Chapter 12: Trials

12.1   Trials in Child Protective Proceedings       12-2

12.2   Time Requirements       12-6

12.3   Who May Be Present at Trial       12-8

12.4   Use of Videoconferencing Technology       12-9

12.5   Rules of Evidence and Standard of Proof       12-9

12.6   Jury Procedures       12-9

12.7   Jury Instructions       12-10

12.8   Verdict       12-11

12.9   Respondent’s Rights Following Trial       12-12

12.10   Court’s Authority to Call Additional Witnesses or Order
Production of Additional Evidence       12-13

12.11   Record of Proceedings at Trial       12-14

12.12   Motions for Rehearings or New Trial       12-14

In this chapter. . .

This chapter outlines the procedures for conducting a trial or adjudicative hearing in a child protective proceeding. It contains discussions on the purpose of a trial, time requirements, the standard of proof, and jury procedures.

This chapter also includes a discussion on the standards and procedures for granting or denying directed verdicts and motions for new trial or rehearing.

In an effort to provide trial courts with a quick practical guide through the process of adjudicatory hearings, the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) developed the Toolkit for Judges and Attorneys:Adjudicatory Hearing (MCR 3.972). This toolkit is accessible at https://www.courts.michigan.gov/administration/offices/child-welfare-services/cws-toolkit/.

12.1​Trials in Child Protective Proceedings

“[C]hild protective proceedings consist of two distinct phases: the adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase.” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025). In the context of a child protective proceeding, a trial is “the fact-finding adjudication of an authorized petition^[1] to determine if the minor comes within the jurisdiction^[2] of the court[, and also] . . . a specific adjudication of a parent’s unfitness to determine whether the parent is subject to the dispositional authority of the court.” MCR 3.903(A)(27). “If jurisdiction is exercised, the dispositional phase determines what action, if any, will be taken on behalf of the child to ensure the child’s safety and well-being,” including the potential termination of parental rights. Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___. In rare circumstances when certain statutory requirements are met, the trial court may “hold a combined adjudicative and dispositional hearing in which parental rights may be terminated at the initial dispositional hearing.” Id. at ___.³ 

It is the trial or adjudication phase of a child protective proceeding that “‘protects the parents’ fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of their children, while also ensuring that the state can protect the health and safety of the children.’” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 28 (2019), quoting In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 422 (2014). “The question at adjudication is whether the trial court can exercise jurisdiction over the child (and the respondents-parents) under MCL 712A.2(b) so that it can enter dispositional orders, including an order terminating parental rights. . . . And ‘[w]hile the adjudicative phase is only the first step in child protective proceedings,^[4] it is of critical importance because the procedures used in adjudicative hearings protect the parents from the risk of erroneous deprivation of their parental rights.’ The adjudication divests the parent of her constitutional right to parent her child and gives the state that authority instead.” Ferranti, 504 Mich at 15-16, quoting Sanders, 495 Mich at 405 (citations omitted).

The court may conduct the trial in an informal manner, but it must read the allegations in the petition at the beginning of a trial (unless waived) and make a record of the proceeding. MCL 712A.17(1); MCR 3.972(B)(2).

Note: Child protective proceedings are civil, not criminal, proceedings. MCL 712A.1(2). See also People v Ali, 328 Mich App 538, 548 (2019) (finding that child protective proceedings are fundamentally different than criminal proceedings).

If the factfinder concludes that the child is not within the jurisdiction of the court, the court must dismiss the petition. MCL 712A.18(1); In re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 202 (1991).

If the factfinder concludes that the child is within the jurisdiction of the court, the court will generally hold a dispositional hearing. MCR 3.973(A). See Chapter 13 for information on dispositional hearings.

“[A] default cannot be entered in child protective proceedings” because “MCR 3.901(A)(1) sets forth the court rules that are applicable to child protective proceedings[, and] the rule pertaining to defaults, MCR 2.603, is not among the rules specifically incorporated into juvenile or child protective proceedings.” In re Collier, 314 Mich App 558, 569 (2016). Furthermore, “a default is not an adjudication^[5] of [the] respondent’s fitness as a parent, and [the Michigan Court of Appeals] ha[s] not encountered any authority that a default can serve as a substitute for adjudication.” Id. at 570.

