15.20​Prison Sentences

“If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, the juvenile shall receive credit against the sentence for time served before sentencing.” MCL 712A.18(1)(o).

A.​Prosecutor-Designated Cases

Juveniles convicted of specified juvenile violations⁹⁹ and sentenced under MCL 712A.18(1)(o) may be committed to the Department of Corrections. MCL 712A.18h states:

“A juvenile sentenced to imprisonment under [MCL 712A.18(1)(p)] shall not be committed to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections. This section does not apply if the juvenile was convicted of a specified juvenile violation as defined in [MCL 712A.2d].”¹⁰⁰ 

However, an offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of an offense is not subject to the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465, 489 (2012) (homicide offender under the age of 18 may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole unless a judge or jury first has the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82 (2010) (sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may not be imposed upon a defendant under the age of 18 for a nonhomicide offense). A juvenile convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory life-without-parole sentence may be subject to the sentencing requirements set out in MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a. Under circumstances in which MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a applies to an offender, the prosecuting attorney must file a motion if he or she intends to seek imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. MCL 769.25(3); MCL 769.25a(4)(b).

“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and . . . it is the prosecution’s burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 129 (2022). “MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find a particular fact before it can impose an LWOP sentence.” Taylor, 510 Mich at 135. “The trial court . . . must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP.” Id. at 136. “This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission.” Id. (noting that “our decision today does not foreclose a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if it is determined that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence.”).

“[T]he Michigan Constitution requires that 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25 as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence like other older adults.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 244 (2022).¹⁰¹ In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255. (holding that because defendant “was sentenced without consideration of the attributes of youth, his sentence is unconstitutional, and he must be resentenced”). The Michigan Supreme Court held that Parks is retroactive “to cases where the period for direct review had expired when Parks was decided.” People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___ (2025), aff’g ___ Mich App ___ (2024). Previously, Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), “held that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. In Parks, the Michigan Supreme Court “held that federal precedent concerning the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ did not support extending Miller’s protections to 18-year-olds,” but “that our state Constitution’s broader prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 did support such an extension.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Whether Parks would have retrospective or prospective application required an initial determination of “whether the Parks holding was merely procedural, or whether it concerned substantive rights of a fundamental nature.” Id. at ___. “[S]ubstantive rules should normally be given retroactive application.” Id. at ___. Also relevant to determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively or prospectively are the Linkletter-Hampton factors: “‘(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.’” Poole, ___ Mich at ___, quoting People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674 (1971) (utilizing the standard set in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)). However, “[t]he importance of the Linkletter-Hampton factors is greatly circumscribed when substantive rules or rights are implicated in a holding, and retrospective application is favored.” Poole, ___ Mich at ___. Only when the Linkletter-Hampton factors “strongly indicate otherwise” will a substantive rule be limited to prospective application. Id. at ___. Because Parks involved a substantive rule, it should be given retroactive application, and its application to the defendant in Poole required that the defendant be resentenced according to MCL 769.25. Poole, ___ Mich at ___ (confirming retroactivity with Linkletter-Hampton factors and overruling the state retroactivity analysis in People v Carp, 496 Mich 440 (2014)).

When sentencing a juvenile to a term-of-years sentence, “consideration of youth and its attendant circumstances is . . . required by this state’s sentencing jurisprudence.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 188 (2022).¹⁰² “[I]n all sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial courts are to consider the defendant’s youth and must treat it as a mitigating factor.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 189. “Youth matters in sentencing decisions involving juvenile offenders, and the trial court is responsible for tailoring a sentence to an individual defendant and for giving reasons for imposing each sentence in order to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at 192. There is “no requirement for an on-the record articulation of how youth or the Miller factors affected a sentence[.]” Boykin, 510 Mich at 192. In fact, “there is no authority that imposes a higher standard of articulation regarding youth beyond our general requirement that a trial court must adequately explain its sentence on the record in order to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at 194.

