Canon 4: A Judge May Engage in Extrajudicial Activities¹

“As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that time permits, the judge is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law. A judge should regulate extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties.

A judge may engage in the following activities:

A. Law-Related Activities.

(1) A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.

(2) A judge may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, and may otherwise consult with such executive or legislative body or official on such matters.

(3) A judge may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A judge may participate in the management and investment of such an organization’s funds.

(4) A judge may make recommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.

B. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, speak, and consult on nonlegal subjects, appear before public nonlegal bodies, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

C. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon the judge’s impartiality or interfere with the performance of judicial duties. A judge may serve and be listed as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization. A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.

D. Fundraising Activities. A judge should not individually solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization or any organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice or use or permit the use of the prestige of the office for that purpose. A judge may, however, serve as a member of an honorary committee or may join a general appeal on behalf of such an organization. A judge may speak or receive an award or other recognition in connection with an event of such an organization. A judge may allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the judge’s involvement in an event so long as the judge does not individually solicit funds.

E. Financial Activities.

(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or judicial office, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, exploit the judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.

(2) Subject to the requirements of E(1), a judge may hold and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but should not serve as director, officer, manager, advisor, or employee of any business. Provided, however, with respect to a judge holding office and serving as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business not prohibited heretofore by law or judicial canon, the effective date of the prohibition contained herein shall be the date of expiration of the judge’s current judicial term of office.

(3) A judge should manage investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in which the judge is disqualified. As soon as it can be done without serious financial detriment, the judge should dispose of investments and other financial interests that require frequent disqualification.

(4) Neither a judge nor a family member residing in the judge’s household should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as follows:

(a) A judge may accept a gift or gifts not to exceed a total value of $375, incident to a public testimonial; books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the judge and spouse to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.

(b) A judge or a family member residing in the judge’s household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to other applicants.

(c) A judge or a family member residing in the judge’s household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge, and if the aggregate value of gifts received by a judge or family member residing in the judge’s household from any source exceeds $375, the judge reports it in the same manner as compensation is reported in Canon 6C. For purposes of reporting gifts under this subsection, any gift with a fair market value of $150 or less need not be aggregated to determine if the $375 reporting threshold has been met.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘family member residing in the judge’s household’ means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a person treated by a judge as a family member, who resides in the judge’s household.

(6) A judge is not required by this code to disclose income, debts, or investments, except as provided in this canon and Canons 3 and 6.

(7) Information acquired by a judge in a judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed by the judge in financial dealings or for any other purpose not related to judicial duties.

(F) Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as an executor, administrator, testamentary trustee, or guardian, except for the estate, testamentary trust, or person of a member of the judge’s immediate family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. As a family fiduciary, a judge is subject to the following restrictions:

(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that as such fiduciary the judge will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or if the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2) While acting as such fiduciary, a judge is subject to the same restrictions on financial activities that apply in the judge’s personal capacity.

(G) Arbitration. A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator, except in the performance of judicial duties.

(H) Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law for compensation except as otherwise provided by law.

(I) Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A judge, however, may represent the country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.” Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.

 

Disclaimer: Many of the opinions in this chapter involve more than one Canon of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct; however, only information relevant to MCJC 4 is featured in this chapter. In addition, parts of MCJC 4 involve judicial disclosure and disqualification. These topics are comprehensively addressed in the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Judicial Disqualification Benchbook.

 

 

Misusing position.

•Misusing judicial office for personal benefit. A judge “used official [court] stationery to solicit donations to produce and implement two educational programs and for business correspondence pertaining to the production of related materials” and “further used official stationery to solicit contributions to finance events and activities related to these programs, including prominent placement of his name and judicial status in advertising for a concert to benefit his projects.” In re Thompson, 470 Mich 1347, 1348 (2004).² The judge’s “admitted and proven acts of misconduct in this case include . . . [p]articipation in civic and charitable activities that detract from the dignity of office or interfere with performance of judicial duties, in violation of [MCJC 4(C)]”; “[i]ndividual solicitation of funds, in violation of [MCJC 4(D)]”; “[m]isuse of the prestige of judicial office including misuse of court resources such as official [court] letterhead to solicit funds, and for personal advantage or gain, and for the advantage or gain of another, in violation of [MCJC 4(D)]”; and “[e]ngaging in financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or judicial office, in violation of [MCJC 4(E)(1)].” Thompson, 470 Mich at 1347-1349 (judge suspended for 90 days without pay and ordered to pay costs).

•Accepting football tickets. A judge’s “accept[ance] in open court football tickets from an attorney appearing before him” violated MCJC 4(E)(4), which absent an exception, “prohibits a judge or family member residing in the judge’s household from accepting ‘a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone . . . .’” In re Haley, 476 Mich 180, 182-183 (2006).³ In Haley, none of the exceptions to MCJC 4(E)(4) applied: “The first, [MCJC 4(E)(4)(a)], permits specific types of gifts valued under $100,^[4] such as gifts associated with public testimonials, complimentary books provided by publishers for official use, or bar-related functions and activities devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice”; “[t]he football tickets [did] not fit into any of these narrow categories, so this first exception [was] inapposite.” Haley, 476 Mich at 191. “Second, [MCJC 4(E)(4)(c)] permits gifts from a donor that ‘is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge . . . .’”; “[t]he record established that [the attorney] routinely appeared before [the judge] representing his clients and was actually appearing before [the judge] when he offered the gift.” Haley, 476 Mich at 191. Accordingly, MCJC 4(E)(4)(c) was inapposite. Haley, 476 Mich at 191. “The remaining provision, [MCJC 4(E)(4)(b)], permits the judge to accept ‘ordinary social hospitality’”; “when determining whether the acceptance of a particular gift is consistent with ‘ordinary social hospitality’ [the Court] view[s] the conduct through an objective lens.” Haley, 476 Mich at 191-192. “Here, the context of [the judge’s] acceptance of the football tickets was not social, but rather a judicial, context”; “[t]he singularizing fact of this case is that [the judge] accepted a gift in open court in the course of executing his judicial duties.” Id. at 193. “That the gift of tickets might well be deemed ‘ordinary’ in other contexts does not make its acceptance in a nonsocial setting consonant with the canon”; “[t]he fact that the gift was offered in open court by a litigant in a pending case excludes the possibility that the event can objectively be characterized as ‘social hospitality.’” Id. “[A] reasonable observer would [not] conclude that ‘ordinary social hospitality’ fairly describes an exchange of gifts in open court between a litigant in an immediately pending case and a judge in that same case.” Id. Accordingly, the judge “engaged in misconduct by accepting a gift in contravention of [MCJC 4(E)].” Haley, 476 Mich at 195-196 (judge publicly censured).

•Individually soliciting funds on behalf of a charitable organization. A judge was “the founder and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Coalition for Family Preservation,” and a local law firm “held a golf outing fundraiser for that organization”; “[t]he [fundraiser] invitation state[d] that [the judge] sponsored the golf outing,” and “[t]he program[, signage, and handout] for the event prominently identifie[d] [the judge] as the ‘Coalition Founder.’” In re Brown, 468 Mich 1228 (2003).⁵ Accordingly, the judge’s conduct constituted “[i]ndividual solicitation of funds on behalf of a charitable organization, or permissive use of the prestige of the judicial office for that purpose, contrary to [MCJC 4(D)].” Brown, 468 Mich at 1228-1229 (judge publicly censured).

•Misusing judicial office to solicit money from defendants for a charitable cause. A magistrate was presiding over traffic citations and permitted a police officer to sit at a table next to the podium in the courtroom with a bag of tickets from a local field day, and “dismissed the tickets of defendants pleading responsible or who were found responsible and advised them to purchase tickets from the police officer”; “[s]ome defendants were asked how many children they planned to take and if the number was too low they were told they needed to take more children,” and “[o]thers were told to ‘dig deeper,’ call someone, or go to an ATM machine.” In re Shannon, 465 Mich 1304 (2002).⁶ “In one case a defendant was asked how much money he had” and “[w]hen the defendant said he had $116 on him, [the magistrate] told him to buy $100 worth of tickets”; “[t]he average ticket purchase was approximately $50 per person.” Id. The magistrate’s “conduct, whether well intentioned or not, gave the appearance of using the powers of his position as magistrate to solicit money from defendants for a charitable cause” and constituted “[u]sing, or giving the appearance of using, the prestige of office to solicit funds for an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, contrary to [MCJC 4(D)].” Shannon, 465 Mich at 1304 (magistrate publicly censured and suspended for 30 days without pay).