Although “courts may assume jurisdiction over a child on the basis of the adjudication of one parent[,]” procedural “due process requires that every parent receive an adjudication hearing before the state can interfere with his or her parental rights.” Sanders, 495 Mich at 407, 412-413 n 8, 415, 422-23 (finding unconstitutional the one-parent doctrine, which permitted the court to “enter dispositional orders affecting parental rights of both parents” once “jurisdiction [was] established by adjudication of only one parent”).⁶ See also In re Dixon (On Reconsideration), 347 Mich App 337, 359, 360 (2023). In Dixon, the Court acknowledged the outcome in Sanders and discussed how “the court and the DHHS bypassed [the incarcerated] father’s right to direct the placement of his child by delaying his legal ability to assert that right.” Dixon, 347 Mich App at 352. According to the Court, “[t]here [was] no legitimate excuse for the DHHS’s failure to timely declare father a respondent,” and the delays caused by the DHHS’s failure to timely make the child’s father a respondent “impinged on father’s constitutional right[]” to direct the care, custody, and control of his son before he himself was adjudicated.⁷ Id. at 353.

The trial court erroneously assumed jurisdiction over respondent’s three sons after trial based on its determination that respondent neglected her three daughters, two of whom lived with respondent and one of whom lived with the girls’ father, because respondent failed to discover the unacceptable living conditions at the girls’ father’s home and the abuse of another child residing in the girls’ father’s household. In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). The girls’ father resided with his partner, his partner’s children, and one of respondent’s daughters. Id. at ___. The other two girls occasionally visited their father’s home, and the respondent’s sons never visited the girls’ father’s home. Id. at ___. One of the partner’s children was treated so badly that he died from his injuries. Id. at ___. The girls’ father and his partner were arrested on torture and murder charges. Id. at___. The trial court assumed jurisdiction over all six of respondent’s children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), and found statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) due to her “‘willful ignorance’” of the conditions in the girls’ father’s home. Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App at ___. The trial court later determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of all the children because respondent’s “lack of a permanent home rendered her unable to provide the children with permanency, stability, and finality.” Id. at ___. On appeal, the Boshell/Shelton Court held that the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction over respondent’s three sons based on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect because “the record [did] not support the trial court’s determination that respondent neglected any of her children.” Id. at ___. Rather, the record showed that respondent reported the girls’ father to CPS at least twice in the four years after they separated, but it did not show whether or to what extent CPS investigated the reports. Id. at ___. Further, “[t]he trial court plainly erred by finding that [respondent’s] boys were subjected to aggravating circumstances [under MCL 722.638] because . . . the abusers . . . were not a parent, guardian, or custodian of the boys, and nothing in the record suggests that they ever resided with the boys.” Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App at ___. Thus, the DHHS was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the boys with respondent. Id. at ___ (reversed and remanded).

“[N]either the admissions made by [the adjudicated parent] nor [the unadjudicated parent’s] failure to object to those admissions constituted an adjudication of [the unadjudicated parent’s] fitness[.]” In re SJ Temples, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 12, 2015 (Docket No. 323246)⁸ (finding that the trial court violated the unadjudicated parent’s “due process rights by subjecting him to dispositional orders without first adjudicating him as unfit[]”).

“Plowing forward with an adjudication hearing in the absence of both [the] respondent and an attorney who can represent [the] respondent offends due process.” In re Collier, 314 Mich App at 569-571 (finding the respondent-father “was effectively denied the adjudication to which he was entitled” where, on the day scheduled for the respondent’s adjudication bench trial, the hearing referee excused the respondent’s counsel from the case, entered a default against the respondent for failure to appear, and continued to conduct the hearing and receive the testimony of the petitioner’s witnesses; “the hearing referee denied [the] respondent his right to due process by entering a default against him for his failure to appear at the adjudication hearing and by infringing [on] his fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care and custody of his minor child”).

A.​Judge or Referee as Factfinder

Unless a party has demanded a trial by judge or jury, a referee may conduct the trial. MCR 3.913(B). However, parties have the right to a judge at a hearing on the formal calendar, which includes a trial.⁹ MCR 3.912(B). A judge must conduct a jury trial. MCR 3.912(A).