A juvenile defendant’s “50-to-75-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder [does not] pass muster under the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment . . . .” People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). Additionally, “[u]nder the principle of proportionality, [a defendant is] entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly account[s] for the individualized circumstances of the offender and the offense.” Id. at ___. “[A]s [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012)] and its progeny have now made clear, such circumstances include mitigating considerations related to [defendant’s] youth. Eads, ___ Mich App at ___. In this case, defendant “was found guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) for crimes he committed as a juvenile.” Id. at ___ (citations omitted). “The trial court sentenced [defendant] as an adult and, departing upward from the guidelines, imposed consecutive terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder and two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm.” Id. at ___. After Miller and the enactment of MCL 769.25a, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile was entitled “to resentencing such that he or she, by default, could not receive a term-of-years sentence with a minimum higher than 40 years or a maximum higher than 60 years.” Eads, ___ Mich App at ___. Defendant’s sentence was “a minimum sentence 10 years higher and a maximum sentence 15 years higher than [the] statutory upper limits—for committing a lesser offense as a juvenile.” Id. at ___. “[I]ronically, [defendant] fared worse than he would have if the jury had convicted him of [first-degree murder].” Id. at ___. Further, “despite [defendant’s] juvenile status and all that has now been recognized to come with it, [he] received a sentence for second-degree murder that would require him to outlive his life expectancy before even becoming eligible for parole and would deny him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at ___. The trial court “openly acknowledged that [defendant’s] background and the circumstances of the murder demonstrated that [he] was immature and impulsive, lacked discipline and self-restraint, and had been negatively influenced by gang members from a young age.” Id. at ___. “Such observations reflect the very characteristics of youth that a sentencing court must consider as potentially mitigating the sentencing offense.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court “dismissed the very notion that such characteristics might have a mitigating effect and instead considered them as aggravating factors in support of a significant departure sentence—an approach plainly contrary to Miller and its progeny.” Id. at ___. Accordingly, defendant’s term-of-years sentence “violate[d] the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and it [was] also disproportionate given the sentencing court’s failure to consider [defendant’s] youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors.” Id. at ___.

People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30, 33-34 (1992), “set forth criteria to apply in a challenge to a statutory sentence: (1) the severity of the sentence imposed compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed on other offenders in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation.” People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “There is no requirement that a trial court reduce its sentence out of consideration for a defendant’s youth.” Id. at ___. “Instead, recent caselaw requires only that the attributes of youth be taken into consideration.” Id. at ___. “There is no authority that imposes a higher standard of articulation regarding youth beyond [the] general requirement that a trial court must adequately explain its sentence on the record in order to facilitate appellate review.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). In Nard, “defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of two young boys (and rape of one) who were fishing at a local pond.” Id. at ___. “For these crimes the trial court, in exercising the statutory discretion granted to it, sentenced defendant to two terms of life with the possibility of parole.” Id. at ___. “But then, in People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 322 (2022), the Michigan Supreme Court held that sentencing juvenile offenders convicted of second-degree murder to serve terms of life, even with the possibility of parole, constituted cruel or unusual punishment.” Nard, ___ Mich App at ___ (citation omitted). “As a result, . . . the trial court resentenced defendant to serve concurrent prison terms of 60 to 150 years for each conviction.” Id. at ___. Defendant appealed the sentences, “present[ing] an as-applied challenge to his individualized [term-of-years] sentence, which requires [the Court] to consider the particular facts surrounding defendant’s conviction and sentence.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, defendant argued that “the trial court erred by not adequately considering the mitigating factors of youth.” Id. at ___. As to the harshness of punishment, the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant’s intentional, brutal, and torturous killing of innocent and essentially helpless children outweighed the severity of this term-of-years sentence.” Id. at ___. As to comparative punishments, “[d]efendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to sentences that the Legislature has authorized for other serious crimes.” Id. at ___. The Court noted that “Michigan’s sentence for second-degree murder does not appear out of step with the majority of other jurisdictions in this country.” Id. at ___. But in this case, the comparative-punishment factor suggests that “defendant’s sentence was unduly harsh when compared to second-degree murder sentences for other juvenile offenders.” Id. at ___. As to rehabilitation, defendant contended that his sentence, effectively life imprisonment, failed to account for his rehabilitative potential, which is a goal of granting parole. Id. at ___. The defendant’s argument was not persuasive as he had already been paroled. Id. at ___. “In sum, the trial court adhered to its obligation to balance defendant’s attributes of youth . . . and in doing so it handed down a sentence that was individualized to defendant and the circumstances of his crimes.” Id. at ___.

