

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH HAFLER,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

STARNIQUE PRUITT,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED

October 13, 2026

11:31 AM

No. 377753

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 25-101190-DC

Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and RICK and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this child-custody case, defendant (mother) appeals by right the trial court’s September 26, 2025 orders granting plaintiff (father) joint legal and physical custody of their minor child, KH, and denying mother’s motion to change domicile. Mother raises multiple claims of error regarding the trial court’s application of the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 *et seq.* For the reasons stated in this opinion, we disagree with mother’s arguments and therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The parties are the biological parents of KH, born in 2021. The parties were never married and never lived together, but they executed an affidavit of parentage (AOP). Father filed a complaint seeking joint custody and parenting time in January 2025, when mother informed him that she intended to relocate with KH to Arizona. Mother moved KH to Arizona in April 2025 and filed a motion to change domicile in June. A two-day bench trial took place in August and September.

According to the evidence presented, KH spent significant amounts of time in the care of both parents, but mother was the primary caretaker and father paid child support. Father’s relatives testified that father was a good parent and had a loving relationship with KH. When KH was about one year old, mother suspected father of sexually molesting KH. She prohibited father from having overnights with KH but allowed him to have parenting time as long as someone else was present. Mother, a flight attendant, testified that she moved to Phoenix after being offered a more favorable position there and because she would have more family support in that area. Father testified at trial that he did not object to mother’s move to Arizona, but that he wanted to help raise KH and

have as much time with KH as possible. Mother testified that she was open to father having parenting time but did not want KH to ever be alone with father, and she wanted sole physical and legal custody of KH.

Following trial, the trial court found that KH had an established custodial environment with both parents in Michigan. Therefore, the trial court stated, it must determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence that a change to that environment was in KH's best interests. The trial court then addressed each statutory best-interest factor. Among other findings, the trial court found that mother's sexual-abuse allegations against father were not credible, that KH had a stable upbringing in Michigan until April 2025, and that mother's decision to relocate KH to Arizona without approval reflected poor judgment.

Based on its findings, the trial court ordered that both parties would have joint legal and physical custody, and that father would have parenting time. The trial court also denied mother's motion to change domicile, finding that mother had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that relocation was in KH's best interests. The trial court ordered mother to return KH to Michigan by November 1, 2025. The trial court entered two written orders to that effect on September 26, 2025, and this appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court employs three different standards of review when analyzing child-custody cases. *Foskett v Foskett*, 247 Mich App 1, 4; 634 NW2d 363 (2001). "To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge [1] made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or [2] committed a palpable abuse of discretion or [3] a clear legal error on a major issue." MCL 722.28; see also *Pierron v Pierron*, 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). The same standard applies to orders concerning parenting time. *Barretta v Zhitkov*, 348 Mich App 539, 549; 19 NW3d 420 (2023).

We have further explained these three standards of review applicable to custody cases as follows:

Under the great weight of the evidence standard, this Court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless they clearly preponderate in the opposite direction. *Rittershaus v Rittershaus*, 273 Mich App 462, 473; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). In a child custody context, "[a]n abuse of discretion exists when the trial court's decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias." *Berger* [v *Berger*, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008)]. Clear legal error occurs "[w]hen a court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law." *Fletcher v Fletcher*, 447 Mich 871, 881; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). Additionally, we review de novo a trial court's resolution of issues of law, including the interpretation of statutes and court rules. *Hill v LF Transp, Inc*, 277 Mich App 500, 507; 746 NW2d 118 (2008). [*Brausch v Brausch*, 283 Mich App 339, 347; 770 NW2d 77 (2009).]