In a bench trial, a party may demand that a judge preside rather than a referee by filing a written demand with the court. MCR 3.912(B). The demand must be filed within “(1) 14 days after the court gives notice of the right to a judge, or (2) 14 days after an appearance by an attorney or lawyer-guardian ad litem, whichever is later, but no later than 21 days before trial. The court may excuse a late filing in the interest of justice.” Id.¹⁰

B.​Lawyer-Guardian ad Litem Recommendation

“At the conclusion of the proofs, the lawyer-guardian ad litem for the child may make a recommendation to the finder of fact regarding whether one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.” MCR 3.972(D).

C.​Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Factfinder

Subchapter 3.900 of the Michigan Court Rules does not have a specific court rule addressing required findings of fact and conclusions of law by a judge or referee in a nonjury trial.¹¹ However, MCR 3.977(I), which sets out the requirements for findings and conclusions following hearings on the termination of parental rights, may be helpful:

“   (1)    General. The court shall state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient. . . .

   (2)    Denial of Termination. If the court finds that the parental rights of respondent should not be terminated, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(3)    Order of Termination. An order terminating parental rights under the Juvenile Code may not be entered unless the court makes findings of fact, states its conclusions of law, and includes the statutory basis for the order.” MCR 3.977(I).

After trial, a referee must “make a written signed report to the judge containing a summary of the testimony taken and a recommendation for the court’s findings . . . .”¹² MCL 712A.10(1)(c).

12.2​Time Requirements

If a child is not in placement, a court must hold a trial within six months of the authorization of the petition unless it adjourns the trial for good cause under MCR 3.923(G). MCR 3.972(A).

If a child is in placement, the court must hold a trial “as soon as possible, but not later than 63 days after the child is removed from the home unless the trial is postponed:

(1) on stipulation of the parties for good cause;

(2) because process cannot be completed; or

(3) because the court finds that the testimony of a presently unavailable witness is needed.” MCR 3.972(A).

If a trial is postponed because the process cannot be completed or because the testimony of an unavailable witness is necessary, the court must “release the child to the [child’s] parent, guardian, or legal custodian unless the court finds that releasing the child to the custody of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian will likely result in physical harm or serious emotional damage to the child.” MCR 3.972(A).

In child protective proceedings, adjourning a trial or hearing should only be granted for good cause after the court takes the child’s best interests into consideration. MCR 3.923(G). The adjournment must be “for as short a period of time as possible.”¹³ Id. In order for a court to find good cause, “‘a legally sufficient or substantial reason’ must first be shown.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 10-12 (2008) (although the court erred by failing to find good cause or consider the child’s best interests to support its multiple adjournments, reversal was not required when the respondent-mother contributed to the adjournments on several occasions and failed to show how she was prejudiced by them).

The court’s refusal to adjourn a child protective proceeding pending the outcome of a related criminal proceeding that arose out of the same factual circumstances did not violate the appellant-parents’ Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. In re Stricklin, 148 Mich App 659, 664-665 (1986) (finding that an “accept[ance of the] appellant[-parents’] premise that the increased risk of loss of parental rights was the penalty imposed upon them for their refusal to testify [at the child protective proceeding], it must be concluded that the testimony sought through such compulsion would have been nonincriminating[, and t]he compulsion of nonincriminating testimony is not the sort of compulsion contemplated by the Fifth Amendment.”).¹⁴

“If the child has been removed from the home, a review hearing must be held within 182 days of the date of the child’s removal from the home, even if the trial has not been completed before the expiration of that 182-day period.” MCR 3.972(A).

MCR 3.973(B), which governs notice of dispositional hearings, contemplates a combined adjudicative and dispositional hearing: “[u]nless the dispositional hearing is held immediately after the trial, notice of hearing may be given by scheduling it on the record in the presence of the parties or in accordance with MCR 3.920.” MCR 3.973(C) assigns to the court’s discretion the interval between the trial and the dispositional hearing (not to exceed 28 days except for good cause, when a child is in placement). Accordingly, the two hearings may be combined if necessary preparations are made before the hearing, including preparation of a case service plan.¹⁵ MCL 712A.18f(2). See also MCR 3.973(E)(2).