 

 

 

Grievance investigations concerning various administrative and court-related matters.

•Failing to disclose fee referral relationship. A part-time municipal judge failed to regulate their extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties by failing to disclose a fee referral relationship between a private attorney that practiced before the court and the law firm where the judge was a shareholder, in violation of MCJC 4. JTC Case Summary, 16-4 (dismissed with an admonition).

 

Grievance investigations concerning various matters outside of court.

•Financially benefiting from event planned by court staff. A judge attended an event planned for them by their court staff, at which they accepted a large monetary gift from ticket sales proceeds in excess of the gift limit, in violation of MCJC 4(E)(4)(c). JTC Case Summary, 13-8 (dismissed with a caution).

•Listing judiciary names as members of campaign fundraising committee. A judge listed the names of other judges and judicial officers as members of their campaign fundraising committee, in violation of MCJC 4(D). JTC Case Summary, 14-7 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Participating in certain fundraising events. A judge officiated a game at a fundraiser for an organization that routinely provides several services in cases before the judge’s court, and served as an auctioneer for another agency’s fundraiser, in violation of MCJC 4(C) and MCJC 4(D). JTC Case Summary, 20-7 (dismissed with a caution).

•Soliciting contribution to charitable event. A judge signed a letter written on court stationery soliciting a contribution for a charitable event that they participated in organizing, in violation of MCJC 4(D). JTC Case Summary, 14-11 (dismissed with an admonition).

•Soliciting contributions to scholarship. A judge solicited contributions to a scholarship, in violation of MCJC 4(D). JTC Case Summary, 20-1 (dismissed with a caution).

 

 

 

Guidance on engaging in various matters in court.

•Sentencing offenders to community service work to compile statistics for election. “A judge may not sentence offenders to community service work to compile statistics on the number of cases handled in the court by candidates for a vacancy on the court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-107, June 18, 1996.⁷ “Initially, judges may not generally utilize their positions to solicit funds for or generally advance their own privately supported charities” under MCJC 4(D); “[w]hile there is no issue of soliciting money for this ‘public service’ the utilization of the offender time could be construed as a donation ‘in kind’ which would run afoul of [MCJC 4(D)].” EO JI-107. “Moreover, the purpose of supplying such information could be misconstrued quite easily”; “[w]hile a judge may personally speak as an individual on behalf of or support another candidate for judicial office, the judge may not use the prestige of the judicial office and the judge’s judicial authority in sentencing to do so.” Id.

•Imposing sentences requiring payment to specific entity. “A judge may not impose sentences requiring criminal defendants to pay moneys which are allocated to educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic activities, unless the sentencing practice has been authorized by law.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-55, June 22, 1992.⁸ MCJC 4 “allows judges to participate in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic activities, but clearly says a judge may not personally solicit funds for any civic/charitable organization, nor use the prestige of judicial office for solicitation purposes.” EO JI-55. “Unless a sentencing practice has been authorized by law, a judge’s imposition of that sentence is unethical.” Id. “A sentencing program by which a judge requires parties to pay moneys which are allocated to charitable/civic purposes is akin to a ‘solicitation’ by the judge for that charitable/civic activity and contravenes [MCJC 4],” and “[a] sentencing program, no matter how laudable the goals, which uses the power of the judicial office to solicit moneys is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” EO JI-55.

•Imposing sentences with option of community service or contributing to designated charity. “A sentencing judge may not give offenders the option of performing a designated number of hours of community service work or making a monetary contribution to a charity designated by the judge”; “[i]f judges are forbidden to solicit for charity [under MCJC 4(D)], clearly judges cannot direct contributions by requesting or requiring offenders to donate contributions in lieu of fine or jail time to charities designated by the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-48, March 10, 1992.⁹ “Just because the option of making cash contributions to the court’s charity in lieu of performing a certain number of hours of community service work is in addition to the more traditional sentences of time and fine does not make the sentencing practice any more acceptable.” Id. “The sentencing judge is left open to the accusation that a particular community service alternative is intentionally more burdensome than required in order to encourage monetary contributions to the judge’s charity,” and “[t]he judicial imposition of dollars for hours also discriminates in favor of those more affluent offenders who have the means to buy out of community service work.” Id.

•Permitting artwork display. “Displaying artwork or other products in a courthouse or courtroom at no charge does not violate judicial ethics” because while MCJC 4(E)(4) “prohibits the judge from personally receiving gifts under various circumstances,” “in this case the donation is to the local government entity, and not to the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-25, May 25, 1990.¹⁰

 

Guidance on engaging in various matters outside of court.

•Attending law firm-sponsored events. MCJC 4(B) “provides that a judge may engage in ‘social or recreational activities’ as long as the activities do ‘not detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with the performance of judicial duties’”—“[t]here is no outright prohibition from attending law firm events, but there are limitations judicial officers must be aware of.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-156, February 9, 2024. “[B]efore accepting any invitation to any type of event, the judicial officer must be vigilant and complete an analysis to ensure compliance” with the MCJC. Id. “When judicial officers attend events given by law firms, the judicial officers should:

1. be aware that a broad range of the Bar and the public attend these events;

2. be cognizant that oftentimes these events are photographed and placed in the view of the public and that these photographs may be manipulated and used for the gain of the host or user of the photograph, for example, in print media, social media, et cetera[];

3. avoid situations where lawyers may attempt to engage the judicial officer in ex parte communication on a pending or forthcoming case; and

4. refrain from discussing pending cases with any person.” Id.

“This does not mean [judicial officers] are unable to engage in ‘ordinary social hospitality’ activities, but they should complete the analysis to ensure the engagement falls under the ‘ordinary social hospitality’ concept and that attendance at the event does not cross the line of conduct that is prohibited by the [MCJC].” EO JI-156.

•Accepting gifts. “A judge, judge’s family member, or staff member may accept gifts that are considered ‘ordinary social hospitality’ but should not accept any other gifts from persons who may appear before the judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-146, September 3, 2020. MCJC 4 “pertains to extrajudicial activities and requires the judge to uphold the duty of impartiality in other professional and personal activities, and to ensure that the judge’s family members conduct themselves consistent with the judge’s obligation.” EO JI-146. Ordinary social hospitality should be viewed objectively, and “the exchange must be in a social, rather than professional, context”; “[a]dditionally, a history of reciprocal hospitality between the judge and the person offering the gift supports an inference that the gift is ordinary social hospitality.” Id. “[E]xamples of gifts that may constitute ordinary social hospitality include:

1. A bottle of wine or a dessert or food item that is presented by a houseguest.

2. The purchase of a meal by a friend or colleague with the reasonable expectation that a future purchase would be reciprocated by the receiving judge.

3. Mutual gift exchanges, such as exchanging of holiday/birthday gifts of comparable value.

4. Produce from a home garden when similar hospitality is reciprocated.

Examples of gifts that would not typically be considered ‘ordinary social hospitality’ include:

1. Any gifts from attorneys, litigants, or persons whose interests have or are likely to come before the judge. Gifts from these sources, regardless of the value, are strictly prohibited.

2. Tickets to concerts, shows, sporting events, or fundraising events.

3. Gifts that are of significant value, such as use of a vacation home or time-share and expensive gifts from a lobbyist or vendor.

4. Gifts that are presented where there is no reasonable expectation of reciprocity. For example, if a judge and her husband were taken out to dinner by a salesperson who was selling a product that may be purchased or utilized by the court, the judge could not ethically allow the salesperson to pick up the dinner tab as there is no reasonable expectation that the expenditure would be reciprocated by the judge. Furthermore, this could be viewed as the judge’s misuse of the prestige of office.

Based on the provisions of [MCJC 4((E)], a judge, judge’s family member, or staff should not accept gifts from persons whose interests are before the judge or are likely to come before the judge.” EO JI-146.

•Participating in civic and charitable activities. “A judge may participate in civic and charitable activities which meet the following limitations and/or criteria:

1. The activities may not detract from the dignity of the judicial office.

2. The activities may not interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

3. The activities may not reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality.

4. The activities may not give the appearance of impropriety.

5. The judge may serve and be listed as an officer, director, trustee or nonlegal advisor of a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization and serve as a member of an honorary committee or join a general appeal of such an organization only if: (a) it is unlikely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge; (b) it is unlikely the organization will become engaged in adversary proceedings in any court; (c) the judge does not personally solicit funds; and (d) the prestige of the judicial office is not used for solicitation of funds or membership.

