M Civ JI 107.03 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Causation

When I use the term “because of” I mean that protected activity must be one of the motives or reasons defendant [ discharged / or / threatened / or / discriminated against ] the plaintiff. Protected activity does not have to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons that made a difference in defendant’s decision to [ discharge / or / threaten / or / discriminate against ] the plaintiff.

*(In order to prove causation, plaintiff must show that a decision-maker or a person who influenced the decision knew of plaintiff’s protected activity. Knowledge may be shown by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.)

Note on Use

*This paragraph should be read only if knowledge is an issue in the case. See Kaufman & Payton, PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich App 250; 503 NW2d 728 (1993); Roberson v Occupational Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322; 559 NW2d 86 (1996); Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan) Inc, 239 Mich App 270; 608 NW2d 525 (2000); Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306; 628 NW2d 63 (2001); see also Melchi v Burns Int’l Sec Serv, Inc, 597 F Supp 575 (ED Mich 1984).

Comment

On the meaning of “because of” in the employment discrimination context, see Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001), and other cases cited in the comment to M Civ JI 105.02 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Definition.

History

M Civ JI 107.03 was added April 1, 2002. Amended April 1, 2004.