12.3​Who May Be Present at Trial

Before proceeding with the trial, the court must determine that the proper parties are present. MCR 3.972(B)(1). “The respondent has the right to be present, but the court may proceed in the absence of the respondent provided notice has been served on the respondent.” Id. “[The] respondent should not [be] defaulted for failing to appear.” In re Collier, 314 Mich App 558, 569-570 (2016) (finding “no authority for the proposition that a respondent in a child protective proceedings can be defaulted[ for failing to appear for trial, and determining in this case that] . . . the hearing referee [who oversaw the respondent’s adjudication hearing] denied [the] respondent his right to due process by entering a default against him for his failure to appear at the adjudication hearing . . .”).¹⁶

In its discretion, a court may excuse a child “as [it] determines the child’s interests require[,]” but may not restrict the child from attending trial. MCL 712A.12; MCR 3.972(B)(1).

A member of a local Foster Care Review Board must be admitted to a trial. MCL 712A.17(6).

12.4​Use of Videoconferencing Technology

The use of videoconferencing technology during trial is governed by MCR 3.904(B). See Section 1.7.

12.5​Rules of Evidence and Standard of Proof

“Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the rules of evidence for a civil proceeding and the standard of proof by a preponderance of evidence apply at the trial, notwithstanding that the petition contains a request to terminate parental rights.”¹⁷ MCR 3.972(C)(1). See also In re Dearmon/Harverson-Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 696 (2014) (citing MCR 3.972(C)(1) and stating that “the rules of evidence apply to adjudication hearings”); In re Collier, 314 Mich App 558, 573 (2016) (“[u]nlike at the dispositional phase of protective proceedings, the rules of evidence apply to adjudication trials[,]” and the petitioner is not “allowed to present inadmissible hearsay evidence”), citing MCR 3.972(C) and In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 405 (2014).

The standard of proof required to terminate parental rights at an initial disposition or on a supplemental petition is clear and convincing evidence, or, if an Indian child is the subject of the proceedings, beyond a reasonable doubt. MCR 3.977(E)(3); MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b); MCR 3.977(G)(2); 25 CFR 23.121(b). Statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3) must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re D M A N, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). That termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at ___. ¹⁸

12.6​Jury Procedures

A brief discussion of jury procedures is contained in this section. For a detailed discussion, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Civil Proceedings Benchbook, Chapter 7.

In child protective proceedings, parties have the right to demand a jury trial. MCL 712A.17(2); MCR 3.911(A). Juries in child protective proceedings consist of six jurors. MCL 712A.17(2). Alternate jurors may be impaneled and may deliberate under MCR 2.511(B) and MCR 2.514(A)(3).¹⁹ 

Prospective jurors must be summoned and impaneled in accordance with MCR 2.510.

Although MCR 2.508–MCR 2.516 govern most jury procedures in child protective proceedings, these types of cases have their own specific set of rules regarding peremptory challenges, multiple parties, and verdicts:

“(2) In a child protective proceeding,

   (a)    each party is entitled to 5 peremptory challenges, with the child considered a separate party, and

      (b)    a verdict in a case tried by 6 jurors will be received when 5 jurors agree.”

(3) Two or more parties on the same side, other than a child in a child protective proceeding, are considered a single party for the purpose of peremptory challenges.

(a) When two or more parties are aligned on the same side and have adverse interests, the court shall allow each such party represented by a different attorney 3 peremptory challenges.

(b) When multiple parties are allowed more than 5 peremptory challenges under this subrule, the court may allow the opposite side a total number of peremptory challenges not to exceed the number allowed to the multiple parties.” MCR 3.911(C).

12.7​Jury Instructions

A brief discussion of jury instructions is contained in this section. For a detailed discussion, see the Michigan Judicial Institute’s Civil Proceedings Benchbook, Chapter 6.

MCR 2.512(D) governs the creation, modification, and use of Model Civil Jury Instructions and Model Criminal Jury Instructions. MCR 2.512(D)(2) provides:

“Pertinent portions of the instructions approved by the Committee on Model Civil Jury Instructions^[20] or its predecessor committee must be given in each action in which jury instructions are given if

(a) they are applicable,

(b) they accurately state the applicable law, and

(c) they are requested by a party.” MCR 2.512(D)(2).

A court may also “give additional instructions on applicable law not covered by the model instructions[, but the] [a]dditional instructions . . . must be patterned as nearly as practicable after the style of the model instructions, and must be concise, understandable, conversational, unslanted, and nonargumentative.” MCR 2.512(D)(4).