6. The judge may speak at or receive an award in connection with an event of a[n] educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, and even allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the event, but may not individually solicit funds.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, J-8, January 31, 2014.

“A judge may be a member of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic fund-raising committee as long as the judge does not individually solicit money.” EO J-8. MCJC 4(C) “permits a judge to serve and be listed as director or trustee of charitable or civic organizations, so long as participation meets the requirements of [MCJC 2(A), MCJC 4(B), MCJC 4(C), and MCJC 4(D)].” EO J-8. “Therefore, a judge may be identified by name and judicial office on letterhead, in circulated literature or in any other communications disseminated by the organization of which the judge is a member.” Id. “Additionally, if a board or committee sends a general appeal mailing to a variety of people who are known to support the organization, the presence of the judge’s name on that letterhead or as one of several signators would not be improper.” Id.

“A judge is permitted to solicit membership in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization as long as the membership solicitation is not included in the same letter as a solicitation of funds.” EO J-8. “But, a judge should not participate in membership solicitation if doing so could be perceived as using the prestige of the judicial office to coerce participation due to [MCJC 4(C)].” EO J-8.

“A judge may not personally solicit membership for an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization or cause,” and “[a] judge may not select and invite guests, and host a progressive dinner where the proceeds are given to support an organization because this is tantamount to an individual solicitation, prohibited by [MCJC 4(D)].” EO J-8. “Speeches, broadcasts, or other communications where the judge personally asks others to contribute would therefore be improper,” and “[t]his would apply whether or not the judge is identified by judicial title.” Id. “Therefore, participation in a telethon as a special guest offering support of the organization or using the prestige of office to encourage contributions is prohibited by the same Canon.” Id.

MCJC 4(B) “allows a judge generally to write, lecture, teach, speak and consult on nonlegal subjects, appear before nonlegal bodies and engage in the arts, sports or other social and recreational activities, as long as the guidelines are not violated.” EO J-8. “Therefore a judge is allowed to participate in a walk-a-thon, softball game, etc., or other educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic causes as long as the judge does not personally solicit contributions, does not individually solicit for backers or sponsors of other participants, and does not allow others to use the prestige of the judge’s office to coerce solicitations on the judge’s behalf.” Id. “A judge may participate and be listed in promotional materials as a participant in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic activities, as long as the participation does not involve the judge individually soliciting funds.” Id.

Under MCJC 4(D), “[a] judge may attend a testimonial dinner in the judge’s honor held by a charitable or civic organization where the proceeds of the dinner are allocated to a charitable or civic purpose,” and “[t]he judge may even allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the judge’s involvement in the event as long as the judge does not individually solicit funds.” EO J-8. “A judge may regularly participate in dinners held by educational, religious or fraternal organizations.” Id.

•Hosting a commercially-sponsored program. “A judge’s hosting of a commercially-sponsored program has the potential to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or judicial office, interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, exploit the judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-137, May 11, 2012.¹¹ “While the notion of educating the public about the law and the legal system is supported in the Code, it is secondary to the performance of judicial functions”; “[t]o the extent that a judge is permitted to engage in financial and business dealings outside the scope of judicial functions, doing so cannot impinge on the integrity of the performance of those functions.” EO JI-137. “A judge’s ability to speak on ‘nonlegal subjects’ and to participate in ‘civic and charitable activities’ [under MCJC 4] also has some limitations.” EO JI-137. “[E]ven if the content of the program could conceivably comport with [MCJC 4], it is difficult to envision how hosting on a regular basis any commercially-sponsored program would not place the judge in contravention of [the canon’s] proscription against the use of the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others.” EO JI-137. Moreover, “[a] full-time judge, who is paid to host a commercially-sponsored program, violates [MCJC 4(E)(2)] if, in doing so, the judge serves as a director, officer, manager, advisor or employee of any business regardless of where the business is located, whether the judge’s compensation from the business is reported to the State Court Administrative Office, or the number of judges seated on the hosting judge’s court.” EO JI-137.

•Displaying an attorney’s for-profit educational courses and materials. “The display of an attorney’s for-profit educational courses and materials should not be allowed in the court clerk’s office or in any area the public may perceive to be under the court clerk’s control or other court staff’s control.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-135, October 15, 2010.¹² “Allowing a display of the course materials in a common area where non-court personnel may make information available to the public does not constitute the practice of law by a judge in the courthouse in contravention of [MCJC 4(H)],” but “[t]o minimize any potential misconception that any judge endorses the course or has authored the materials, the display or informational material should clearly identify the author (which may be an individual, firm, or company).” EO JI-135.

•Charging a vendor fee at a judicial conference. “A judicial association may charge a vendor a fee for making space available for the vendor to display services and products at a judicial conference in an amount in excess of $100^[13] if the fee charged is either in an amount reasonably calculated to represent the costs incurred by the association in making space available to the vendor or, if there is no additional cost to the association in making space available to the vendors, the fee charged the vendor is not used to offset the cost of the conference itself, but rather is meticulously accounted for as a contribution to the association and used for other functions of the association such as ‘. . . the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice’ in accordance with [MCJC 4(A)(3)].”State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-136, January 14, 2010.¹⁴ “The treasurer of the organization, who is a judge, may receive the fee and handle those funds on behalf of the organization in order to deposit them in the organization’s bank account as it would not constitute a solicitation, nor would it tend to adversely reflect on the judge’s impartiality or judicial office for the reasons stated previously.” EO JI-136.

Where “the vendor approached the association about displaying services and products at the conference” and MCJC 4(D) only prohibits the solicitation of funds, and “the association merely offers the vendors the opportunity to display their services and products at the conference and the cost to the vendor is reasonably calculated to offset the cost of resources or space provided to the vendor or is accounted for as a contribution to the association, it would not appear to constitute solicitation of funds and, therefore, could be received by the treasurer of the association, who is a judge.” EO JI-136. “On the other hand, consistent with the prohibition against a judge’s individual solicitation of funds, a judicial association cannot directly solicit a vendor to attend a conference for the purpose of raising funds for the organization.” Id.

“The physical receipt of that money by a judge would not constitute solicitation.” EO JI-136. As MCJC 4(A)(3) states that a “‘judge may participate in [the funds’] management and investment of such an organization’s funds,” it would not violate the Code for that judge to handle and deposit the funds in the association’s bank account on behalf of the association.” EO JI-136. “Because the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit the receipt of these monies by a judge, contemplating delegation of the task to court personnel is not necessary.” Id. “Moreover, delegation of those duties to court personnel, whose conduct might in any event be imputed to the judge, would create a separate but additional problem of asking the employee to perform duties outside the scope of their employment.” Id.

“[C]ommon experience suggests that most vendors are not regularly or frequently involved in litigation”; “[i]n fact, it is more highly unlikely that such vendors would come before the court or be involved in frequent transactions with the court.” EO JI-136. “Absent a circumstance where experience demonstrates that a particular vendor is likely to come before any court whose judge is a member of the association, charging and receiving a fee from a vendor to display its materials or services at a conference would not per se adversely reflect on a judge’s impartiality or judicial office.” Id. “Moreover, because one of the purposes of the conference is educational, it can only add to judges’ ability to perform their duties and fulfill their judicial office to be made aware of services and technologies that may be of assistance to them in the administration of justice.” Id. “No judge attending the conference is obligated in any way to utilize the products or services of any vendor that may display its materials at the conference; therefore, charging the vendors a fee creates no obligation and does not tend to adversely reflect on a judge’s impartiality or judicial office.” Id.

•Participating in charity event. “A judge may not participate in a fundraiser commonly referred to as ‘Jail and Bail,’ ‘The Great American Lockup’ or a ‘Lockup for Charity,’ where the primary involvement of the judge is to set an amount of money that constitutes a target amount for an individual to pay or try to raise as ‘bail’”; “[w]here the purpose of a judge’s involvement is to determine the amount of money to be paid to a charitable organization by donors, such involvement constitutes a direct solicitation for the charity and is not permitted.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-125, April 20, 2001.¹⁵ “The scenario of this type of fundraising has been found to constitute a direct solicitation and give the appearance of the judicial office being used to give prominence and potential publicity to the proceedings” in contravention of MCJC 4(D). EO JI-125. “The proceedings themselves are, of course, taken in a humorous light, however the individuals brought before the judge, albeit voluntarily, are often citizens, public officials, or professionals, including lawyers who may have official dealings with the judge.” Id.

