6.6Mandatory Sentences

The legislative sentencing guidelines do not apply if a crime has a mandatory determinate penalty or a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. MCL 769.34(5).

A.Mandatory Determinate Minimum Sentences

Where a statute requires a court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence, the court must impose that sentence without regard to the recommended minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. MCL 769.34(2)(a). Imposing a minimum sentence not within the range recommended by the guidelines is not a departure when the sentence is mandated by the statute governing the sentencing offense. Id.

The following controlled substances offense statutes provide mandatory minimum sentences:

•MCL 333.7410(2) – mandatory two-year minimum sentence¹ and a maximum sentence not to exceed 60 years, see MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) and MCL 333.7410(2), for an individual over 18 year of age who violates MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) by delivering certain schedule 1 or 2 controlled substances in an amount less than 50 grams to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library.

•MCL 333.7410(3) – mandatory two-year minimum sentence² and a maximum sentence not to exceed 40 years, see MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) and MCL 333.7410(3), for an individual over 18 year of age who violates MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) by possessing with intent to deliver certain schedule 1 or 2 controlled substances in an amount less than 50 grams to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library.

•MCL 333.7413(2)³ – mandatory five-year minimum sentence⁴ and a maximum sentence not to exceed twice the sentence authorized under MCL 333.7410(2) or MCL 333.7410(3) (i.e., 120 years and 80 year, respectively), for a person convicted of two or more offenses described in MCL 333.7410(2) or MCL 333.7410(3).

•MCL 333.7416(1)(a) – mandatory sentence of not less than half of the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for an adult who commits such an act and not more than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for an adult who commits such an act.⁵

B.Mandatory Life Imprisonment Without Parole (LWOP)

1.Statutes Authorizing Mandatory LWOP

The following controlled substance offenses are punishable by mandatory LWOP:

•MCL 333.17764(7)—conviction of MCL 333.17764(2) resulting in death where the offender had intent to kill or seriously impair two or more persons.⁶

•MCL 750.16(5)—conviction of MCL 750.16(1) resulting in death where the offender had intent to kill or seriously impair two or more persons.⁷

•MCL 750.18(7)—conviction of MCL 750.18(1) or MCL 750.18(2) resulting in death where the offender had intent to kill or seriously impair two or more persons.⁸

2.Miller⁹ and its Progeny

A mandatory sentence of LWOP may not, consistently with the Eighth Amendment, be imposed upon an individual who was under the age of 18 at the time of the sentencing offense. See Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465 (2012) (homicide offender under the age of 18 may not be sentenced to LWOP unless a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 75 (2010) (sentence of LWOP may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for a nonhomicide offense). Further, the Court agreed that “no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and 18,” and “to treat those two classes of defendants differently in [Michigan’s] sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point of being cruel under [Michigan’s] Constitution.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 266 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Parks Court considered an 18-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder, and did not discuss the mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for 18-year-old defendants convicted of other offenses. Id. at 268 (concluding that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution, . . . and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16”). Accordingly, it is unclear to what extent Parks applies to the controlled substance offenses punishable by mandatory LWOP.

To comply with Miller, the Legislature enacted MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a,¹⁰ which establish sentencing and resentencing procedures applicable to certain offenders under the age of 18 who are convicted of certain offenses carrying mandatory life-without-parole sentences, including a violation of MCL 333.17764(7). If the prosecuting attorney files a motion to sentence a defendant to LWOP, the court is required to conduct a hearing where it considers the Miller factors¹¹ and any other relevant criteria and specifies on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it considered and its reasons for the sentence imposed. MCL 769.25(6)-(7); MCL 769.25a(4)(b). At a sentencing hearing held under MCL 769.25, the prosecutor bears the burden “to rebut a presumption that the particular juvenile defendant is not deserving of LWOP,” and “[i]f the prosecutor cannot should this burden by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must sentence the defendant to a term of years.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 138-139 (2022). Further, even if the defendant is sentenced to a term of years, the court “must consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a,” but “the court’s consideration of youth need not be articulated on the record.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 196 (2022).

“[T]he decision to sentence a juvenile to life without parole is to be made by a judge and . . . this decision is to be reviewed under the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard” because “[t]he trial court remains in the best position to determine whether each particular defendant is deserving of life without parole.” People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 137, (2018) (holding that “MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth Amendment because neither the statute nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead, life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). “[A]ll Miller requires sentencing courts to do is to consider how children are different before imposing life without parole on a juvenile.” Skinner II, 502 Mich at 130 (explaining that trial courts are not required to “explicitly find that a defendant is ‘rare’ or ‘uncommon’ before it can impose life without parole”).

For additional discussion of sentencing juvenile and 18-year-old offenders to life without parole, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Juvenile Justice Benchbook, Chapter 19. For a table summarizing the application of MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a to juvenile offenders, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Quick Reference Guide.