A trial court's determinations regarding a child's established custodial environment and best interests are findings of fact. *Mogle v Scriver*, 241 Mich App 192, 197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000); *Shade v Wright*, 291 Mich App 17, 22; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). We review a trial court's weighing of the best-interest factors and its ultimate decisions awarding custody and parenting time for an abuse of discretion. *Berger*, 277 Mich App at 705; *Diaz v Davey*, 307 Mich App 366, 389; 861 NW2d 323 (2014). The abuse-of-discretion standard likewise applies to a trial court's decision on a motion to change a child's domicile. *Brown v Loveman*, 260 Mich App 576, 600; 680 NW2d 432 (2004).

Finally, when this Court does detect error under the applicable standard of review, we apply MCR 2.613(A) to determine whether the error is grounds "for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order" of the trial court. See MCR 3.201(C); *Winkler v Winkler*, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 377570); slip op at 5. Under this "harmless-error rule, which generally applies to civil proceedings," we do not grant relief on appeal unless "it is more likely than not that the error affected the case's outcome." *In re Miller*, 347 Mich App 420, 429; 15 NW3d 287 (2023) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. FRAMEWORK FOR CUSTODY AND CHANGE-OF-DOMICILE DECISIONS

Mother first contends that the trial court committed clear legal error by misapplying the legal framework for addressing her motion to change domicile. Specifically, she argues that it was error for the trial court to first address the child's established custodial environment and the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23 before considering statutory factors specific to her request for change of domicile under MCL 722.31(4). We disagree.

The CCA is a comprehensive scheme that governs the resolution of custody disputes in Michigan. In "all actions involving dispute of a minor child's custody, the court shall declare the child's inherent rights and establish the rights and duties as to the child's custody, support, and parenting time in accordance with" the CCA. MCL 722.24(1). "If a child custody dispute is between the parents, . . . the best interests of the child control." MCL 722.25(1). This case requires us to consider the relationship between two provisions of the CCA: MCL 722.27, which governs child-custody disputes generally, and MCL 722.31, which governs disputes regarding a parent's desire to change the child's legal residence, often referred to as a change in domicile. In *Rains v Rains*, 301 Mich App 313, 325; 836 NW2d 709 (2013), this Court explained how a trial court must ordinarily apply MCL 722.31 when faced with a motion to change domicile:

A motion for a change of domicile essentially requires a four-step approach. First, a trial court must determine whether the moving party has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the factors enumerated in MCL 722.31(4) . . . support a motion for a change of domicile.^[1] Second, if the factors support a change

¹ Those factors are:

in domicile, then the trial court must then determine whether an established custodial environment exists. Third, if an established custodial environment exists, the trial court must then determine whether the change of domicile would modify or alter that established custodial environment. Finally, if, and only if, the trial court finds that a change of domicile would modify or alter the child's established custodial environment must the trial court determine whether the change in domicile would be in the child's best interests by considering whether the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 have been established by clear and convincing evidence.

Mother argues that the trial court erred because it was required to evaluate the statutory factors in MCL 722.31(4) *before* proceeding to analyze the child's established custodial environment and the best-interest factors. At first glance, mother's argument appears to be consistent with *Rains*, 301 Mich App at 325-330. We conclude that mother is mistaken, however, because under the circumstances of this case the trial court was not required to consider the statutory factors in MCL 722.31(4) at all.

This Court's decision in *Kessler v Kessler*, 295 Mich App 54, 57-58; 811 NW2d 39 (2011), and the Supreme Court's peremptory order in *Kleinfeldt v Stern*, 516 Mich 883 (2024),² are controlling. They explain that MCL 722.31, by its own terms, applies only to "[a] child whose parental custody is governed by court order" MCL 722.31(1). Here, as in *Kessler* and *Kleinfeldt*, there was no existing court order governing parental custody. Rather, because the parties had executed an AOP, mother had "initial custody . . . until otherwise determined by the

(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the quality of life for both the child and the relocating parent.

(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or her time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether the parent's plan to change the child's legal residence is inspired by that parent's desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule.

(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the legal residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time schedule and other arrangements governing the child's schedule in a manner that can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely to comply with the modification.