•Moderating a forum conducted by a political party. Because MCJC 4 “permits, in fact encourages, judges to engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system and the administration of justice,” but “[j]udges are not permitted [to] participate in civic activities that reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality or that in any manner inhibit performance of judicial duties, . . . a judicial officer may serve as moderator at a forum on criminal justice initiatives conducted by a political party provided the judge does not comment on pending or impending cases in any court; the judge does not take a position on a legislative initiative that would preclude the judge from later presiding over a case or controversy involving the matter; and, the judge’s participation does not interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial duties.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-121, April 23, 1999.¹⁶

•Attending a dinner sponsored by a political party. “A judge may not attend a testimonial dinner sponsored by a political party where the price of admission exceeds the reasonable cost of attendance” because “[i]t is unethical for a judge to use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office to raise money for a political party.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-115, August 15, 1997.¹⁷ “While it is clear that judges may attend political gatherings and make individual contributions to political parties, the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct does not permit judges to personally solicit money for any purpose–not even for the judge’s own election campaign.” Id. Under MCJC 4(D), “[e]ven when the event does not require a judge to actively solicit moneys, it is improper for a judge to use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for fund raising purposes.” EO JI-115.

•Receiving and reporting compensation for speaking engagement or event. “A judge may serve as ‘track steward’ at an automobile race provided that the judge is not classified as an employee of the race track, race sponsor, race sanctioning body or other organization involved in holding the activity.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-110, November 15, 1996.¹⁸ “[P]rovided that the particular activity does not detract from the dignity of the office,” there are “no adverse ethical implications from a judge’s participation in an auto racing activity[.]” Id. However, MCJC 4(E)(2) “prohibits a judge from serving as a director, officer, manager, advisor, or employee of any business”; “[t]herefore, if the judge, by serving as track steward, is classified as an employee of the particular sponsoring or sanctioning organization, the judge could not serve.” EO JI-110.

•Participating in public protest. “A judge may not participate in a public protest against a group or organization which advocates against a particular race, ethnic group or religion.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-109, August 6, 1996. “MCJC 4 addresses judicial participation in questions of policy, and encourages judges to participate in activities which improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, but ‘through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.’” EO JI-109. “Because judges are supposed to be impartial, to make decisions based upon the law and the record of a case, and to uphold the law, judges should not declare their personal preferences regarding policy questions.” Id. “If a judge has become identified with a particular interest group or position, and that group appears as a party or a similar issue arises before the judge in a pending matter, the judge may have to recuse himself or herself in order to preserve the fairness of the process.” Id.

•Taking position on proposal. “A judge may take a position on a proposal to eliminate adult education in the state to the extent that the position addresses the impact of the proposal on the administration of justice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-108, June 25, 1996. “The matters of educational opportunities and educational resources are significant to the legal system and the administration of justice”; “[i]n fact, the impact of education generally on the social and economic factors material to poverty and crime is a serious matter of interest to the justice system,” and “[t]he concerns and advice of the judiciary are to be welcome” under MCJC 4. Id. Accordingly, insofar “as a judge’s public comments on adult education are limited to its impact on the administration of justice, they are not unethical.” Id.

•Accepting pro bono legal services from sibling. “A judge may accept pro bono legal services from the judge’s sibling in the pursuit of a public policy issue pending in a case before another judge.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-106, February 22, 1996.¹⁹ “Clearly, a judge may accept a gift or favor from a sibling under [MCJC 4(E)(4)(b)],” and “[t]he ethics provisions do not distinguish between types of gifts and/or favors[.]” EO JI-106. “Were it not for the fraternal relationship, the pro bono nature of the services rendered in the case might be considered an improper gift or favor unless they came within the purview of [MCJC 4(E)(4)(c)]”; however, “[t]he circumstance . . . is uniquely characterized by the familial relationship between the judge and the lawyer offering the services,” and “[a]s such, the acceptance of those pro bono services is not unethical.” EO JI-106.

•Using jury records for personal election mailings and soliciting support from jurors. “A judge may not use jury records for the judge’s personal election mailings” and “may not personally solicit public statements of support from persons who have served as jurors in the judge’s court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-104, October 5, 1995.²⁰ “Use by a judge in a re-election campaign of information about the identity, addresses or other information about jurors disclosed in their questionnaires or during the jury selection process would violate the provisions of [MCJC 4(E)(7)] and would not be permitted.” EO JI-104.

•Teaching law course. “A judge may teach a law course as long as the obligations of teaching do not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties” in accordance with MCJC 4(E)(1); “[t]he role of a judge teaching a course on the law one evening a week is one of proper utilization of the judge’s skill and knowledge for the advancement of the public’s knowledge of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-99, March 15, 1995.²¹ However, under MCJC 4(E)(2), “[a] judge may not serve as a contributing editor of a journal of political opinion,” because “[e]ven if the judge is not compensated, the editorial responsibilities involve ‘advising’ the journal regarding what it should publish and in what form.” Id.

•Serving as trustee for relative. “A judge may not serve as trustee of an inter vivos trust for an aunt.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-98, January 18, 1995.²² MCJC 4(F) “prohibits a judge from serving as a testamentary trustee for anyone other than their immediate family member,” and “[t]here appears to be no substantive nor fiduciary difference between the function and duty of a testamentary trustee versus the trustee of an inter vivos trust.” EO JI-98.“The evils to be avoided by prohibiting judges from serving as trustees, namely the appearance of additional prestige or advantage . . . are equally present whether the trust is testamentary or created by inter vivos document.” Id. Accordingly, there is “no relevant difference between a trustee’s function and duties as trustee of an inter vivos versus testamentary trust, and a judge may not serve as trustee for either trust except for an immediate family member.” Id. MCJC 4(F) “allows a judge to serve as a trustee only for an immediate family member,” i.e., “only parent and child, husband and wife, or brother and sister.” EO JI-98. “Any other relationship would not be directly connected or next in line to the judge but rather would depend on an intervening relative”; “[a]n aunt, therefore, would not be considered . . . to be a member of the judge’s ‘immediate’ family.” Id. “Even where the family relationship is sufficiently close, there are still restrictions on the circumstances under which a judge may serve as a fiduciary as set forth in [MCJC 4(F)(1) and MCJC 4(F)(2)],” and “[e]xisting policy dictates that the circumstances under which a judge should serve as trustee should be highly limited.” EO JI-98. Accordingly, “[a] judge is prohibited from serving as a trustee under an inter vivos trust for a maternal aunt.” Id.

•Transferring law practice. “Whether or not a lawyer may ‘assign’ a law practice is a question of law”; “[a] lawyer may not offer or make an agreement to transfer a law practice when:

(a) there is no provision for client consent to the transfer of the client’s file and transfer of lawyer responsibility for the matter;

(b) the transferring lawyer assumes judicial office and continues to be actively involved in the law practice by the transferred firm; or

(c) the transferring lawyer assumes judicial office and maintains a continuing financial or business interest in the former law practice.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-89, April 8, 1994.²³

“A judge may not plan to utilize or utilize the library, secretary, conference room, or other assets of the judge’s former law firm on a regular basis after assuming judicial office.” EO JI-89. “A full time sitting judge is generally prohibited from practicing law” under MCJC 4(H), and “[w]hen elected or appointed to judicial office the lawyer must promptly discontinue the practice of law.” EO JI-89. “It is clear that a lawyer may not unilaterally transfer a client file to another lawyer, whether by sale or assignment, and that the affected clients must consent to any transfer of their file,” and “unless the assignment is irrevocable, the judge continues to have an active, albeit limited, interest in a law practice in violation of [MCJC 4(H)].” EO JI-89.

“[E]thics rules mandate that a full-time judge sever all relations with the judge’s former firm on taking the bench with the exception of payment by the purchaser for the reasonable value of the practice transferred by the seller.” EO JI-89. “Where the arrangement calls for payment of the purchase price over time, the law permits the judge to hold a security interest in the assets, but a title retaining contract” is not permitted by MCJC 4(H). EO JI-89.

“The continued use of the former firm’s library by the judge creates problems,” and “utiliz[ing] the assets of the judge’s former firm on a regular basis” creates “on-going contact” and “raises questions regarding judicial impropriety in contravention of [MCJC 4(E) and MCJC 4(H)].” EO JI-89. Accordingly, “the judge’s ongoing use of the judge’s former private law facility is improper.” EO JI-89.