In addition to providing a written copy, the court must orally provide the jury with pretrial instructions and final instructions. See MCR 2.513(A); MCR 2.513(N)(1); MCR 2.513(N)(3).

12.8​Verdict

“In a child protective proceeding, the verdict must be whether one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.” MCR 3.972(E).

A.​Motions for Directed Verdict

A motion for directed verdict is permitted only at an adjudication trial before a jury; a motion for directed verdict is prohibited at an adjudication trial before the bench. In re Miller, 347 Mich App 420, 427 (2023) (holding that the trial court erred by granting the respondent’s motion for directed verdict after petitioner presented its evidence at a bench trial because the court rule applicable to motions for directed verdict, MCR 2.516, is expressly made applicable to child protective proceedings by MCR 3.911(C), which governs procedure for jury trials in juvenile cases; trial court’s decision affirmed because it reached the right result albeit for the wrong reason). 

When a motion for directed verdict is permissible, “[a] party may [make the motion] at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. The motion must state specific grounds in support of the motion. If the motion is not granted, the moving party may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so, as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict that is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury, even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts.” MCR 2.516. See MCR 3.911(C), which indicates that MCR 2.516 applies to child protective proceedings.

The judge may grant a motion for directed verdict only “when the evidence does not establish a prima facie case and reasonable persons would agree that there is an essential failure of proof.” Auto Club Ins Assoc v Gen Motors Corp, 217 Mich App 594, 601 (1996). The evidence and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn from it must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401, 407 (1975).

B.​Verdict in Jury Trial

A verdict in a child protective proceeding is reached when five of the six jurors agree.²¹ MCR 3.911(C)(2)(b). A party may require the jury to be polled. MCR 2.514(B)(2). If the number of jurors agreeing is less than required, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation. MCR 2.514(B)(3). If the required number of jurors agrees to a verdict, it is deemed complete, and the court must discharge the jury. Id.

The court may also discharge and order a new jury:

“(1) because of an accident or calamity requiring it;

(2) by consent of all the parties;

(3) whenever an adjournment or mistrial is declared;

(4) whenever the jurors have deliberated and it appears that they cannot agree.

The court may order another jury to be drawn, and the same proceedings may be had before the new jury as might have been had before the jury that was discharged.” MCR 2.514(C).

12.9​Respondent’s Rights Following Trial

“If the trial results in a verdict that one or more statutory grounds for jurisdiction has been proven, the court shall advise the respondent orally or in writing that:

(1) appellate review is available to challenge any errors in the adjudicatory process, which may be challenged in an appeal from the court’s initial order of disposition,

(2) an indigent respondent is entitled to appointment of an attorney to represent the respondent on any appeal as of right and to preparation of transcripts, and

(3) the respondent may be barred from challenging the assumption of jurisdiction if they do not timely file an appeal under MCR 7.204 or a delayed appeal under MCR 3.993(C).”²² MCR 3.972(F).

“The respondent may challenge the assumption of jurisdiction in an appeal from the order terminating respondent’s parental rights if the court fails to properly advise the respondent of their right to appeal pursuant to [MCR 3.972](F)(1)-(3).” MCR 3.972(G).

12.10​Court’s Authority to Call Additional Witnesses or Order Production of Additional Evidence

“If at any time the court believes that the evidence has not been fully developed, it may:

(1) examine a witness,

(2) call a witness, or

(3) adjourn the matter before the court, and

(a) cause service of process on additional witnesses, or

(b) order production of other evidence.” MCR 3.923(A).

See In re Vandalen, 293 Mich App 120, 137 (2011) (in a child protective proceeding, the court had authority to obtain, on its own accord, a previously entered custody order “in an attempt to resolve a conflict in the testimony, which bore on respondent-mother’s ability to adequately protect the children from harm or abuse, an issue pertinent to the termination decision[]”);²³In re Alton, 203 Mich App 405, 407-408 (1994) (in a delinquency proceeding, the court properly allowed additional testimony that directly addressed key conflicts between the testimony of the complainant and the juvenile).