(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support obligation. [MCL 722.31(4).]

² "Supreme Court orders that include a decision with an understandable rationale establish binding precedent." *People v Giovannini*, 271 Mich App 409, 414; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).

court.” MCL 722.1006. An AOP “is not an initial custody order.” *Kleinfeldt*, 516 Mich at 883. “Consequently, the factors set forth in MCL 722.31 do not apply.” *Kessler*, 295 Mich App at 58.

Instead, this case is governed by MCL 722.27, the statute that applies to any child-custody dispute “submitted to the circuit court as an original action . . .” MCL 722.27(1). See *Kleinfeldt*, 516 Mich at 884. Under that statute, the court cannot “issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). Accordingly, because this was an original action and the trial court was being asked to issue a new order, the trial court was required to begin by determining KH’s established custodial environment, which it did. See *Kessler*, 295 Mich App at 61. Then, the trial court was required to apply the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23, which, again, it did. Because the trial court found that KH’s established custodial environment was with both parents in Michigan, and mother wanted sole physical and legal custody of KH in Arizona, mother was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that changing the custodial arrangement in this way was in KH’s best interests. See *Kessler*, 295 Mich App at 61; see also *Kuebler v Kuebler*, 346 Mich App 633, 670; 13 NW3d 339 (2023) (“[W]hen there is an established custodial environment with both parents, neither parent’s established custodial environment may be disrupted except on a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that such a disruption is in the children’s best interests.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court found that mother had failed to prove that relocation was in KH’s best interests and therefore denied her request to change KH’s domicile.

With the proper framework established, we conclude that the trial court did not commit clear legal error by failing to evaluate the statutory factors in MCL 722.31(4) before proceeding to the established-custodial-environment and best-interest analyses. See *Kessler*, 295 Mich App at 57. As discussed, because “the change-of-domicile factors specifically apply only to petitions for change of domicile in situations where there is already a custody order governing the parties’ conduct,” *id.* at 58, MCL 722.31 does not apply at all, so the sequencing urged by mother was not required.

Having failed to recognize that MCL 722.31 does not apply, mother’s brief on appeal does not address whether the trial court committed clear legal error by unnecessarily considering the MCL 722.31(4) factors *after* it properly conducted its analysis under MCL 722.27. Because the issue is not raised, we need not consider it. See *Meemic Ins Co v Fortson*, 506 Mich 287, 301 n 7; 954 NW2d 115 (2020). Nevertheless, assuming that it was clear legal error for the trial court to additionally consider the statutory factors under MCL 722.31(4), the error was harmless because it did not affect the result. See MCR 2.613(A); *Winkler*, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. The trial court found that KH’s established custodial environment was with both in parents in Michigan, considered the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23, found that “[t]he child’s best interest is served by joint custody in Michigan,” and determined that mother had “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that relocation was in the child’s best interest.” These findings satisfy the trial court’s duty under MCL 722.27. Therefore, no purpose would be served by remanding the case for the trial court to reconsider mother’s request to change domicile without reference to the factors in MCL 722.31(4). See *Rains*, 301 Mich App at 331 (holding that the trial court’s error in applying the proper legal framework did not require reversal or remand because it was “obvious from the trial court’s detailed findings and conclusions that it would have denied the

motion for a change of domicile because of [the mother's] inability to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the move was in the child's best interests").

B. MOTHER'S FILING OF A MOTION TO CHANGE DOMICILE

Mother next contends that the trial court clearly erred by stating that mother had not filed a motion to change domicile when the record establishes that she had filed such a motion. She argues that the trial court's order denying that motion should be vacated because it "was premised on the mistaken factual finding that no motion had been filed" We disagree.

On August 21, 2025, at the end of the first day of trial, the trial court commented as follows:

Now, I'm going to say this. There is no motion that's been filed in this court for change of domicile, Ma'am, and this Court has jurisdiction over this child. So you never filed a request to move that child from Michigan to Arizona. No? If there is one filed—if there was one filed, drafted, it was not filed with the Wayne County Court.