•Participating in fundraising activities on behalf of bona fide charitable/civic organizations. “A judge may participate in a broad range of fundraising activities on behalf of bona fide charitable/civic organizations, but only to the extent that the fund raising activities do not involve direct, individual solicitation on the part of the judge”; “[f]urther, such activities may not use the judge’s name or position as a judge to encourage, invite, solicit or otherwise engage in fund raising activities.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-87, March 23, 1994.²⁴ “[W]hen considering whether to participate in such activities and assuming an interest in the particular organization, the judge must decide whether the appeal involves a personal solicitation, and/or whether the anticipated role of the judge would either intentionally or unintentionally use the judge’s prestige and/or position as judge to encourage membership or contribution”; “[i]f either occurs, then the judge must decline participation.” Id. “[A] judge participating in a radiothon for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)” where “[t]he NAACP proposes that the judge serve as a ‘celebrity guest’ on the show to urge listeners to join the organization and explain why the judge is a member of the organization and why it is important to join,” violates MCJC 4 in two respects. EO JI-87. “It anticipates the judge pre-recording a public service announcement to be broadcast on the program urging the public to join the organization and/or agreeing to be interviewed about why the judge is a member and why it is important to join”; “[s]uch activities, assuming they identify the individual, amount to personal solicitation.” Id. “Moreover, the very thrust of the proposed participation is to use the judge’s prestige and position as a judge to encourage contributions”; “[t]he judge would be a ‘celebrity guest’ solely because of the position as a judge,” and “[t]he implication is that people should join and/or contribute because a person as important as a judge or this judge is a member and wants them to do so.” Id. “Therefore, although a judge may participate in fundraising activities that include general appeals and do not specifically focus on the judge’s position as a judge, participation by a judge in a radiothon which identifies the judge by name and position, as a celebrity guest who then speaks, either in a pre-recorded announcement or in an interview, to encourage others to join the organization or contribute to it, is precluded by [MCJC 4(D)].” EO JI-87.

•Giving a speech at a private conference. “A judge may give a speech concerning nonlegal subjects at a private conference sponsored by a company.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-80, February 16, 1994.²⁵ MCJC 4(B) “specifically authorizes a judge to speak on nonlegal topics before nonlegal bodies,” and “[s]ince the sponsoring company and the attendees have not in the past had, nor are likely in the future to have matters coming before the district court, the impartiality of the judge when performing judicial duties would not be affected by participation in the program.” EO JI-80. Under MCJC 4(E)(4), “[a] judge may accept an honorarium for speaking in the program if other participants would receive a comparable honorarium, and if the value exceeds $100,^[26] the judge reports it to the State Court Administrator.” EO JI-80.

•Receiving compensation for legal material. “A judge may write an article containing general legal information, provide work product for inclusion in an educational pamphlet or cassette tape sold for profit, and receive compensation therefor, provided that the promotion and sale of the material is not an exploitation of the author’s judicial position and the activity does not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-76, December 9, 1993.²⁷ “Writing an article for an educational pamphlet on divorce qualifies as [permissible] activity . . .  under [MCJC 4], provided that it comports with [MCJC 4(E)], and provided further, that the product distributed does not constitute the practice of law in contravention of [MCJC 4(H)].” EO JI-76.

•Accepting scholarships or fellowships to attend professional development seminars. “A judge may accept scholarships or fellowships in order to attend professional development seminars provided they are awarded on the same terms as applied to nonjudicial applicants and do not adversely reflect upon the judge’s impartiality toward persons whose interests come before the judge,” and “[a] judge may compete for scholarship funds to attend a professional seminar designed to develop leadership and networking for women.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-75, November 16, 1993.²⁸ MCJC 4(B) “provides that a judge may engage in non-legal social, civic, and charitable functions that do not detract from the dignity of their office and that do not reflect adversely upon their impartiality or interfere with the performance of their judicial duties, and do not involve individuals or special interests which would likely come before the court.” EO JI-75. A national non-profit leadership development program for women “professes to include lawyers and elected officials based upon their ability to make substantive contributions to seminar discussions,” and “[i]t is at least arguable that a judge could contribute to the promotion of a better understanding and appreciation of the legal system by participation in a seminar of this nature.” EO JI-75. Further, “[u]nlike [MCJC 4(E)(4)(a)] in regard to gifts and loans, there does not appear to be a monetary figure restriction [in MCJC 4(E)(4)(b)] on the amount of the scholarship.” EO JI-75.

•Participating in fund raising for a political party. “A judge may not participate in fund raising for a political party and its candidates by calling bingo numbers, selling bingo cards, and handling money at the event.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-73, October 6, 1993.²⁹ “It is well-established that a judge may not personally and directly solicit funds for a civic/charitable purpose [JI-1, JI-33], or for the judge’s campaign for political office.” Id. (bracketed information in original). “While [MCJC 4(C)] provides wide latitude for public service by judges, it inferentially restricts such discretion by warning against participation in charitable organizations that adversely reflect upon the impartiality or that interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial duties.” EO JI-73. Where “the judge would be selling bingo cards and taking money from attendees,” “[t]hese activities are the direct and personal ‘solicitation of funds’ by the judge, and prohibited.” Id.

•Participating in charity fashion show. “A judge may participate as a model in a fashion show, the proceeds of which will be allocated to charitable purposes, provided that the judge’s participation does not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or interfere with the judge’s impartiality, and the judge does not solicit funds.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-71, July 2, 1993.³⁰ “Participation in the event, and being listed in promotional literature as participating in the event, is not unethical.” Id.

•Providing services as conciliator. “A judge should not provide services as a conciliator in disputes that are likely subjects of arbitration or litigation.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-69, June 21, 1993.³¹ “There seems to be no meaningful distinction to be made of the fact that [MCJC 4(G)] omits the specific use of the term conciliation, but does use the term mediation”; “[t]hese terms and the processes under them aimed at a reconciliation are so clearly connected that reason requires that [MCJC 4(G)] be applied to both of them.” EO JI-69. MCJC 4(G) “contemplates parties engaged in a litigious dispute or about to become so engaged, and bars judges from becoming involved in the process outside of the judge’s formal duties.” EO JI-69. “There must be concern that the disputed matter may come before the judge’s court or in another judicial forum where the actions of the ‘conciliator judge’ are drawn into the controversy or the prestige of the judicial officer is asserted to support or enhance the propriety of a proposed reconciliation.” Id.

•Participating in health education and social awareness activities. “A judge may participate in health education and social awareness activities such as AIDS prevention, and encourage other persons to support the same cause”; however, “[a] judge should not wear on the judicial robe symbols indicating the judge’s support or opposition to a particular political, social, or charitable/civic cause.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-68, April 26, 1993.³² MCJC 4 “encourages judicial officers to contribute toward the improvement of criminal and juvenile justice and to participate in [law-related activities],” and “[j]udges are allowed to engage in avocational activities provided they do not interfere with or detract from the dignity of judicial office or the performance of judicial duties.” EO JI-68.“Wearing the AIDS ribbon would publicly identify the judge with the AIDS educational program,” and “[t]he wearing of a ribbon for this purpose on street clothes outside the courtroom” is permissible; however, “a judge should not wear [such a symbol] on the judicial robe.” Id.

•Holding non-fundraising event in honor of nonjudge. “If the purpose of the event is not fund-raising, a group of judges may hold a testimonial dinner in honor of a nonjudge, invite lawyers and judges to the event, and assess each attendee a pro rata share of the actual costs of the event.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-49, March 20, 1992.³³ “It is commonplace for groups to hold meetings in public facilities which rent out private rooms and offer standard menus for various set rates, depending on attendance,” and “[s]ome facilities require an advance deposit or a minimum attendance guarantee.” Id. “Advising attendees of their pro rata share for attendance at the event is not . . . prohibited ‘solicitation of funds.’” Id. “Likewise, if one event organizer has advanced a deposit, it is not improper for the individual to be reimbursed from payments from attendees subsequently received”; “[t]here is no need to create elaborate bookkeeping or separate accounts.” Id. “Any reasonable method of determining each attendee’s share and reimbursing the organizer for any advance payments is acceptable.” Id. However, “[i]f the purpose of the event is fund-raising, a group of judges holding a testimonial dinner may solicit funds from attendees only if a nonjudge handles the solicitation and the funds, and only if the proceeds are allocated to a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization.” Id.

•Accepting a referral fee. “A full-time referee may not accept a referral fee for referring clients to a lawyer” because “the receipt of a referral fee [constitutes] ‘practicing law for compensation’” within the meaning of MCJC 4(H). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-45, December 20, 1991.³⁴ “The prospective client looks to the referring lawyer for the expertise and knowledge necessary to make an appropriate referral, and the referring lawyer uses legal expertise and skill in making that selection”; “[t]herefore, a full-time referee may not accept a referral fee.” Id.

