“The trial of criminal cases shall take precedence over all other cases[.]” MCL 768.2. “No adjournments, continuances or delays of criminal causes shall be granted by any court except for good cause shown in the manner provided by law for adjournments, continuances and delays in the trial of civil causes in courts of record: [p]rovided, [t]hat no court shall adjourn, continue or delay the trial of any criminal cause by the consent of the prosecution and accused unless in his discretion it shall clearly appear by a sufficient showing to said court to be entered upon the record, that the reasons for such consent are founded upon strict necessity and that the trial of said cause cannot be then had without a manifest injustice being done.” Id.
“The court may refuse to adjourn a proceeding for the appointment of counsel or allow a defendant to retain counsel if an adjournment would significantly prejudice the prosecution, and the defendant has not been reasonably diligent in seeking counsel.” MCR 6.005(E).
The moving party has the burden of establishing good cause for an adjournment. MCL 768.2; MCR 2.503(B)(1).
Denial of a continuance may violate a defendant’s right to due process in certain circumstances. Ungar v Sarafite, 376 US 575, 589 (1964). “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. at 589.
If the defendant requests a continuance, the following factors should be considered:
•whether the defendant is asserting a constitutional right (e.g., the right to counsel);
•whether the defendant has a legitimate reason for asserting the right (e.g., a bona fide irreconcilable dispute with counsel over whether to call alibi witnesses);
•whether the defendant was negligent with regard to any delay in his or her request;
•whether the defendant requested previous adjournments; and
•whether the defendant can demonstrate that prejudice would result from a denial of the request. People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 578 (1972); People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348 (1992).
Adjournments were warranted in the following situations:
•When defense counsel sought to withdraw. Williams, 386 Mich at 575-576.
•Preparation of defense expert witness endorsed on day of trial. People v Wilson, 397 Mich 76, 81-82 (1976).
•New statements made by witnesses shortly before trial. People v Suchy, 143 Mich App 136, 142-146 (1985)
•Defendant requested properly fitted clothes to replace ill-fitting clothes brought for trial. People v Turner, 144 Mich App 107, 110-111 (1985).
An adjournment was not warranted where the defendant “did not attempt to locate and secure potential expert witnesses until soon before the trial began[,]” failed to “move for an adjournment until the day before trial[,]” “had already caused his trial to be delayed for several months[,]” and “fail[ed] to show that the absence of [the expert witness] prejudiced him in any significant way.” People v Daniels, 311 Mich App 257, 266-268 (2015) (citations omitted).
A trial court’s desire to expedite the court’s docket is not a sufficient reason to deny an otherwise proper request for a continuance. Williams, 386 Mich at 577 (emphasis added).
A trial court’s grant or denial of a party’s request for a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Jackson, 467 Mich 272, 276 (2002).
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s request for a continuance, the defendant must still establish that he or she was prejudiced by the court’s decision. People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 574 (1972); People v Daniels, 311 Mich App 257, 266 (2015) (citation omitted).