors identified in Peeler [was] unknown, the practice appear[ed] to have been used with some regularity over many decades in some courts.” Id. at ___. “Calling into question convictions in numerous cases in which defendants were convicted following a fair trial under the most stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would therefore hinder unnecessarily the administration of justice in Michigan.” Id. at ___. “For that reason, the third Linkletter-Hampton factor also weigh[ed] against Peeler’s retroactive application.” Id. at ___. “Thus, the Linkletter-Hampton factors do not support applying Peeler retroactively on collateral review.” Id. at ___.

Due process. A defendant’s right to due process may be violated when “‘[t]he retroactive application of an unforeseeable interpretation of a criminal statute’” works to the defendant’s detriment. People v Johnson, 302 Mich App 450, 464 (2013), quoting People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 750 (2000) (alterations in original). “[D]ue process is violated when the retroactive application of a judicial decision acts or operates as an ex post facto law[.]” Johnson, 302 Mich App at 464-465. However, a defendant is not “deprived of ‘due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime’” when judicial interpretation of an applicable statute does not have “the effect of criminalizing previously innocent conduct.” Id. at 465, quoting Bouie v City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 355 (1964) (emphasis omitted).

J.​Lack of Precedent - Case of First Impression

A case of first impression is “‘[a] case that presents the court with an issue of law that has not previously been decided by any controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction.'” Sabbagh v Hamilton Psychological Servs, PLC, 329 Mich App 324, 368 (2019), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (finding that an issue remains one of first impression where it has only been addressed by unpublished decisions).

K.​Overruling Precedent

“Stare decisis ensures ‘uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law[.]’” Stokes v Swofford, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024) (citation omitted). However, “precedents can be revisited if wrongly decided.” Id. at ___. “A decision is wrongly decided if it misunderstood or misconstrued a plainly worded statute or if it has fallen victim to a subsequent change in the law.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts apply “a three-part test to examine the effects of overruling a previous incorrect judicial decision: (1) whether the questioned decision defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the decision were overturned, and (3) whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks omitted), citing Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464 (2000).

In Stokes, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled in part Woodward v Custer, 476 Mich 545 (2006), “because the test adopted by the Woodard Court regarding the evaluation of specialists in medical malpractice actions [was] inconsistent with the statutory language in MCL 600.2169.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___. “Woodard provided a skewed and inaccurate construction of MCL 600.2169, which [had] resulted in highly qualified experts being disqualified.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___. Specifically, “Woodard incorrectly conflated the terms ‘specialty’ and ‘subspecialty’ in a manner that was inconsistent with and changed the meaning of the plain language of the statute, and it failed to highlight the significant discretion provided to trial courts under MCL 600.2169(2) and (3) to exclude experts even when such experts qualify under [

Addressing the first Robinson factor, the Stokes Court concluded that “Woodard defies practical workability” because its application “led to inconsistent and untenable results in subsequent cases.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___. Next, the Court found that “reliance interests”—the second Robinson factor—“do not favor retention of Woodard’s interpretation of MCL 600.2169.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___. “In assessing reliance interests, ‘the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.’” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___, quoting Robinson, 462 Mich at 466. “‘In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest.’” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___, quoting Robinson, 462 Mich at 467 (emphasis omitted). “‘When that happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction.’” Id. (holding that “Woodard departed from the plain meaning of MCL 600.2169”). 

The Stokes Court observed that “overruling Woodard would not rob litigants of their protected interests in securing appropriate experts, for the right itself is statutorily guaranteed.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___. Michigan courts do “not recognize the need to alter litigation strategy as a sufficient reliance interest preventing the overruling of precedent.” Id. at ___ (“[T]here is no reliance interest when litigants need to adjust their litigation strategy.”). “Such a circumstance would apply to any overruling of precedent and is not a compelling reason to prevent a flawed interpretation of the law from being corrected.” Id. at ___ (“There is no reason to doubt that Michigan lawyers are well-equipped to modify their expert selections in line with an accurate interpretation of MCL 600.2169[.]”).

Turning to the final Robinson factor, “whether the law or relevant facts have changed such that the prior decision can no longer stand,” the Stokes Court held that “the totality of the remaining factors weigh in favor of overruling Woodard in part” due to “the instability of the decision and its lack of justification moving forward.” Stokes, ___ Mich at ___ (holding that “Woodard was in part wrongly decided and must be overruled in part”).