•Selling law books. “A judge may sell law books to persons whose interests are unlikely to come before the judge” without violating MCJC 4(E) because “[a] judge is not restricted in negotiating or concluding an agreement for the sale of law books at market value with one whose interests do not come before the judge, or with a lawyer who is not likely to practice before the court on which the judge serves.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-40, July 29, 1991.³⁵ “If the purchaser is a party or advocate for a party in a matter coming before the judge and the purchase transaction has not been fully completed, i.e., all elements of the purchase agreement fulfilled, the judge must disclose the relationship on the record and recuse unless the parties ask the judge to proceed.” Id. “A judge may . . . sell his/her law books to a lawyer who is likely to come before the court on which the judge serves if a device [is] used to shield the identity of the purchaser, such as a blind trust” because “[a]n indirect sale (via a device to shield purchaser identity) would not violate the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct as long as the identity of the purchaser remains undisclosed to the judge.” Id.

•Soliciting funds for judicial organization. “A judge may not personally solicit funds on behalf of any charitable organization”; however, “[a]n organization of judges may retain a non-judge executive director to solicit funds for the organization’s charitable and educational activities.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-33, December 19, 1990.³⁶ “If the organization’s fund-raising letter is signed by someone other than one of its members, and the organization’s members do not personally participate in the solicitation, the organization’s solicitation for charitable and educational purposes does not violate [MCJC 4(D].” EO JI-33.

•Giving away fundraiser tickets. “A judge may attend a fundraiser held for a nonjudicial candidate, and may participate in campaign activities which do not constitute a public endorsement of the nonjudicial candidate”; “[t]he same rules apply to a judge’s participation in a campaign for a nonjudicial candidate who is a relative of the judge or a member of the judge’s household.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-30, November 15, 1990.³⁷ “Similar logic would allow a judge to give away extra fundraising tickets the judge has purchased but cannot use”; “[t]his is distinguished from the judge receiving free fundraising tickets, which would fall within [MCJC 4(E)(4)], and from the judge reselling tickets, since a judge may not directly solicit funds.” EO JI-30. “A judge may also buy a block of tickets, such as all seats at a specific table for a dinner event, with the intention of giving them away to friends or to ensure good attendance at the event.” Id. “As long as the judge does not use the power and prestige of the office in such give-aways and does not suggest the recipient can expect something from the judge in return for attending, such intentional give-aways are not improper.” Id.

•Selling computer program. “A judge who has developed a computer program which will produce forms for use by lawyers may sell the program to a lawyer or other person as a distributor”; “[t]he judge may retain a royalty for the units sold, but may not take part in the marketing of the product or be retained in any advisory capacity as to technical questions concerning the product” and “should have no ownership in the purchaser entity, nor have any rights in the operation by which the product is distributed.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-21, May 11, 1990.³⁸ “Development of a computer program to assist in using state-approved forms qualifies as [appropriate] activity . . . under [MCJC 4], provided that it comports with [MCJC 4(E)].” EO JI-21.

•Providing legal advice/services. Whether a judge may provide legal advice or legal services depends on the circumstances.

Providing legal advice to immediate family member. “A judge may, without compensation, provide limited legal advice or counseling to members of the judge’s immediate family, but may not act as their advocate or negotiator, or make appearances as counsel for the family members.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, J-2, November 3, 1989.³⁹ Accordingly, “a judge may provide limited legal advice or counseling to a son-in-law concerning a real estate transaction, including drafting or reviewing documents incident to the transaction”; “[h]owever, the judge cannot receive compensation for these services, may not function as advocate or negotiator, and may not make an appearance as counsel.” Id.

Drafting a will. “A judge may without compensation draft a will for a member of the judge’s immediate family.” EO J-2. “The drafting of wills for close family members, however, may raise attorney-client conflicts of interest,” and “[a] judge engaging in permitted legal work is governed by the same rules as a lawyer and should proceeding accordingly.” Id.

Providing legal advice to charitable/civic organizations. “It is improper for a judge to provide legal advice to charitable/civic organizations on which the judge serves.” EO J-2. MCJC 4(C) “provides that a judge may serve as ‘an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor . . .’ of educational, charitable, or civic organizations”--”[b]y this choice of language, the Code authorizes the giving of ‘nonlegal’ advice to such organizations by a judge” and “also clearly forbids a judge to provide ‘legal advice’ to charitable or civic organizations.” EO J-2. The absence of remuneration has no bearing on the propriety of the conduct.” Id.

Appearing in legal proceedings. “Advocacy is inconsistent with the judicial office and prohibited completely, except for pro se matters,” and “[t]he absence of compensation and the locus of the proceeding do not mitigate the prohibition.” EO J-2. “Judges have the same right to represent themselves as other citizens, and may appear pro se as a party before tribunals and in negotiations.” Id. “[J]udges should be able to represent themselves in personal matters before tribunals or in negotiation, as long as this right is not abused and appropriate steps are taken to avoid the appearance of favoritism or impropriety, such as where the matter is in the judge’s own court.” Id. “A judge may not appear as an attorney for family members in proceedings outside the state.” Id. “While a judge may give legal advice to members of the judge’s family (for no compensation), the judge may not make an appearance as counsel for, or function as an advocate or negotiator on behalf of, that family member.” Id. “The fact that [the appearance is] ‘out of state’ . . . makes no difference”; “[a]n impartial judiciary, in both fact and appearance, and whether in Michigan or outside the state, is essential to the administration of justice.” Id.

•Attending a charity dinner in the judge’s honor. “A judge may attend a testimonial dinner in the judge’s honor held by a charitable or civic organization where the proceeds of the dinner are allocated to a charitable or civic purpose”; “the judge’s acceptance of such an honorary or testimonial is [not improper], given that [MCJC 4(E)(4)(a)] explicitly allows such testimonials and the judge will not solicit funds or attendance to the event.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-9, July 19, 1989.⁴⁰

•Accepting contributions after election. “A candidate, successful or not, may not accept contributions after the election from friends or relatives to retire campaign debts” because “contributions from friends or relatives on or after election day may constitute a gift or loan prohibited” by MCJC 4(E)(4). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-7, July 7, 1989.⁴¹

•Soliciting funds for charity door-to-door or on the street. “A judge may not participate by going ‘door to door’ or ‘on the street’ as part of the sale of items, products or gaining contributions, where the primary purpose is to solicit funds for charitable or philanthropic organizations.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-3, February 8, 1989.⁴² “[W]hile fund-raising for charitable organizations is not only ‘laudable’ and should be encouraged to the extent that it is not clearly prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct, every reference to person-to-person solicitation of funds rather than a ‘general appeal’ has been found to be improper.” Id. “Accordingly, a judge may not individually solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization or use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for that purpose-which includes selling or soliciting funds for items on the street or going door-to-door.” Id.

•Writing a legal column for a newspaper. “A judge may write a regular legal column of a general information[al] nature for a newspaper, and may contribute to radio or television programs of a similar nature, provided that such activity does not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, and provided that all aspects of such activity conform with the provisions of the code of judicial conduct” because “[a]ctivities which enhance public knowledge about the law, the legal system and the administration of justice are clearly encompassed by the terms of MCJC 4.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, C-217, July 1979.

 

Guidance on serving on various organizations.

•Serving on charitable or non-profit organization. “A judge may serve as a member of an honorary committee or may join a general appeal on behalf of a charitable organization and may speak at or receive an award or other recognition in connection with an event of such an organization and a judge may allow his or her name or title to be used in advertising the judge’s involvement in an event so long as the judge does not individually solicit funds”; “[a]llowing the use of the prestige of the judge’s office does not create an appearance of impropriety.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-139, October 21, 2013.⁴³ Although “a judge may use the prestige of office for the activities specified in [MCJC 4] without the same being a violation of [MCJC 2], the appearance of impropriety standard of [MCJC 2] still applies to a judge’s participation in other extra-judicial activities under [MCJC 4].” EO JI-139. “Therefore, a judge may not serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a charitable or non-profit organization if the organization is regularly engaged in adversary proceedings before any court or is likely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the particular judge, as to do so would be a violation of [MCJC 4(C)]”; engaged in proceedings “includes, but is not limited to, providing testimony or documentary evidence to the court or participating in case status conferences in certain types of cases on a regular basis.” EO JI-39. “Nor may a judge serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of a charitable or non-profit organization where the sole purpose of the charitable or non-profit organization is to raise money for the court’s own court-ordered programs.” Id. “[I]nasmuch as [MCJC 4(C)] limits a judge’s role as an advisor to a charitable organization to that of a nonlegal advisor, a judge should not perform legal work in connection with the creation or ongoing operation of a charitable organization, including organizations that are created for the specific purpose of raising funds for problem-solving court programs.” EO JI-139.

