7.7​Sentencing Juveniles for Second-Degree Murder

“[A] parolable life sentence for a defendant who commits second-degree murder while a juvenile violates Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution,” which forbids cruel or unusual punishment, including “unusually excessive imprisonment.” People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 313, 322 (2022). Accordingly, while the statutory penalty for second-degree murder is imprisonment for life or any term of years, MCL 750.317, Stovall limits the sentencing court’s discretion in cases involving juvenile offenders.

A juvenile defendant’s “50-to-75-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder [does not] pass muster under the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment . . . .” People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). Additionally, “[u]nder the principle of proportionality, [a defendant is] entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly account[s] for the individualized circumstances of the offender and the offense.” Id. at ___. “[A]s [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012)] and its progeny have now made clear, such circumstances include mitigating considerations related to [defendant’s] youth. Eads, ___ Mich App at ___.²⁰ In this case, defendant “was found guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) for crimes he committed as a juvenile.” Id. at ___ (citations omitted). “The trial court sentenced [defendant] as an adult and, departing upward from the guidelines, imposed consecutive terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder and two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm.” Id. at ___. After Miller and the enactment of MCL 769.25a, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile was entitled “to resentencing such that he or she, by default, could not receive a term-of-years sentence with a minimum higher than 40 years or a maximum higher than 60 years.” Eads, ___ Mich App at ___. Defendant’s sentence was “a minimum sentence 10 years higher and a maximum sentence 15 years higher than [the] statutory upper limits—for committing a lesser offense as a juvenile.” Id. at ___. “[I]ronically, [defendant] fared worse than he would have if the jury had convicted him of [first-degree murder].” Id. at ___. Further, “despite [defendant’s] juvenile status and all that has now been recognized to come with it, [he] received a sentence for second-degree murder that would require him to outlive his life expectancy before even becoming eligible for parole and would deny him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at ___. The trial court “openly acknowledged that [defendant’s] background and the circumstances of the murder demonstrated that [he] was immature and impulsive, lacked discipline and self-restraint, and had been negatively influenced by gang members from a young age.” Id. at ___. “Such observations reflect the very characteristics of youth that a sentencing court must consider as potentially mitigating the sentencing offense.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court “dismissed the very notion that such characteristics might have a mitigating effect and instead considered them as aggravating factors in support of a significant departure sentence—an approach plainly contrary to Miller and its progeny.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, defendant’s term-of-years sentence “violate[d] the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and it [was] also disproportionate given the sentencing court’s failure to consider [defendant’s] youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors.” Id. at ___.

People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30, 33-34 (1992), “set forth criteria to apply in a challenge to a statutory sentence: (1) the severity of the sentence imposed compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed on other offenders in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation.” People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “There is no requirement that a trial court reduce its sentence out of consideration for a defendant’s youth.” Id. at ___. “Instead, recent caselaw requires only that the attributes of youth be taken into consideration.” Id. at ___. “There is no authority that imposes a higher standard of articulation regarding youth beyond [the] general requirement that a trial court must adequately explain its sentence on the record in order to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). In Nard, “defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of two young boys (and rape of one) who were fishing at a local pond.” Id. at ___. “For these crimes the trial court, in exercising the statutory discretion granted to it, sentenced defendant to two terms of life with the possibility of parole.” Id. at ___. “But then, in People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 322 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of second-degree murder to serve terms of life, even with the possibility of parole, constituted cruel or unusual punishment.” Nard, ___ Mich App at ___ (citation omitted). “As a result, . . . the trial court resentenced defendant to serve concurrent prison terms of 60 to 150 years for each conviction.” Id. at ___. Defendant appealed the sentences, “present[ing] an as-applied challenge to his individualized [term-of-years] sentence, which requires [the Court] to consider the particular facts surrounding defendant’s conviction and sentence.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, defendant argued that “the trial court erred by not adequately considering the mitigating factors of youth.” Id. at ___. As to the harshness of punishment, the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant’s intentional, brutal, and torturous killing of innocent and essentially helpless children outweighed the severity of this term-of-years sentence.” Id. at ___. As to comparative punishments, “[d]efendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to sentences that the Legislature has authorized for other serious crimes.” Id. at ___. The Court noted that “Michigan’s sentence for second-degree murder does not appear out of step with the majority of other jurisdictions in this country.” Id. at ___. But in this case, the comparative-punishment factor suggests that “defendant’s sentence was unduly harsh when compared to second-degree murder sentences for other juvenile offenders.” Id. at ___. As to rehabilitation, defendant contended that his sentence, effectively life imprisonment, failed to account for his rehabilitative potential, which is a goal of granting parole. Id. at ___. The defendant’s argument was not persuasive as he had already been paroled. Id. at ___. “In sum, the trial court adhered to its obligation to balance defendant’s attributes of youth . . . and in doing so it handed down a sentence that was individualized to defendant and the circumstances of his crimes.” Id. at ___.

“[I]n light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and the legal developments that have followed, [defendant’s] term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” People v Echols, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “In Miller, the United States Supreme Court recognized that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing and held that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). In this case, defendant, who was one month past his eighteenth birthday, argued that “his term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder for an offense he committed when he was 18 years old violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. Additionally, defendant argued that his sentence was unconstitutional under the state’s principle of proportionality. Id. at ___.

“Under this sentence, [defendant would] not even become eligible for parole for the first time until well past the life expectancy of individuals incarcerated as adults, let alone as youths, and several decades beyond when he would have first become parole-eligible under the life sentence deemed unconstitutional in [People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022)].” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. “Had [defendant] been convicted of first-degree murder as originally charged, he would now be entitled to a resentencing hearing and would be facing a default term-of-years sentence limited to a minimum of 25 to 40 years and a maximum of 60 years.” Id. at ___. “Instead, defendant, for committing a lesser offense than first-degree murder, is left with a minimum sentence that is 15 years higher—and a maximum sentence that is 90 years higher—than the default 60-year statutory upper limit for first-degree murder, and without any of the significant procedural safeguards that must be satisfied to exceed the statutory limits for first-degree murder.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Such a sentence is out of line with other jurisdictions’ punishments . . . and leaves [defendant] without any more meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation than a juvenile sentenced to parolable life.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, defendant’s “75-to-150-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and [defendant] is entitled to resentencing as a result.” Id. at ___. [T]he Court did not resolve the proportionality challenge, noting that defendant’s “sentence could not meet [Michigan’s] proportionality requirement given that it [was] . . . unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.” Id. at ___; see also id. at ___ (also noting that the trial court must ensure that its resentencing is both constitutional and proportional; among other things, the court must consider “defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of the offense as potentially mitigating—and not aggravating—factors”).

See also People v Campbell, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). In Campbell, “[d]efendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offenses, argue[d] that his sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and AWIM [assault with intent to murder] convictions violate the principle of proportionality.” Id. at ___. “A sentence is reasonable if it adheres to the ‘principle of proportionality,’ which requires the sentence to be ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” Id. at ___, quoting People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 474 (2017). “[A] sentencing court must consider the offender’s youth and treat it as a mitigating factor when imposing a term-of-years sentence on a juvenile defendant.” Campbell, ___ Mich App at ___. Here, “[d]efendant’s minimum sentence of 65 years for second-degree murder exceeds the suggested maximum sentence for an offender who was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “[i]t is clear from the record that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors of defendant’s youth during sentencing” pursuant to the holding in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012). Thus, “[d]efendant was entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly accounted for the individualized circumstances of defendant and the offenses, which included his youth and its attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted).

For a discussion of the constitutionality of mandatory life without parole sentences as applied to juveniles and 18-year-old defendants, see Section 7.5(B).