“[I]n light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and the legal developments that have followed, [defendant’s] term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” People v Echols, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). “In Miller, the United States Supreme Court recognized that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing and held that mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). In this case, defendant, who was one month past his eighteenth birthday, argued that “his term-of-years sentence of 75 to 150 years for second-degree murder for an offense he committed when he was 18 years old violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. Additionally, defendant argued that his sentence was unconstitutional under the state’s principle of proportionality. Id. at ___.

“Under this sentence, [defendant would] not even become eligible for parole for the first time until well past the life expectancy of individuals incarcerated as adults, let alone as youths, and several decades beyond when he would have first become parole-eligible under the life sentence deemed unconstitutional in [People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022)].” Echols, ___ Mich App at ___. “Had [defendant] been convicted of first-degree murder as originally charged, he would now be entitled to a resentencing hearing and would be facing a default term-of-years sentence limited to a minimum of 25 to 40 years and a maximum of 60 years.” Id. at ___. “Instead, defendant, for committing a lesser offense than first-degree murder, is left with a minimum sentence that is 15 years higher—and a maximum sentence that is 90 years higher—than the default 60-year statutory upper limit for first-degree murder, and without any of the significant procedural safeguards that must be satisfied to exceed the statutory limits for first-degree murder.” Id. at ___ (cleaned up). “Such a sentence is out of line with other jurisdictions’ punishments . . . and leaves [defendant] without any more meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation than a juvenile sentenced to parolable life.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, defendant’s “75-to-150-year term-of-years sentence for second-degree murder violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and [defendant] is entitled to resentencing as a result.” Id. at ___. [T]he Court did not resolve the proportionality challenge, noting that defendant’s “sentence could not meet [Michigan’s] proportionality requirement given that it [was] . . . unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.” Id. at ___; see also id. at ___ (also noting that the trial court must ensure that its resentencing is both constitutional and proportional; among other things, the court must consider “defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of the offense as potentially mitigating—and not aggravating—factors”).

See also People v Campbell, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2025). In Campbell, “[d]efendant, who was 18 years old at the time of the offenses, argue[d] that his sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and AWIM [assault with intent to murder] convictions violate the principle of proportionality.” Id. at ___. “A sentence is reasonable if it adheres to the ‘principle of proportionality,’ which requires the sentence to be ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” Id. at ___, quoting People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 474 (2017). “[A] sentencing court must consider the offender’s youth and treat it as a mitigating factor when imposing a term-of-years sentence on a juvenile defendant.” Campbell, ___ Mich App at ___. Here, “[d]efendant’s minimum sentence of 65 years for second-degree murder exceeds the suggested maximum sentence for an offender who was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder.” Id. at ___. Additionally, “[i]t is clear from the record that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors of defendant’s youth during sentencing” pursuant to the holding in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012). Thus, “[d]efendant was entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly accounted for the individualized circumstances of defendant and the offenses, which included his youth and its attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors.” Id. at ___ (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[T]he decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole [is properly decided] by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”¹⁰³ People v Skinner (Skinner II), 502 Mich 89, 107-108 (2018) (holding that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments “because neither [MCL 769.25] nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone”), rev’g People v Skinner (Skinner I), 312 Mich App 15 (2015) and aff’g in part and rev’g in part People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368 (2016). See Section 19.1(C) for discussion of juvenile life-without-parole sentences.

B.​Court-Designated Cases

A juvenile who is not convicted of a specified juvenile violation “shall not be committed to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections.” MCL 712A.18h.