•Serving on board of community foundation. “A judge is not ethically prohibited from serving on the board of an area community foundation” where “[t]he foundation appears to qualify as a ‘bona fide’ charitable institution” and the service would not otherwise contravene MCJC 4(C). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-103, July 14, 1995.⁴⁴ 

•Serving on executive agency. “A district court magistrate may not concurrently serve on a city board of police commissioners.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-94, July 27, 1994.⁴⁵ “The board of police commissioners regularly reviews and investigates citizens’ complaints against officers, serves as a final appeal for officers who have been disciplined, and approves or denies promotions of police officers”; “[a]lthough the board of police commissioners may serve to facilitate the administration of justice [under MCJC 4(I)] by reviewing and investigating citizen complaints against officers, the fundamental principles of impartiality, independence and integrity of a judge are in conflict with the member’s role on the commission.” EO JI-94.

•Serving on board of directors of corporation for the delivery of health maintenance services. “Full-time and part-time judges are prohibited from serving on boards of directors of any business with or without compensation”; “[a] judge may not serve on the board of directors of a corporation for the delivery of health maintenance services unless the organization is a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, the organization is unlikely to be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, and the organization is not regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-72, July 29, 1993.⁴⁶ “The fact that the nonprofit corporation is being operated partly for the laudatory purpose of bettering the lives of migrant patients is not dispositive of the issue” because “[t]he corporation must be considered a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization before the judge can participate as a board member subject to the conditions of [MCJC 4(C) and MCJC 4(D)], regardless of its not-for-profit status.” EO JI-72. “The fact that the [health maintenance organization] services provide a focus on the migrant population may make the organization tantamount to a ‘civic organization,’” but “[t]he facts presented do not indicate that the nonprofit corporation qualifies under this standard.” Id. “If the organization is not a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization within the meaning of [MCJC 4(C)] . . . look to [MCJC 4(E)(2)],” and “[i]f the organization falls within [MCJC 4(E)(2)], the judge may not participate on the board.” EO JI-72.

•Serving on board of directors of golf course. “Full-time and part-time judges are prohibited from serving on boards of directors of any business with or without compensation,” and “[a] judge may not serve on the board of directors of a golf course operated as a private corporation, even if the golf course is not operated for profit.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-70, June 28, 1993.⁴⁷ “The fact that the golf course may be operated for the benefit of the community, and is not designed to earn a profit is not dispositive of the question,” because “[n]owhere in [MCJC 4(C) or MCJC 4(E)] is the profitability of the organization a factor.” EO JI-70. “Although it may be true that many not-for-profit organizations are also bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations, that is not always the case”; “[c]onversely, the fact that a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization makes a profit, does not automatically prohibit a judge’s participation.” Id. “If the golf course were a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, the judge could participate on the board as long as the conditions of [MCJC 4(C) and MCJC 4(E)] are met.” EO JI-70. In EO JI-70, there was nothing “that indicate[d] that the golf course qualifie[d] under this standard”--“[t]he fact that the golf course is open to the public does not equate with it being a ‘civic’ organization,” and “[t]he fact that the golf course is the location for sport or leisure activity does not make it any less a business covered by [MCJC 4(E)].” EO JI-70. “Although the judge may have a passive investment in the golf course, the judge may not participate on the board.” Id.

•Serving as a member of an independent law revision commission. “A judge may sit as a member of an independent law revision commission providing information and assistance to the Legislature so long as the duties of the commission are limited to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice and so long as the membership of the committee does not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-67, March 30, 1993.⁴⁸ “It is clear that a judicial officer is required not only to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary but also to bear the burden of contributing to the improvement of the law, the legal system and the administration of justice, including the revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice.” Id. “At [MCJC 4(A)(2)] a judicial officer is authorized to consult with the executive or legislative body or official on such matters, and at [MCJC 4(A)(3)] a judicial officer is authorized to be a member of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.” EO JI-67. Further, “[t]he subjects to be considered by the Law Revision Commission all clearly impact and will improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice–a function clearly permitted by [MCJC 4(I)].” EO JI-67.

•Serving on political action committee. “A judge may not serve on a legislative affairs and political action committee whose mission is to support pro-business oriented candidates to partisan or nonpartisan offices.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-65, February 25, 1993.⁴⁹ “By serving as a member of a committee which has taken a stance in favor of or in opposition to a particular sector of the community, the judge is stripped of impartiality and would face recusal on each occasion that the policy or law affecting that sector was the subject matter being contested in a legal proceeding or when a member of that sector appeared before the judge in question.” Id. “It is clear that promoting the interests of the business sector is distinct and apart from the general ‘improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice’ as it pertains to the courts.” Id.

•Serving on board of legal aid organization. “A judge serving on the board of directors of a nonprofit legal aid organization is required to disclose the relationship when one of the parties appearing before the judge is represented by a lawyer from the legal aid organization.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-51, April 3, 1992.⁵⁰ There is no “ethical requirement to per se disqualify the judge when one of the parties in a proceeding before the judge is represented by a lawyer from the legal aid organization” because it is doubtful “that a reasonable person would conclude that a judge could not fairly and impartially adjudicate a matter in which the organization has no personal interest in the outcome other than to ensure that the staff lawyers provide quality representation for its legal aid clients.” Id. However, “if the legal aid organization has a personal interest in the proceeding, pecuniary or otherwise because of commitment to the particular causes or the enforcement of its own policies, then the judge must recuse from hearing the case or deciding the issue.” Id.

•Serving on attorney discipline board. “A judge may serve as a member of an attorney discipline board hearing panel and participate in a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-24, May 17, 1990. “MCJC 4 explicitly allows judges to participate in a variety of organizations and activities devoted to the improvement of law, the legal system, and the administration of justice,” and there is “no explicit prohibition or underlying philosophy which would require a lawyer to resign from the disciplinary board hearing panel when the lawyer becomes a judge.” EO JI-24. “It would be hard to imagine an activity which would ‘improve the legal system and the administration of justice,’ MCJC 4, more than participation in the bar’s self-regulatory boards and agencies.” EO JI-24. “Participation in discipline proceedings can increase a judge’s appreciation for the demands of law practice, and focus the judge’s attention on checks and balances that the judge could apply in similar fact situations which come before the judge.” Id. Accordingly, there is “nothing per se improper with a judge serving on lawyer disciplinary panels.” Id.

•Serving on board of organization with political ties. “A judge may not serve as a member of the board of directors of a charitable, nonprofit organization which is under the auspices of a political party” because doing so “has the potential of compromising not only the independence but also the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-22, May 16, 1990.⁵¹ While MCJC 4(C) “provides wide latitude for public service by judges, it inferentially restricts such discretion by warning against participation in charitable organizations that adversely reflect upon the impartiality or that interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial duties.” EO JI-22. “Even if it is assumed that the organization is well-distanced from the political party, the mere fact that the foundation bears the name of a deceased leader of the party makes it more probable than not that the judge, as a member of the board, will be perceived by the public to endorse the brand or style of politics engaged in by the deceased political leader.” Id.

•Serving on census count committee and on nonprofit corporation. “A judge may serve as a member of a census count committee formed to promote census awareness in the judge’s community, if (a) the activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office, (b) the activities do not interfere with the performance of judicial duties, (c) the activities do not reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, and (d) participation in the activities does not constitute an appearance of impropriety.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-18, March 27, 1990.⁵² “It is unlikely, if not impossible, for such a ‘blue ribbon committee’ to be involved in proceedings before a state court or federal court judge”; accordingly, “[t]o serve on the committee would not be a violation of [MCJC 4].” EO JI-18.

•Serving as director of nonprofit corporation. “A judge may serve as director of a nonprofit corporation formed by a university to manage various entrepreneurial activities for the university, if (a) the nonprofit corporation is a bona fide educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, (b) the nonprofit corporation will not be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, and (c) the nonprofit corporation will not be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-18, March 27, 1990. “Although it would appear unlikely that the nonprofit corporation formed by the state university would become engaged in legal proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, or that the organization ‘will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court,’ if such should occur, the judge should resign from the board of the corporation.” Id.