12.11​Record of Proceedings at Trial

“A record of all hearings must be made. All proceedings on the formal calendar^[24] must be recorded by stenographic recording or by mechanical or electronic recording as provided by statute or MCR 8.108.” MCR 3.925(B). See also MCL 712A.17(1), which requires the court to record the proceedings via stenographic notes or another method of transcription.

12.12​Motions for Rehearings or New Trial

A.​Generally

In a child protective proceeding, “except for a case in which parental rights are terminated, a party may seek a rehearing or new trial by filing a written motion^[25] stating the basis for the relief sought[.]” MCR 3.992(A). “In a case that involves termination of parental rights, [a party may file] a motion for new trial, rehearing, reconsideration, or other postjudgment relief[.]” Id.

A petition for rehearing may be filed by “an interested person[,]” which includes a member of a local foster care review board with whom the child’s case has been assigned. MCL 712A.21.

“Except as otherwise stated in [MCR 3.992(B)], a motion will not be considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented to the court, or presented, but not previously considered by the court, which, if true, would cause the court to reconsider the case.” MCR 3.992(B). “A motion that seeks relief from an order entered pursuant to MCR 3.991(A)(3) must be considered regardless of whether the matter(s) it presents were previously presented to or considered by the court.” MCR 3.992(B).

B.​Procedural Requirements

1.​Timing

The written motion stating the basis for the relief sought must be filed “within 21 days after the date of the order resulting from the hearing or trial.” MCR 3.992(A). If the case involves “termination of parental rights, a motion for new trial, rehearing, reconsideration, or other postjudgment relief shall be filed within 14 days after the date of the order terminating parental rights.” Id. But see MCL 712A.21, which requires a petition for rehearing to be filed within 20 days of entry of the order terminating parental rights where parental rights have been terminated and custody of a child has been removed from the parents, guardian, or other person.

However, “[t]he court may entertain an untimely motion for good cause shown.” MCR 3.992(A).

Any response by parties to a motion for rehearing or new trial “must be in writing and filed with the court and served on the opposing parties within 7 days after notice of the motion.” MCR 3.992(D).

2.​Notice

“All parties must be given notice of the motion in accordance with [MCR] 3.920.”²⁶ MCR 3.992(C).

3.​No Hearing Required

The court does not need to hold a hearing before ruling on a motion for rehearing or new trial. MCR 3.992(F). “Any hearing conducted shall be in accordance with the rules for dispositional hearings and, at the discretion of the court, may be assigned to the person who conducted the hearing.”²⁷ Id.

4.​Stay of Proceedings and Grant of Bail

The court may stay any order pending a ruling on a motion for rehearing or new trial. MCR 3.992(G).

5.​Findings by Court

The court must state the reasons for its decision on the record or in writing. MCR 3.992(F).

C.​Standards for Granting Relief

MCR 3.992(A) does not state the standard for granting relief following a court’s consideration of a party’s motion for rehearing or new trial. See In re Alton, 203 Mich App 405, 409 (1994). However, MCR 2.613(A), the “harmless error rule” for civil proceedings, applies to child protective proceedings. MCR 3.902(A). See also In re Alton, supra at 410. MCR 2.613(A) states:

“An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.”

In In re Alton, 203 Mich App at 409-410, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the juvenile court for a rehearing on the juvenile’s motion for a new trial, adopting the following guidelines for ruling on such motions:

“In ruling on the motion, the parties and the trial court applied the rules for granting a new trial embodied in MCR 2.611(A)(1). That court rule is not applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See MCR [3].901(B). Therefore, we remand this case for the trial court to reconsider the juvenile’s motion under the proper standard of review: whether, in light of the new evidence presented, it appears to the trial court that a failure to grant the juvenile a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A). In this case, that means the trial court must decide whether it appears that if the court refuses to grant the motion, it will be exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile who is not properly within its jurisdiction. The trial court must state the reasons for its decision on the record or in writing. MCR [3].992(E).”²⁸

D.​Remedies

“The judge may affirm, modify, or vacate the decision previously made in whole or in part, on the basis of the record, the memoranda prepared, or a hearing on the motion, whichever the court in its discretion finds appropriate for the case.” MCR 3.992(E). See also MCL 712A.21(1).

The court may also enter an order for supplemental disposition while the child remains under the court’s jurisdiction. MCL 712A.21(1).