In fact, the register of actions shows that mother's motion to change domicile had been filed on June 18, 2025. However, it had not been noticed for a hearing. "When a party fails to file a praecipe or notice a motion for hearing, the motion is not placed on the court's calendar for decision and the circuit judge generally has no knowledge of the matter." *Knight v Prime Fin*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 29, 2014 (Docket No. 313879), p 4.³ The register of actions reflects that a request for hearing (praecipe) on the motion was filed or entered on the docket on August 21, 2025, the same day that the trial court made the above-referenced comment. The praecipe indicates that mother's counsel signed a certification on the praecipe on June 20, 2025, and it is unclear why the praecipe did not appear on the docket until August 21. It seems likely, however, that the trial court's comment, which the transcript shows was made shortly after 12:00 p.m. on August 21, prompted some activity that resulted in the filing or entry of the praecipe later that day. The praecipe placed the motion on the calendar for September 23, 2025 at 1:30 p.m., which was the same date and time that had been set for the continuation of the bench trial. That date and time for the continuation of the bench trial was proposed by the court and agreed to by the parties just moments before the trial court stated that mother had not filed a motion for change of domicile. Thus, it appears that the praecipe was not completed and entered on the docket by the court until later in the day on August 21, after the comment in question was made by the trial court.

Even though it appears that the trial court was unaware on the first day of trial that mother had filed a motion to change domicile in June 2025, there is no indication that the trial court's erroneous statement on August 21 affected the trial court's later decision to deny that motion after

³ "Unpublished opinions are not binding authority but may be persuasive or instructive." *Winkler v Winkler*, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 377570); slip op at 12 (citation modified).

it properly came before the court. The trial court, in announcing its rulings on September 26, 2025, stated:

This matter comes on Plaintiff Father's Complaint to establish custody, filed in January of this year. And Defendant Mother's Motion to Change Domicile, which was filed in June of this year.

Thus, the trial court was clearly aware, at the time of its ruling, that mother had filed her motion in June. It made no clearly erroneous statement or finding regarding the filing of the motion at the time it explained its decision to deny it. And although the trial court faulted mother for having unilaterally relocated with KH without the court's approval, it is undisputed that mother moved KH to Arizona in April 2025, *before* she filed the motion to change domicile in June 2025. Therefore, there is no indication that the trial court's initial mistake about whether and when mother eventually filed the motion had any effect on its ruling. Accordingly, mother is not entitled to relief on this issue. See MCR 2.613(A); *Winkler*, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.

C. FATHER'S LACK OF OBJECTION TO THE MOVE

Mother next contends that the trial court's denial of mother's request to change domicile must be reversed because it went against the great weight of evidence that father, according to his own testimony, did not object to the move. We disagree.

Mother frames her argument as a misapplication of the four statutory factors under MCL 722.31(4). As previously discussed, however, because no custody order was in place, MCL 722.31 does not apply. Accordingly, mother is not entitled to relief on these grounds.

The separate extent to which father's testimony is relevant to the trial court's consideration of the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23 is not before us because it was not raised in the proceedings below or on appeal. See *Meemic Ins Co*, 506 Mich at 301 n 7. We note, however, that trial courts deciding child-custody issues under MCL 722.27 have an independent obligation to do so in the best interest of the children irrespective of what their parents may desire or agree to. See *Harvey v Harvey*, 470 Mich 186, 194; 680 NW2d 835 (2004); *Phillips v Jordan*, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000). Although father testified that he did not object to mother's move to Arizona, he also testified that he wanted joint custody, and mother does not appear to dispute that moving to Arizona would change KH's established custodial environment. Consequently, not only was it mother's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that this change was in KH's best interests, see *Kessler*, 295 Mich App at 61; *Kuebler*, 346 Mich App at 670, the trial court's finding that mother failed to satisfy that burden is reversible on appeal only if it went against the great weight of evidence or was otherwise an abuse of discretion or the product of clear legal error. See MCL 722.28. That standard is not met here.

D. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS

Next, mother advances a series of arguments suggesting that the trial erred⁴ by finding that best-interest factors (f) (moral fitness), (j) (willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent), and (l) (any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to the custody dispute) favored father. We disagree.

As discussed, in a child-custody dispute between parents, the best interests of the child control. MCL 722.25(1). To determine the best interests of the child, the trial court must consider the factors enumerated in MCL 722.23. *Foskett*, 247 Mich App at 9.

Mother objects that the trial court improperly gave “only cursory treatment” to father’s criminal history under factor (f). But under factor (f), morally questionable conduct should be considered only as it relates to a person’s fitness as a parent. *Fletcher*, 447 Mich at 887. A trial court must look to the parent-child relationship and the effect the conduct at issue would have on the relationship. *Id.* Here, there was no evidence that father’s criminal history had any bearing on his relationship with KH. Although father had been convicted of murder and served a lengthy sentence before he fathered KH, there was no evidence that he was involved in any criminal activity or misconduct after his release (other than mother’s allegations of abuse, which the trial court found not credible). The trial court also noted that mother was aware of plaintiff’s criminal history when she chose to have a child with plaintiff. Therefore, the trial court’s findings on this issue were not against the great weight of evidence. See MCL 722.28.

Mother also challenges the trial court’s findings that factors (f) and (l) favored father because mother made allegations of sexual abuse that the trial court found were not credible, unsubstantiated, and reflected poor judgment. The trial court explained as follows:

The mother and her sister testified that the child was sexually abused by the Father. The Court finds these allegations not credible. No CPS or police reports were filed. The pediatrician diagnosed the child’s condition as a diaper rash, not abuse. No expert testimony or corroborating evidence was produced at trial. These allegations arose only after disputes escalated between the part[ies]. . . .

So the Court finds . . . no credible evidence of abuse by the Father

This Court defers to the trial court’s determination of credibility, and we see no grounds to disturb the trial court’s findings on this issue. *Berger*, 277 Mich App at 705, 707.

⁴ Mother argues that the trial court “abused its discretion.” Although the weighing of the multiple factors to arrive at the ultimate custody decision is subject to abuse-of-discretion review, a finding that a particular factor favors one party more than the other is reviewed under the great-weight-of-evidence standard. See *Berger*, 277 Mich App at 710-712.

Mother further contests the trial court's findings that factors (f) and (j) favored father because of mother's decision to move KH to Arizona without first seeking the court's permission after plaintiff initiated this action for custody. Doing so was another exercise of poor judgment, the trial court found, and also interfered with father's relationship with KH. Here, too, the trial court's findings that these factors favored plaintiff were not against the great weight of evidence. Although mother argues that she acted in good faith, this Court cannot "substitute its judgment" on the trial court's best-interest findings "unless they *clearly* preponderate in the opposite direction." *Rittershaus*, 273 Mich App at 473 (quotation and citation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Mother has not satisfied that high burden.

E. PARENTING TIME

Next, mother contends that the trial court's order should be vacated in part because it compelled mother to return KH to Michigan while leaving the terms of parenting time unresolved. We disagree.

When the trial court announced its ruling from the bench on September 26, 2025, it inquired into father's work schedule, which he explained was in flux. The trial court responded that it would address the specifics of a parenting-time schedule and exchanges at a hearing on November 3, after the child was returned to Michigan. In the meantime, the trial court outlined that the general contours of father's parenting time would be alternating weekends or midweek with alternating weeks during the summer and alternating holidays. The trial court then entered its written order providing, in part, as follows:

3. **Parenting Time – Interim:** Until November 1, 2025, Plaintiff–Father shall have parenting time with the minor child via Our Family Wizard video calls for at least thirty (30) minutes prior to the child's bedtime on Saturdays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays.

