1.3​Applicability of Criminal Statutes and Rules of Criminal Procedure in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings

A.​Applicability of Penal Statutes

1.​Criminal Offenses

Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings. MCL 712A.1(2); In re Lee, 282 Mich App 90, 99 (2009). Nevertheless, “substantive criminal law applies” in such proceedings, “because the critical issue is whether the juvenile violated the law.” In re Alton, 203 Mich App 405, 407 (1994), citing MCL 712A.2(a)(1); see also In re McDaniel, 186 Mich App 696, 699-700 (1991) (“‘criminal statutes’ apply to juvenile offenders”).

The Family Division has jurisdiction over proceedings involving a juvenile under age 18 who “has violated any municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States.” MCL 712A.2(a)(1). Under the Michigan Court Rules, a delinquency proceeding is “a proceeding concerning an offense by a juvenile, as defined in MCR 3.903(B)(3).” MCR 3.903(A)(5). MCR 3.903(B)(3), in turn, defines “[o]ffense by a juvenile” as including “an act that violates a criminal statute, a criminal ordinance[, or] a traffic law[.]”

2.​Criminal Penalties

Because the disposition of a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding is governed by the Juvenile Code, the penalty provisions contained in criminal statutes are generally inapplicable. MCR 3.943(E)(1) provides that “[i]f the juvenile has been found to have committed an offense and the court has considered the results of a risk and needs assessment pursuant to MCR 3.907, the court may enter an order of disposition as provided by MCL 712A.18.” The court must “order the juvenile returned to his or her parent if the return of the juvenile to his or her parent would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the juvenile or society.” MCL 712A.18(1). MCL 712A.18(1)(a)-(o), in turn, provides the Family Division with several additional dispositional options following adjudication,⁴⁰ including warning and dismissal, probation, commitment to a public or private institution, and placement in a juvenile boot camp. The Family Division may also “order [a] juvenile to pay a civil fine in the amount of the civil or penal fine provided by the [violated] ordinance or law.” MCL 712A.18(1)(j).

“‘[J]uvenile justice procedures are governed by the applicable statutes and court rules, with an emphasis on rehabilitation rather than retribution.’” Lee, 282 Mich App at 99 (citation omitted). MCR 3.902(B) reflects this goal, providing as follows:

“(B) Philosophy. The [court] rules must be interpreted and applied in keeping with the philosophy expressed in the Juvenile Code. The court shall ensure that each minor coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall:

(1) receive the care, guidance, and control, preferably in the minor’s own home, that is conducive to the minor’s welfare and the best interests of the public; and

(2) when removed from parental control, be placed in care as nearly as possible equivalent to the care that the minor’s parents should have given the minor.”

MCL 712A.1(3) contains substantially similar language. See also In re Whittaker, 239 Mich App 26, 29 n 1 (1999) (noting that placement of a juvenile on probation following his delinquency adjudication for first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a four-year-old victim demonstrated the significant difference between a juvenile disposition and an adult sentence).

B.​Applicability of Statutory Rules of Criminal Procedure

MCR 1.104 provides that “[r]ules of practice set forth in any statute, if not in conflict with any of [the Michigan Court Rules], are effective until superseded by rules adopted by the Supreme Court.”⁴¹ Accordingly, statutory rules of criminal procedure, if not in conflict with the court rules governing juvenile delinquency proceedings, are generally applicable in such proceedings. See McDaniel, 186 Mich App at 698-700 (MCL 767.39, abolishing the common-law distinction between principal and accessory, applied to delinquency proceedings, since the statute did not duplicate or conflict with any other procedural rule applicable to juvenile proceedings).

C.​Applicability of Rules of Evidence

MCR 3.901(A)(3) states, in relevant part:

“The Michigan Rules of Evidence, except with regard to privileges, do not apply to proceedings under [subchapter 3.900 of the Michigan Court Rules], except where a rule in [subchapter 3.900] specifically so provides. . . .”

See also MRE 1101(b)(7) (the Michigan Rules of Evidence, other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply in Family Division proceedings involving juveniles “whenever MCR subchapter 3.900 states that the Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply[]”).

The Michigan Rules of Evidence are applicable at trial in delinquency proceedings. MCR 3.942(C). The applicability of the Michigan Rules of Evidence in other contexts is explained in relevant sections throughout this benchbook.

D.​Applicability of Constitutional Protections

“‘[T]he full panoply of constitutional rights’ does not apply to juvenile proceedings.” Whittaker, 239 Mich App at 28, quoting People v Hana, 443 Mich 202, 225 (1993). However, “a degree of procedural regularity . . . that comports with ‘the basic requirements of due process and fairness’ and ‘full investigation[]’” is required. Id. at 218-219, quoting Kent v United States, 383 US 541, 553 (1966); see also McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 US 528, 543 (1971) (“the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings . . . is fundamental fairness[]”); In re Gault, 387 US 1, 12 (1967).

“While juveniles are entitled to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination, to a privilege against self-incrimination, and to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial.” Whittaker, 239 Mich App at 28, citing McKeiver, 403 US at 533.⁴² Moreover, there is no constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. Hana, 443 Mich at 220. “Rather, and in derogation of the common law, juvenile justice procedures are governed by statutes and court rules that the [Family Division is] required to follow in the absence of constitutional infirmity.” Id.