•Serving as director, officer, manager, advisor or employee of any business. Under MCJC 4(E)(2), “full-time and part-time judges are prohibited from serving as director, officer, manager, advisor or employee of any business, with or without compensation.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, J-3, January 26, 1990.⁵³ The prohibition applies “regardless of where the business is located, regardless of whether the judge properly reports compensation from the business to the State Court Administrative Office, and regardless of whether the judge serves on a single-judge or multi-judge court.” Id. “A retired judge who serves as visiting judge under special assignment by the State Court Administrative Office may serve as director, officer, manager, advisor or employee of a business, provided that during the period of any judicial assignment, the judge (a) takes a leave of absence as director, officer, manager, advisor or employee of the business, (b) receives no remuneration from the business during the period of judicial service, and (c) is disqualified from hearing any matter related to the interests of the organization on which the judge serves.” Id. “A part-time or retired judge may serve as director of a charitable, religious, educational, fraternal or civic organization which is not regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.” Id.

 

Guidance on serving in dual roles.

•Serving as part-time magistrate and attorney. “A part-time magistrate is not per se disqualified from representing the funding unit of the magistrate’s court in a civil matter in the circuit court”; “[t]he magistrate is required to analyze each situation on a case by case basis to determine whether representation is permitted.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-97, November 21, 1994.⁵⁴ “Once it is determined that the part-time magistrate may represent a particular client in another court, there are additional ethical principles to consider.” Id. “First, [MCJC 4(G)] would preclude a part-time magistrate from serving as ‘an arbitrator or mediator, except in the performance of judicial duties.’” EO JI-97. “Secondly, any information acquired by the lawyer while serving as a part-time magistrate should not be used in financial dealings or for any other purpose not related to the part-time magistrate’s duties as a judicial officer” under MCJC 4(E). EO JI-97. “Thirdly, the part-time magistrate is obligated to ‘screen for conflicts’ before undertaking the private representation of a client, and should not proceed if delivering services regarding that claim will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities as a part-time magistrate.” Id. “If the part-time magistrate is disqualified from handling a private case because of lawyer ethics rules, members of the magistrate’s law firm are also disqualified from handling the matter unless the particular ethics rule disqualifying the part-time magistrate allows other firm members to participate after proper screening, fee apportionment, and notice.” Id. “If the part-time magistrate is disqualified from handling a private case because of restrictions applicable only to magistrates and not found in lawyer ethics rules, the disqualification is not imputed to other firm members.” Id. “Firm members may handle matters before the part-time magistrate’s court”; however, “[t]he part-time magistrate is disqualified from any matter in which a member of the firm appears.” Id.

•Serving as part-time judge and conservator. “A part-time judge may serve as the conservator of a protected person but should decline if such service would impose on the performance of judicial duties, detract from the dignity of judicial office, or if it would constitute the use of the prestige of office to advance the personal interests of the judge or others”; however, “[a] part-time judge may not serve as conservator of a business or other enterprise.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-88, March 30, 1994.⁵⁵ Under MCJC 4(F), it is “not ethical for a full-time judge to serve as conservator except for a member of the judge’s immediate family and under the conditions listed.” EO JI-88.“It is obvious that to the extent [conservator] activity would impose on a part-time judge’s performance of judicial duties or ‘detract from the dignity of the office’ such conduct would violate [MCJC[4], and would be prohibited to the same extent as for full-time judges.” EO JI-88. “[It] is clearly foreseeable that litigation could arise from conducting the financial affairs of a protected person.” Id. “Special care must be exercised to avoid a violation of the judicial Canons, and therefore, although a part-time judge may serve as a conservator for a protected person, a part-time judge may not act as conservator of a business.” Id.

•Serving as assistant prosecutor and part-time magistrate.“An assistant prosecutor may not serve as a part-time magistrate for a district court” because “[a] magistrate is a ‘judge’ whose conduct is governed by the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct,” and “judges should refrain from dealings that . . . involve them in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the [c]ourt” in accordance with MCJC 4(E)(1). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-56, July 24, 1992.⁵⁶

•Serving as retired judge and mediator or arbitrator. “A retired judge may participate as mediator or arbitrator as long as (a) the retired judge does not participate during the period of any judicial assignment” and “(b) the retired judge is disqualified from mediation and arbitration in matters in which the judge served as judge, and is disqualified as judge from matters in which the judge participated as mediator or arbitrator.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-28, July 12, 1990.⁵⁷ While “a full-time sitting judge may not serve as arbitrator or mediator in a matter in which the judge is not presiding as a judge” under MCJC 4(G), “this prohibition [is not] strictly applied to retired judges who are subject to call.” Id. And while MCJC 4(H) prohibits a full-time sitting judge from engaging in the practice of law, “a retired judge subject to assignment may have formerly engaged in mediation or arbitration activities outside the performance of judicial duties.” Id. “Although a retired judge’s participation in mediation and arbitration activities unrelated to the performance of judicial duties will increase the number of cases in which the retired judge will be disqualified from serving as judge . . . this inconvenience is [not] significantly different from the disqualification of a retired judge because of previous participation as a judge in a matter, or previous participation as a lawyer in a matter.” Id.

 

Guidance on lending support.

•Supporting charitable organizations on social media. “Judges may support charitable organizations on social media so long as the organization will not likely be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge, the judge does not coerce participation by others, and the judge does not individually solicit funds for the organization” under MCJC 4; however, “[j]udges shall not individually publish their own specific charitable contributions on social media” because “[s]uch a public disclosure is proscribed conduct under [MCJC 4(D)].” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-148, November 1, 2019. “Although social media and websites can reach a larger audience, any communication permissible via a print document continues to be permissible in a charitable organization’s digital content”; accordingly, “[j]udges may allow their names and photographs to be shown on the website or in the social media of a charitable organization if the use does not: (1) appear to be the judge’s personal solicitation for funds; (2) coerce participation from others; or (3) compromise the integrity of the court.” EO JI-148.

•Donating to a nonjudicial candidate’s campaign. “A sitting judge may make a private monetary donation to a nonjudicial candidate’s campaign”; “[e]ven though the candidate must publish a financial report of donations, the contribution would not amount to a ‘public endorsement’ of the candidate.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-145, June 15, 2015. “Given the [2013] amendments of [MCJC 4] allowing judges to be more involved in fundraising activities” and “relax[ing] some of the previous restrictions on a judge’s extrajudicial activities,” “a campaign contribution to a nonjudicial candidate, without more, is not ethically prohibited.” EO JI-145.

•Contributing to a bond issue. “A judge may make a financial contribution to a group supporting a bond issue to build a new school in the school district in which the judge resides” and “may also allow a yard sign to be placed in the judge’s yard, indicating support for the bond issue” because “[t]he two activities . . . appear to fall within the allowable range of activities” of MCJC 4(C). State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-116, November 7, 1997.⁵⁸

•Sponsoring a youth sports team with campaign funds. “A judicial candidate may spend campaign funds on sponsorship of a youth sports team so long as the information displayed on the schedule and uniforms of the team do not misrepresent the candidate’s identity, qualifications, or present position and includes the necessary identifying information.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-58, October 15, 1992.⁵⁹ Under MCJC 4(B), a judge “may engage in the arts, sports and other social and recreational activities so long as the activities do not detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with the performance of the judge’s judicial duties,” and there is no “reason why a judge’s participation in the sponsorship of youth soccer would detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with judicial duties.” EO JI-58.

•Signing resolution endorsing petition. “A judge may not sign a resolution which requests specific action be taken by the mayor and county board of commissioners regarding business closings of a local employer and the union workers it employs.” State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion, JI-52, April 27, 1992.⁶⁰ “The subject matter of the Resolution is not ‘the law, the legal system or the administration of justice’ [as set out in MCJC 4(I)]; the Resolution addresses the private and civic interests of the community, not judicial matters.” EO JI-52. “That the Resolution requests action from the mayor and county board of commissioners would appear to contravene [MCJC 4(A)(2)], which allows a judge to appear at public hearings or consult with executive bodies on matters concerning the law, the legal system and the administration of justice.” EO JI-52. And although MCJC 4(C) “allows a judge to participate in civic and charitable activities ‘that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties,’” “[w]ording in the Resolution which emphasizes the ‘community’ does not in and of itself make signing the Resolution a ‘civic’ activity; intervention in the management decisions of a local business and support of union interests regarding a particular employer are not ‘civic’ activities within the scope of the Canon.” EO JI-52. “Even if signing the Resolution could somehow be construed as a ‘civic activity,’ participation is prohibited since the Resolution does reflect adversely on impartiality and does interfere with the performance of judicial duties.” Id. “Therefore, it is not ethical for a judge to sign the Resolution.” Id.