4. **Parenting Time – After Return:** After November 1, 2025, when the child is returned to Michigan, Plaintiff–Father shall exercise parenting time on alternating weekends and midweek visits, consistent with the recommendations of Family Assessment Services. The exact schedule, including parenting time details and child support, shall be specifically defined at the Review Hearing.

A review hearing was scheduled for November 3, 2025.

Again, the CCA provides: "In all actions involving dispute of a minor child's custody, the court shall declare the child's inherent rights and establish the rights and duties as to the child's custody, support, and parenting time in accordance with this act." MCL 722.24(1). The trial court "may . . . [p]rovide for reasonable parenting time . . . by general *or* specific terms and conditions." MCL 722.27(1)(b) (emphasis added). "Parenting time shall be granted in specific terms if requested by either party at any time." MCL 722.27a(8).

Neither party requested more specific terms at or before the September 26, 2025 hearing. Therefore, nothing in the CCA required the trial court to establish an exact parenting-time schedule at that time. Instead, the trial court exercised its discretion under MCL 722.27(1)(b) to set forth

the “general . . . terms and conditions” of father’s parenting time while waiting until KH was returned to Michigan to establish an exact schedule and details. This exercise of discretion was not “so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” *Berger*, 277 Mich App at 705. Therefore, we leave it undisturbed.

F. CHILD SUPPORT

Lastly, mother contends that the trial court committed clear legal error and abused its discretion by failing to apply the Michigan child-support formula and by failing to enter a uniform child-support order. Again, we disagree.

As stated, the order from which mother appeals provides, in relevant part: “The exact schedule, including parenting time details *and child support*, shall be specifically defined at the [November 3, 2025] Review Hearing.” (Emphasis added.) And again, the CCA provides: “In all actions involving dispute of a minor child’s custody, the court shall declare the child’s inherent rights and establish the rights and duties as to the child’s custody, support, and parenting time in accordance with this act.” MCL 722.24(1). Under MCL 552.605, a child-support order must use the child-support formula established by the Friend of the Court Bureau under MCL 552.519(3)(a)(vi) unless the court finds facts supporting deviation from the formula. *Burba v Burba (After Remand)*, 461 Mich 637, 642-645; 610 NW2d 873 (2000). Further, MCR 3.211(D) provides:

(1) Any provisions regarding child support or spousal support must be prepared on the latest version of the Uniform Support Order approved by the state court administrative office. This order must accompany any judgment or order affecting child support or spousal support, and both documents must be signed by the judge. If only child support or spousal support is ordered, then only the Uniform Support Order must be submitted to the court for entry. The Uniform Support Order shall govern if the terms of the judgment or order conflict with the Uniform Support Order.

(2) No judgment or order concerning a minor or a spouse shall be entered unless either:

(a) the final judgment or order incorporates by reference a Uniform Support Order, or

(b) the final judgment or order states that no Uniform Support Order is required because support is reserved or spousal support is not ordered.

Thus, although the trial court was required to decide the issue of child support in this action and do so using a uniform support order, under MCR 3.211(D)(2)(b) the trial court had discretion to enter a judgment or order stating that the issue of support “is reserved” for a future hearing or order. The trial court plainly did so here. Consequently, the trial court did not “incorrectly choose[], interpret[], or appl[y] the law.” *Fletcher*, 447 Mich at 881. And, as with the decision to postpone an exact scheduling order for a later hearing, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to

reserve the issue of child support for a later hearing was not “so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” *Berger*, 277 Mich App at 705. Therefore, the trial court did not commit clear legal error or abuse its discretion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we are unpersuaded by any of mother’s arguments that the trial court “made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue” such that reversal is required. MCL 722.28. Therefore, the trial court’s orders regarding custody and parenting time and denying mother’s motion to change domicile are affirmed.

/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado